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Most of the results contained in this thesis have already appeared in
several papers. The results in chapters 2 and section 3.2 are based on
Gradus (1988b and 1989b), published in the book by Gustav Feichtinger,
Optimal Control Theory and Economic Analysis 3 and Journal of Economics.
The results contained in the sections 2.5 and 2.6 can also be found in
Gradus (1988a), published in Methods of Operations Research.
Section 3.5.2 is described in more detail in a joint paper with Aart
de Zeeuw (see Gradus and De Zeeuw (1989c)). Furthermore, other parts of
this chapter have benefited from this joint work. Chapter 4 is an extended
version of the paper Gradus (1989a), published in the proceedings of the
IFAC-conference, The Control and Modelling of National Economies. Finally,
chapter 6 is based on joint work with Theo van de Klundert (see Van de
Klundert and Gradus (1990)).
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CHAPIBR 1. SCOPE AND OUTLINE OF Tf~ BOOK
1.1. Scope of the Book
In the last decade, there has been a substantial development in the appli-
cations of dynamic models, which are used to describe the economic behav-
iour of firms. Originally started by Jorgenson (1963) economists have been
working on the description of the development of the firm over time (see
for a survey Feichtinger and Hartl (1986)). In these studies the impact of
different kinds of taxation and other government measures are investi-
gated. However, in these models the government instruments are given
exogenously. By doing this the Lucas critique (cf. Lucas (19~6)), which
points out that the reactions of sll agents have to be included, when
changes in economic policy are evaluated. This implies that not only will
the policy of the firms change, because of changes in the government's
policy, but also that the policy of the government will change, because of
changes in the firms' policy, is neglected.
The sim of this thesis is to describe the interactions between the
decisions made by the firms and the decisions made by the government with-
in a dynamic deterministic neoclassical framework. This will first be done
within a partial context. Next, we will embed the model in a more general
macroeconomic context, in which also the consumers' side and the markets
are modelled.
The modelling will be done by means of game theoretic methods,
where our interest will especially be focussed on the derivation of feed-
back Stackelberg equilibria based on the leadership of the government. An
equilibrium which has received relatively little attention in the lit-
erature, but which has some nice economic properties. In particular these
equilibria satisfy Bellman principle of optimality, which implies that
they have the property, that - independent of the present state or present
decision - the next decisions are again optimal. We compare these feedback
Stackelberg equilibria with the open-loop Stackelberg equilibria, where
the players announce their strategies at the beginning of the planning
period.
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Our research will enable us to give some policy rules for the
government. From a welfare point of view we try to compare different tax
rates and we study the choice between debt and taxation. Furthermore, we
try to point out the importance of credibility of government policy for
different tax rates. Unfortunately, the comparison cannot be performed in
general terms; we therefore have to rely on numerical examples. This il-
lustrates that economists should do more research in this field in order
to attain more practicable rules.
The background of this thesis lies in three different research
areas:
- Dynamic models of the firm.
- Dynamic macromodels of fiscal policy.
- Differential game theory.
The development in these three areas has been rather separate. In the
next three sections we give a brief survey of the recent developments in
these areas. Furthermore, we point out what we will use from these areas
to get a more elaborate picture of the behaviour of the firms and the
government.
1.2. Heview of Dynamic Models of the Firm
Since new techniques like the maximum principle (e.g. Pontryagin et al.
(1962)) and dynamic programming (e.g. Bellman (195~)) have been developed,
there has been a gain in dynamic theory of the firm. Starting with the
pioneering work of Jorgenson (1963), who first applied control theory to
these problems, many authors have used control theory to describe micro-
economic behaviour of firms in particular fields, such as financing (e.g.
Ludwig (1978) and Lesourne and Leban (19~8)), investment (e.g. Kort
(1989)), marketing (e.g. Sethi (19~~), Tapiero (19~3)) and production
(e.g. Hartl and Sethi (1984)). Of course, this list can easily be ex-
tended. An excellent overview can be found in Feichtinger and Hartl
(1986). A lot of attention has also been paid to models which take into
account the influence of all kinds of taxation on the investment, finan-
cing and production decision of the firm. Ylg-Liedenpohja (1978) regards
the influence of personal tax instruments on the value of the firm as
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conceived by the shareholders. In a paper by Muzondo (19~9) the policy of
the firm in an economy with corporate taxation is studied. To avoid an
immediate adjustment of capital goods stock to changes in corporate taxa-
tion adjustment costs are introduced. Van Loon (1983) incorporates a
financial structure in the model of the firm to avoid such a jump of the
capital stock. Furthermore, he investigates the influence of investment
grants. Van Schijndel (1988) studies the influence of both corporate and
personal taxation on optimal dynamic firm behaviour.
The models mentioned above are all deterministic models.
Bensoussan and Lesourne (1981) were the first to introduce uncertainty
into a dynamic model of the firm. They postulate a stochastic earnings
function and they use the technique of dynamic programming and stochastic
differential equations to analyse the solutions. Because of the complexíty
of these models it is almost impossible to obtain analytical solutions and
general conclusions. Therefore, the route of uncertainty will not be
followed in this thesis. We will extend this framework of dynamic firm
behaviour to a"more than one player" context where especially government
behaviour is modelled. For a first attempt see Verheyen (1985). In chap-
ters 2 and 3 we return to a simple dynamic model for the firm, where the
investment-dividend decision is modelled. The other player will be the
government, who influences firms behaviour by its tax policy. In this way
the corporate tax rate appears endogenously in this model setting.
1.3. Dynamic Macrortadels oP Fiscal Policy
Long before economists started to use dynamic theories of firm behaviour,
dynamics were used in macroeconomic theory. Starting point is the pionee-
ring work by Ramsey (1928), which first studies the optimal allocation of
resources. In these papers the optimal trade off between consumption and
investment in an aggregative closed economy without money is described,
where capital accumulation is determined by maximisation of utility. Later
on, by using calculus of variations and Pontryagin's maximum principle,
the optimal growth theory was developed (e.g. Uzawa (1964), Cass (1965),
Koopmans (196~) and Samuelson (196~)). Hall (19~1) introduces fiscal
elements to these optimal growth models and analyses the incidence of a
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lump sum tax, a consumption tax as well as an interest tax. Judd (1985)
examines the short run impact of current and future changes in fiscal
policy within an optimal growth model.
Abel and Blanchard (1983) extended the optimal growth framework to
a decentralised market economy based on microeconomic behaviour of firms
and consumers. They show, that under certain assumptions the outcome of
the decentralised economy is the same as the outcome of the centralised
economy. Furthermore, in this seminal paper the effects of different tax
rates are investigated. The Abel and Blanchard framework turned out to be
an important contribution. A lot of suthors have used it for extensions
and have tried to investigate the incidence of different tax rates in that
case. Van de Klundert and Peters (1986) integrate modern disequilibrium
theory with the theory of intertemporal choice of economic agents.
Blanchard and Fischer (1990, section 2.4) highlight the role of debt and
taxation in a small open economy. Meijdam (198~) and Van de Klundert and
Peters (1988) bring together the issue of monopolistic competition (cf.
Blanchard and Kiyotaki (198~)) and the phenomenon of rational expecta-
tions. Moreover, in some of these papers multiple shooting methods (cf.
Lipton et al. (1982)) are used to get quantitative results. A more compre-
hensive treatment was used in a book by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987),
where an extended version of the Abel and Blanchard model was studied with
overlapping generations and heterogeneous agents. In this book the authors
analyse all kinds of tax reforms.
Another route was taken by Turnovsky (1982), which formulated a
macroeconomic model with consumers, firms and financial assets. In this
paper he has preliminary focussed on the trade off between the financial
structure and taxation. For the purpose of this thesis, however, we go
back to the market model of Abel and Blanchard. In chapter 4 and 5 we
extend this model by including optimal government's behaviour, so that we
are able to show some policy rules.
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1.4. Review of Differential Game Theory
1.4.1. Introduction
The third area that we review briefly, is that of differentisl geme theo-
ry. A definition can be found in Ba~ar (1986, p. 1): "In differentiel game
theory, a fremework is provided for analyzing the interactions of economic
agents among themselves and the appropriate mathematical tools for arri-
ving at "optimal" decisions under varying behavioural stipulations are
set." Because of the importance of dynamic game theory for our thesis we
illustrate the main concepts in section 1.4.2. For a comprehensive treat-
ment we refer to Ba~ar and Olsder (1982). In section 1.4.3 we give a brief
survey of the relevant literature, where we especially focus on macroeco-
nomic applications.
1.4.2. Differentiel Game Theory: Concepts and Solutions
Most discussions in dynamic games are conducted in terms of different
solutions concepts (Nash, Stackelberg and Pareto), information structures
(open-loop and feedback) and period of commitment. If there is no coopera-
tion between the players the Nash equilibrium is a proper equilibrium.
This equilibrium is constructed in such a way, that if one of the players
announces its Nash strategy, it knows that the other players' best re-
sponse to this strategy is the Nash strategy. Therefore, if all players
play Nash there is no incentive to deviate. If one of the players is in a
dominating position (like a government or a treasury) and may announce its
strategy before the other does, the Stackelberg equilibrium concept is the
concept to be used. If players can cooperate, the Pareto equilibrium
should be chosen. A Pareto equilibrium means, that if a set of strategies
is chosen with a different outcome, at least one of the players is worse
off. One of the problems with this equilibrium is its nonuniqueness. In
this thesis we only derive Pareto equilibria as a kind of benchmark.
One can argue, that for the game between government and private
sector, as described in this thesis, the Stackelberg equilibrium concept
seems appropriate. By doing this we formulate policy making in a described
economic environment as a dynamic game in which the government, taking
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into consideration the reactions of the private agents (firms or consu-
mers) to announced policies, acts as the leader, whereas the agents, beha-
ving noncooperatively and maximising for announced policies, act as fol-
lowers.
The open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium requires, that at the begin-
ning the players commit themselves to a strategy for the whole period. As
will be pointed out in more detail in the following chapters, the open-
loop Stackelberg equilibrium can be time-inconsistent (cf. Kydland and
Prescott (19~7), Calvo (19~8)). This means that the policy announced by
the government at the beginning of the planning horizon may no longer be
optimal at some time-point later in time. Therefore, if that is the case
there will be an incentive for the government to deviate from its an-
nounced policy. The policies ex-ante will be different from the policies
ex-post. Thus, if the agents have no reason to believe that the government
will stick to its initial plan, announcing the open-loop strategies is no
longer credible. To overcome this problem the feedback Stackelberg equi-
librium can be used, which is by definition time-consistent, because it
satisfies Bellman's principle of optimality. This principle implies, that
independent of the present state or present decision, the next decisions
are again optimal.
The main difference between open-loop and feedback Stackelberg
equilibria is, thus, whether there is commitment or not.l) In general the
feedback Stackelberg equilibrium is less efficient than the open-loop
Stackelberg equilibrium. Some economists find this inefficiency rather
unsatisfactory. They have built a framework with repeated games and uncer-
tainty, where the time-inconsistent outcome can be sustained (cf. Barro
and Gordon (i983) and Backus and Driffill (1985)). Recently, Kydland
{1989, pp. 267-269) formulated this problem of inefficiency as follows:
"The introduction of optimizing government may initially have offered the
hope of similar scientific benefits. In practice, however, it seemed to
raise more questions than it answered. From a normative point of view, if
one has a government objective, one can certainly determine the optimal
-------------------------------------------------------
i) Another interesting possibility could be a period of commitment between
zero (FBS) and the whole planning horizon (OLS) (cf. Reinganum and Stokey
(1985)). In this thesis we only focus on the difference between zero and
the whole period of commitment.
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policy within e given model. From a positive standpoint, unless one can
demonstrate that a commitment mechanism exists, the no-commituent time-
consistent equilibrium would appear to be the candidate for a framework
for understanding intertemporal policy making. But this outcome, in some
models, can be almost unbelievably bad for society, and it is hard to
imagine that there would not be attempts to set up institutional arrange-
ments, or pass laws that are difficult to change, in order for superior
policies to be implemented."
In this thesis we compare the time-consistent and time-inconsis-
tent equilibria in order to get a more clear understanding of the impor-
tance of the problem of time-inconsistency in economic policy.
1.4.3. A Review of Stackelberg Equilibria in Differential Games
In this section we give a brief survey of Stackelberg equilibria in the
macroeconomic literature. Most applications in the literature are of the
so-called 'linear-quadratic-type' (LQ-type). The reason for this is that
until now a general solution can only be given for a LQ-game. In this case
the players' objective functions are quadratic loss functions and the
constraints are linear. The Stackelberg solution concept for LQ-games was
first stated in a seminal paper by Simaan and Cruz (1973) and later on
worked out in more detail by Cruz (~975)1) and Ba~ar and Olsder (1982).
In the literature there are many examples in which LQ-games are
used and where the Stackelberg equilibria are derived. Such a framework
seems in particular useful for international economics. Examples are
Miller and Salmon (i984), Brandsma and Hughes Hallett (1984), De Zeeuw
(1984), Oudiz and Sachs (1985), Basar, d'Orey and Turnovsky (1988). The
players are different countries, who have as objective function, a
weighted quadratic sum of some well-known targets of economic policy (e.g.
Theil (1964)). These papers focus on a comparison between open-loop and
feedback Stackelberg equilibria. For the examples given in these papers
the open-loop equilibria are better for the leader than the feedback
equilibria,2) but, as stated before, they require a kind of commitment.
1) Cruz (1975) analysed a many-player dynamic game, where there is a
hierarchical system of announcement.
2) However, see for a counter example Van der Ploeg and De Zeeuw (1989).
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In other fields of economics, where the linear-quadratic framework
is applied, there are games between monetary and fiscal authorities (e.g.
Kydland (19~5, 1976)) and games in resource economics (e.g. Hauptman
(1982), Bagchi (1984), Groot (1990)). Simple forms of the linear-quadratic
framework have also been used for all kinds of extensions like imperfect
information (cf. Backus and Driffill (1985)) or repeated games models (cf.
Barro and Gordon (1983)), where threats can be derived which sustain the
time-inconsistent and Pareto-superior outcomes.
Another class of economic games, which has received much attention
in the literature, is the class of so-called Lancaster games of capital-
ism. These games are used to describe games of economic growth and distri-
bution and there is an explicit role for capital accumulation in these
models. The first study, applying dynamic game theory to the modelling of
growth and distribution, is due to Lancaster (19~3). Later on Pohjola
(1983) derived the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium, while the feedback
equilibrium was obtained in a paper by BaSar, Haurie and Ricci (1985). The
latter were able to derive these feedback equilibria due to the relatively
simple structure of this game. Because of the fact that the objective
functions and the state equation are linear in the state variables (capi-
tal), solving the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations lead to value func-
tions which are linear in the state variable. This result was first stated
in Dockner, Feichtinger and JOrgensen (1985).1)
Although the LQ-framework and the class of Lancaster (state
separable) games seem useful in achieving some insight in economic policy,
economists have been searching for games in economics with richer micro-
foundations. A first approach, in using microfoundations in a nonlinear
game between government and private sector, is described in a paper by
Fischer (1980). To avoid technical difficulties, a simple two-period model
with a linear technology, is constructed. However, there is no explicit
statement of feedback equilibria in it. In this paper Fischer calculated
the so-called consistent solution. In a recent paper by De Zeeuw, Withagen
and Groot (1988) it ís shown, that this consistent solution coincides with
the feedback equilibrium, if the number of consumers approaches infinity.
1) The derivation of the different solution concepts for a game similar to
the Lancaster game is given in appendix 2.
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Some well-known extensions of this Fischerian model are Hillier and
Malcomson (1984) and Rogers (198~).
In this thesis our approach will be to develop games between gov-
ernment and private sector, which are based on microfoundations. With
respect to firms we assume that these are value maximising and with re-
spect to consumera we assume that they optimise utility.
1.5. Outline of the Book
In chapter 2 we present a simple differential game between government and
firms. This model is the first step in describing interactions between
government and firms and will be the basis for the other chapters. The
model concerning the firm is related to the models designed by, for
instance, Van Loon (1983), while with respect to the government, we simply
assume that it chooses its corporate tax rate in such a way that govern-
ment consumption is maximised. In this partial equilibrium framework we
derive the open-loop and feedback Stackelberg equilibria and try to give
an economic interpretation. Furthermore, as a kind of benchmark, the
Pareto equilibria are obtained. Appendix 2 contains the mathematical deri-
vations of the different equilibria.
In chapter 3 we extend the basic model of chapter 2 step by step
to make it more realistic. This chapter can be divided into different
parts. In the first part we make the model for the firm more realistic by
introducing a discount rate, a salvage value, depreciation and a declining
price-sales function. Secondly, we include some other policy instruments
for the government into the framework. In the third part, we discuss the
form of the government's objective function. Nevertheless, even with these
extensions, the appealing difference between feedback and open-loop
Stackelberg equilibria still remains. The derivations of the several equi-
libria are given in appendix 3.
In chapter 4 we extend our framework to a general equilibrium
framework, where also the consumers' behaviour and the working of markets
are modelled. In this chapter we assume that the goods market is in equi-
librium, while there will be a fixed wage rate on the labour market. So,
unemployment corresponds to classical unemployment in the sense of
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Malinvaud (19~~). With respect to the government we assume that it chooses
its corporate tax rate in such a direction that the utility of a repre-
sentative consumer is maximised. Similar to the previous chapters, we deal
with two possible solution concepts: the open-loop and feedback Stackel-
berg equilibria. Furthermore, it turns out, that the outcome of this feed-
back Stackelberg equilibrium equals the open-loop Nash equilibrium of a
game between government and firms, if the number of firms is large. More-
over, by using multiple shooting algorithms we obtain the dynamic paths if
the economy goes from its feedback to its open-loop steady-state. In ap-
pendix 4 the derivation of the different feedback Stackelberg equilibria
is given.
In chapter 5 we incorporate, besides a profit tax, a sales tax, a
wage tax and a consumption tax. We try to give the optimal level of these
taxes from a welfare point of view. Furthermore, contrary to chapter 4 it
is assumed that the supply of labour is endogenous. Therefore, we use a
more general utility framework including leisure and we assume that there
is labour market equilibrium. Although the modifications mentioned above
makes the model more realistic, the calculations become quite complicated.
Therefore, for a comparison we have to rely mainly on numerical examples
based on the steady-state. The derivations and proofs of the results in
this chapter are given in appendix 5.
In chapter 6 we study the issue of optimal debt and taxation.
Until now we have assumed that there is a balanced budget policy. The
implications of relaxing this assumption are given in this chapter. How-
ever, to avoid technical difficulties we go back to the simple two-period
model with a linear technology (cf. Fischer (1980)) to study this issue.
Furthermore, in this chapter, the role of debt policy is also analysed, if
the government treats future generations differently or if public invest-
ment is taken into account. Moreover, the implications of time-inconsis-
tency on the role of debt policy are shown.
Finally, in chapter 7 we summarise the conclusions of this book.
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CHAPTER 2. A DIFFERENTIAL GAl~ BEIiiEEN GOVERNlIENP AND FIRM
2.1. Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to study a model of interactions between gov-
ernment and firms. The model presented in this chapter is the first step
in describing interactions and will be the basis for further chapters. A
new point, compared with the current stream of literature, Van Loon
(1983), Van Schijndel (1988), is that not only does the firm's policy
depend on the government's instruments like tax rates and so on, but also
that the government's policy depends on the firm's instrument. By doing
this we deal with the critique of Lucas.
We focus on the investment-dividend decision of the firms and the
corporate tax rate policy of the government within a deterministic dynamic
framework. The firms have to deal with the following dilemma: the firms
wishing to maximise their shareholders' value, have to decide whether.to
invest their money or to pay out dividend. If they invest, there will be
more capital and future dividend mey increase. Thus, with respect to the
economic system, we assume that there is a free market economy with value
maximising firms (cf. Schouten (1980)). Also, the government has to deal
with an interesting dilemma. Assuming that it wants to maximise tax
receipts, one can argue that the government should choose a high rate. But
if it chooses a high rate, the firms would then have less to invest and
future tax income would decrease. So, in some circumstances, it may be
better for the government to choose a low rate. However, these
circumstances depend on the way the firm invests. Thus, the government's
decision is affected by the investment policy of the firm.
In this chapter we show that a differential game is a fruitful
framework to describe these interactions. In section 2.1 we model the
behaviour of the firms, while in section 2.2 the model for the government
is given. The model for the firm is related to the models designed by, for
instance, Leban and Lesourne (1982) and Van Loon (1983). Following Theil's
approach (1964) we take the government as an entity with a single objec-
tive function. Discussions about differential games are conducted in terms
like cooperative and noncooperative strategies and information structures.
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In this chapter our interest is focussed on open-loop and feedback
Stackelberg and Pareto equilibria. These Pareto equilibria are used as a
kind of benchmark. The mathematical structure of our model is related to
the Lancaster model (cf. Lancaster (1973), Pohjola (1983), Hoel (1978)).
This chapter is organised as follows. In section 2.2 we present
the model. In section 2.3.1 we give the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium
of this model, while in section 2.3.2 the open-loop Stackelberg equilibria
are given. The cooperative equilibria, the Pareto solutions, are described
in section 2.3.3. In appendix 2 the derivation of these equilibria, based
on the application of Pontryagin's maximum principle and the use of delta
functions, can be found. In section 2.4 we compare the outcome for the
three solution concepts and try to give an economic interpretation of the
results. Special attention is paid to the role of credibility of the gov-
ernment. One of our conclusions is that credibility of government policy
may have a great influence on the market value of the firm. In section 2.5
we give a further comparison of open-loop and feedback Stackelberg equi-
libria. In section 2.6 we present an alternative way to derive these equi-
libria. This method is based on economic intuition rather than on mathema-
tical calculations. Finally, our findings are summarised in section 2.7.
2.2. The Model
2.2.1. The Firm
The model is developed within a deterministic setting. We assume
that the firms can be represented as one which behaves as if it maximises
the shareholders' value of the firm. This value consists of the sum of the
dividend stream over the planning period. Assuming a zero discount rate,
this yields the following objective function
T
JF - max f D(t)dt,
0
in which: t - time,
T - planning horizon,
D(t) - dividend,
JF - the value of the objective function for the firm.
(2.1)
i3
Assume that the amount of capital goods can only be raised by investment
and that there is no depreciation:
K(t) - I(t), (2.2)
in which: K(t) - capital good stock,
I(t) - investment.
Suppose that the representative firm operates under a constant returns to
scale production technology of the Cobb-Douglas typel)
Q(t) - KS(t)L1-~(t), 0 C ~B C 1,
in which: Q(t) - output,
L(t) - labour.
(2.3)
Assuming that labour supply is completely elastic and that output price
and wage rate are constant, we get a linear relation between labour and
capital good stock and profit and capital good stock. Maximising of divi-
dend, with respect to labour, leads to the well-known condition, that the
marginal productivity of labour equals the wage rate, which implies that
labour is a linear function of the capital stock.2) Substitution of this
into the profit function gives
where:
0(t) - pQ(t) - wL(t)
- aK(t), (2.4)
0(t) - profit (before tax payment),
p - output price,
w - wage rate,
a - rentability of capital good stock.
-------------------------------------------------------
1) The conclusions of this chapter survive for all constant returns to
scale production functions.
2) Since labour is a static variable in the optimisation problem, it is
correct to first maximise profit, with respect to labour, at every time-
point (see e.g. Feichtinger and Hartl (1986, p. 366)).
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This rentability of capital stock is given by
1-1
a - PP((1-A)W)~ . (2.5)
With respect to the financial structure of the firm we assume that invest-
ment is completely financed by retained earnings (there is no debt). Fur-
thermore, profit after taxation can be used for investment or to pay out
dividend
0(t) - TX(t) - D(t) i I(t), (2 6)
in which: TX(t) - tax payment.
Furthermore, investment and dividend are both assumed to be non-negative
D(t) Z 0, (2 7)
I(t) 2 0. (2.8)
Investment is thus assumed to be irreversible. For a motivation of this
assumption see, for example, Arrow (1968) or more recently Pindyck (1988).
2.2.2. The Government
We also make some simplifying assumptions for the government: all
the tax payments received will immediately be spent on government consump-
tion (which is not productive). We may think that the government will
spend its money on building houses, hospital care, social security and
military forces. The government is not able to spend more than it receives
(i.e. no budgetary deficit). In the case of a balanced budget we have:
TX(t) - G(t), (2 9)
in which: G(t) - government consumption.
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As objective for the government we take:
T
JG - max f U(G(t))dt,
T 0
where: JG - the value of the government's objective function,
T - corporate tax rate.
(2.10)
U(G(t)) is the government's utility function, which is defined in terms of
government consumption. In this section we assume that:
U(G(t)) - G(t), (2.11)
i.e. the government has a linear utility function. Of course, other util-
ity functions are possible, but we have taken the linear one for simplic-
ity. With this utility function, utility maximisation is equivalent to
maximising total tax revenues. Furthermore, we assume that the tax pay-
ments are proportional to gross profits and are restricted by
T10(t) 5 TX(t) 5 i20(t),
where T1 and T2 being constants such that
0( Tl ( T2 C 1.
(2.12)
(2.13)
There could be several reasons for imposing upperbounds. If the tax rates
are high, there are high costs of administration, compliance and a great
resistance of the tax payer to pay (cf. Alt (1983)). We try to formalise
these ideas by assuming upperbounds.
2.2.3. The Total Model
We can easily rewrite the model as follows
- government
T
max f aKidt, 0~ T1 s T 5 T2 C 1, (2.14)
i 0
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where the tax rate can be controlled by the government.
- firm
T
max f(aK(1-T) - I)dt, 0 5 I 5( 1-T)aK,
I 0
(2.15)
where the investment level is the control variable of the firm.
- state equation
K - I (2.16)
In this model there are two control variables, T and I, one state variable
K and two players each controlling one variable. Our model is related to
that of Lancaster (19~3), where a differential game between capitalists
and workers is described. Both players have a common interest in capital
accumulation, which can be controlled by the workers by the wage rate, and
controlle~ by the capitalists by the investment rate. The only difference
is that we work with an investment level instead of an investment rate.
However, as we will see in appendix 2 for the Stackelberg equilibrium this
makes no difference. In (2.14) -(2.16) we have described the objectives,
the dynamics and the strategy space of the game. If we want to solve this
game, we have to make some assumptions about the information structure
(open-loop, feedback, closed-loop) and the solution concept (Stackelberg
and Pareto).
2.3. The Equilibria Por the Different Concepts
In this section we give the solutions for three possible solution concepts
(the open-loop and feedback Stackelberg equilibria and the Pareto equilib-
ria). For the Pareto equilibrium there is no difference between the open-
loop and the feedback case. Because of the linearity of the Hamiltonians
in the control variables, the solution has a bang-bang structure. The
derivation of the different equilibria is given in appendix 2 and is
similar to the Lancaster model (e.g. Lancaster (19~3), Pohjola (1983),
BaSar, Haurie and Ricci (1985)).
2.3.1. The Eeedback Stackelberg Equilibrium
The feedback Stackelberg equilibrium is seen to consist of at
least two phases (see tables 2.1 and 2.2). The government starts to tax at
a low rate and the firm invests at its maximum rate. The reason for this
low rate is that there would be more money available for the firm to in-
vest, resulting in greater future tax earnings. In the beginning the firm
invests at its maximum rate in order to be able to pay out more dividend
in the future. Both players are willing to be modest for a while in order
to accumulate capital stock, which is beneficial for both of them. Before
the end of the planning period there is always a period during which the
government introduces the high rate and the firm pays out dividend. When
the end of the planning period is near, the shareholders become more in-
terested in collecting dividend and the government in collecting tax earn-
ings. However, the time-points, where the government and the firm want to
switch their policies are in general not the same and depend on the para-
meters of the model. In the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium, at the mo-
ment that the firm stops investment, the government will immediately react
by introducing the high rate.
Table 2.1. The feedback StackeZberg equtltbrtum tf 22 Z Z.








Table 2.2. The feedback StackeZberg equftfbrfum ff T2 C 2.
t E[O,t~S) t E[t~S,t~S) t E [t~S,T]
T(t) T1 T2 T2
I(t) a(1-i )K(t) a(1-Z2)K(t) 0l
a(1-T )t
1
a(1-T )(t-tT )2 FBS ANK(t) KOe K(t~S)e K
G(t) a~c1K(t) aT2K(t) aT2KNN
D(t) 0 0 a(1-t2)KNN
In tables 2.1 and 2.2 the switching times are defined by
I 1t~S - T - a(1-T2)'
T I ,~n(2r2) It~S - min t~S } a(1-T2 )' tFBS
a(1-~1)tFBSKN - KOe ,





Notice that there are two possibilities for the feedback Stackel-
berg equilibrium. In the case that T2 2~ the firm stops investment and
pays out dividend at the time point t~S. Due to the fact that the fírm
gets less than half of the total profit at the final stage it is less
interested in investment than the government. However, at the time-point
t~S the government changes its policy too and raises the tax rate,
because the only incentive not to do so was that the firm had more money
to invest. The government wants more investment, but cannot force the firm
1) In this chapter we use an asterisk to denote that the capital stock is
in the final stage.
to continue investing. In the situation that T2 ( 2(see table 2.2) the
firm keeps on investing even after the government has raised the tax rate.
The switch from low to high tax will take place at t~S ~ t~S.
2.3.2. The Open-Loop Stackelberg Equilibria
In table 2.3 and 2.4 we present the open-loop Stackelberg equilib-
rium for the case that ~r2 ) Z. In the case that T2 ~ 2 there is no diffe-
rence between the feedback and the open-loop Stackelberg equilibria. The
fact that the government may announce its strategy first, yields no advan-
tage. However, in the case that T2 2 2 there is an interesting difference
between the two solutions. In the open-loop game the firm will switch from
investment to dividend at the time-point tOLS' It can be shown that this
switch will happen at a later point in time than in the feedback game. The
firm's investment period is longer in the open-loop or commitment case
than in the feedback or recursive case and thus there is more capital
accumulation in the economy if open-loop Stackelberg is played. The reason
for this longer period of investment is that the government will postpone
the high tax rate (tOLS ~ tOLS ~ t~S - t~S), which makes investing more
attractive to the firm.
Table 2.3. The open-Zoop Stackelberg equiltbrium tf T1 ) 2.








Table 2.4. The open-Zoop Stackelberg equtlibrium i,~ T2 ~ 2 and T1 ~ 2.
t E [O,tOLS) t E [tOLS'T)






With tOLS ~d K""N defined as
tOLS - min~T - á , T- a(11,~1)~,
a(1-z )tI
K""" - K e .0
(2.21)
(2.22)
From table 2.4 we see that the government's strategy after tOLS is not
unique. The government can choose, for example, an average tax rate Z or
it can choose to continue for a while with the minimal tax rate T1 and
then switch to the maximal tax rate T2 at
T 1-2T1
tOLS - min T - a(,~2-T1), Tj. (2.23)
For reasons of analytical tractability, we only take into account the
solution where the government switches its policy from the low to the high
tax rate, but there are more solutions. However, the value of the objec-
tive function is the same in all cases. This point is not well-clarified
very well in the literature for these Lancaster-type of models. As we will
see in appendix 2 due to an error in the derivation, this nonuniqueness of
the equilibrium was not found by Pohjola (1983). If T1 ~ 2 there will be
no tax switch at all and the solution will be unique (cf. table 2.3).
1 OLS
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In the feedback case, the government wants more investment, but it
cannot force the firm to do so. In the open-loop case, where a pháse with
zero investment and low tax rate is possible (such a phase could not exist
in the feedback game), the government can influence the investment policy
in such a way that its own objective function will have a higher value.
The government achieves this by announcing a relatively long period of low
tax at the start of the planning period. In this way, investing at the
maximum rate becomes more profitable, so the firm will do this during a
longer period. Announcing a period of low tax only makes sense if the
government has a greater affinity to investment than the firm (i.e.
t2 2 2).
2.3.3. The Pareto Equilibria
Here we present the Pareto equilibria, a well-known concept sup-
posing that the firm and government cooperate. In principle, there are
infinitely many Pareto equilibria, depending on the bargaining power of
player 2(the firm) against player 1(the government) given by u(e.g. De
Zeeuw (1984)). The problem is now to maximise, with respect to the admis-
sible strategies and dynamics, J- JO t uJF, where JF and J~ are given by
(2.1) and (2.10).
We distinguish three possible sítuations:
i) u~ 1(the government is in a strong bargaining position),
ii) u - 1,
iii) K) 1(the firm is in a strong bargaining position).
Table 2.5. The Pareto equilibrium (if 0 ~ x ~ 1).
t E[O,tP) t E[tP,tP ) t E[tP,T]
T(t) il T2 ~Z
I(t) (1-T1)aK (1-T2)aK O
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In this situation the time-points tP and tP are defined by





In the first situation, ~ C 1, the solution consists oF three
phases. In the first phase, the government introduces the low rate and the
firm invests sll its money. At the time-point tP the government switches
from the low to the high tax rate. However, due to the strong bargaining
position of the government and contrary to the Stackelberg equilibria, the
firm continues investment until tP. The stronger the bargaining position
of the government the earlier the tax switch and the later the dividend
switch will take place. This can be shown by differentiating tP and tP
with respect to u-
Table 2.6. The Pareto equtltbrtum (íf u- 1).
t E[O,tP) t E[tP, T]
T(t) 21 T E[T1, 22]
I(t) (1-~rl)aK 0
In the second situation (see table 2.6), where N- 1, both players
have equal bargaining power. In this case also the planning period begins
with low tax and maximal investment. At the time-point tp
tP-T-á. (2.26)
the firm starts paying out dividend and the government introduces an arbi-
trary tax rate T E[il, T2]. Because gross profits are maximised, there is
no conclusion possible on the way profit is divided between government and
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shareholders. This Pareto equilibrium thus only determines the value of
the sum of both objectives.
Table 2.7. The Pareto equtlíbrtum (tf N~ 1).
t E [G,tP) t E [tP,T]
T(t) T1 il
I(t) (1-21)aK 0
For this situation, N) 1, the investment switch will take place at
tP-T- (2.27)a(t1~N(1-T1))
If the firm is in a strong bargaining position the government
sticks to its low tax rate, while the firm switches from investment to
dividend at tP. The greater N, the sooner the dividend switch will take
place.
2.4. A Comparison of the Three Concepts
The optimal values of control variables (the tax and investment
rate) for the different solution concepts (see tables 2.1 through 2.7 and
equations (2.15) through (2.27)) generate the following values for the
objective functions, where the subscript G refers to the government and
the subscript F to the firm:
(i) feedback Stackelberg:
JG(~FBS' IFBS) - 1TT1 {K(t~S) - KG} t 1~~2 {KN" - K(t~S)} t
1~T Kw. if T2 ~ 2
2
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- 1T? {K" - KO} ~ l~i K", if T2 2 2, (2.28)
1 2
JF(TFBS' IFBS) -
K.", if T2 C 2.
- K", if z2 Z 2,
(ii) open-loop Stackelberg:
JG(TOLS' IOLS) - l~tl{IC"ww - KO} i
KAMM if T1 ( 2
- 1~21 {Kwrr - KO} t 1~?1 g""" if T1 ) 2.
w"N
JF(~OLS'IOLS) - K '
(iii) Pareto:
- u - 1:
JF(~P. Ip) - KP,
J~(Tp. Ip) -




J (2 I ) - K"
u(1-i2)
F P' P P T2 . u(1-~2)'
JG(Tp, Ip) - 1TT1 (K(tP) - KO) t 1~~2 ( KPN - K(tP))
HT2t Kw"









~`1 . ~`Tl .JG(TP' 1P) - 1-Ti (Kp - KO) } T1 .~(1-T1) Kp.
(i-Ti)u
JF(~P. IP) ' Ti t H(1-T1) --P.
where: JF and J~ are given by (2.1) and (2.10),
(2.32c)
(2.33c)
(~FBS' 1FBS) is the set of strategies for the feedback Stackelberg
equilibrium
a(1-T1)tP
IC P - e ,
a(1-T )tT
K(tP) - e 1 P'
K~~ - ea(1-21)tP ea(i-T2)(tP-tP)
P
Proposition 2.1. For the game described in equation (2.14) through (2.16)
not only will the leader not be worse off, if open-loop Stackelberq is
played instead of feedback Stackelberg, but also the follower will not be
worse off.
Proof. We only take into account the situation, where T2 2 2, because for
other situations it is obvious that both equilibria are equal. We first
show, that the government's objective is greater for the open-loop case
than for the feedback case. According to equation (2.30) we have to dis-
tínguish between two situations:
JG(TOLS' lOLS) - JG(~FBS' 1FBS)
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T
- 1 (KNN11 - K ) ~ K.N. -
1-T1 0
TL N 2 M
1-T1 0
T T




a(1-TL)tFBS 1 s(1-T1)(toLS-tFSS) TL T2
- e 1-T1 e - 1-T1 - 1-T2
a(1-T1)tFBS- e
(2T2-1)(1-T1)
1 1-T2 T1 T2
1-T1 e 1-T1 1-T2~




JG(~OLS' IOLS) - JG(TFBS' IFBS)
- T1 (KNNM - K ) } T1 KMNM -
1-T1 0 1-T1
ZT - I T T ~
- 1 KIlNN Ill 1 ~ 2 Kr
1-T1 1-T1 1-T2
(K - K ) - K
.1T-,~~1 (K - KO) - 1-T2 KN
a(1-T1)tFBS 2T1 a(1-T1)(tOLS-tFBS) T1 T2
- e 1-T1 e - 1-T1 - 1-T2
T2-T1
a(1-T1)tFBS 2T1 1-T2 T1 z2
- e 1-T1 e - 1-T1 - 1-T2
(1-T1)(1-T2) - (1-T1)(1-T2)
(2.34)
a(1-T1)tFBS fZT1 T1 ~2) e - -I1-T2 1-T1 1-T2
a(1-T1)tFBS r(2T1-T2)(1-T1) - Z1(1-i2)- e {l (1-T1)(1-T2)
) 0. (2.35)
Second, we prove that the firm's objective in the open-loop case is
greater. In equation (2.29) and (2.31) it is shown, that in both behav-
ioural models the equilibrium value of the firm's objective function is
equal to the level of capital at the swítching point
~FMM MJF ~OLS' IOLS) - JF(~FBS' IFBS) - K - K
a(1-T )tI a(1-T )tI- e 1 OLS - e 1 FBS ~ 0. (2.36)
Because tOLS ~ t~S the open-loop Stackelberg value is greater than the





~ tax revenues in open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium
~ tax revenues in feedback Stackelberg equilibrium
T t
Figure 2.1. Cnpítal accumulatíon in dífferent strategfc equilibria.
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In figure 2.1 the optimal trajectories for capital stock are drawn
for the two solution concepts, under the assumption that (without loss of
generality) a- 1. One can check that in the open-loop Stackelberg game
the decrease of tax revenues between t~S and tOLS is compensated by the
increase of tax revenues between tOLS ~d T.
In general the Stackelberg equilibria are not Pareto optimal,
because there exists a set of Pareto equilibria which gives a higher value
for both objective functions (see figure 2.2). Thus, there is a gain to
cooperate. How big this gain is depends on the values of the parameters of
the model. The larger the value of T1 (if Stackelberg is played), the
smaller this gain will be. There is even one case, where the open-loop
Stackelberg equilibrium is Pareto optimal and that is if T1 ) 2. Then, the
open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium is equal to the Pareto equilibrium if
there is full weight on the objective functional of the firm (i.e.
u-m).
OLS: open-loop Stackelberg




Figure 2.2. The value of the ob,jective functions by different solution
concepts.
1) To be precise, the firm's objective function is the objective to be
maximised by the centralised decision maker.
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It should be noticed that the Pareto equilibria only make sense if there
is e centralised decision making system. As pointed out in proposition 2.1
in s decentralised decision making system the best outcome for both
players is achieved in the open-loop Stackelberg behavioural equilibrium.
Let us clarify the results with three numerical examples. Assume
without loss of generality that a- KO - 1. Additionally, assume that
T- 5. The examples 1, 2 end 3 differ in the values for T1 and t2. In
example 1 we choose T1 - 4 and T2 2 4, in example 2 T1 - á and i2 - 4 and
in example 3 tl - i6 and T2 - 6. In tables 2.1 and 2.4 we see that in
example 1, where tl ~ 2 and T2 ) 2, the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium
will be different from the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium and there
will be a tax switch. In example 2, where T1 ) Z, the government sticks to
the low tax rate in the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium and this
equilibrium is equal to the Pareto equilibrium if there is full weight on
the objective functional of the firm (i.e. K- m). In example 3, where
T2 ~ 2, the high tax rate is less than a half and there is no difference
between open-loop and feedback Stackelberg equilibria.
Assume now that the game is noncooperative and that the government
chooses its corporate tax policy before the firm chooses its investment
policy. In that case playing open-loop Stackelberg yields the highest
outcome. However, a well-known disadvantage of an open-loop Stackelberg
solution is the possibility of time-inconsistency. In our problem it is
easy to understand that if the government has the possibility, at a moment
between tOLS ~d tOLS (see table 2.3), to make a new plan, it will choose
the high tax rate, thus the solution is time-inconsistent. So, íf the fol-
lower has no reason to believe that the leader will stick to its initial
plan, open-loop is no longer a useful concept. In this case the feedback-
Stackelberg concept, can be used. In the recent literature there has been
a growing interest in the concept of reputation to solve the problem of
time-inconsistency. If the game is played indefinitely many times or if
there is a situation of imperfect information, reputational forces can be
important to prevent the government from cheating (e.g. Van der Ploeg
(198~, section ~), Kreps and Wilson (1982)).
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Table 2.8. Example 1.
FBS OLS
inv. switch 1.0 3.0
tax switch i.o 4.0
total div. 2.12 9.49
total tax rev. 6.73 12.65
final capital 2.12 9.49
Table 2.9. Exarrtple 2.
FBS OLS~Pareto (y, - m)
inv. switch 1.0 2.33
tax switch 1.0
total div. 1.45 2.40
total tax rev. 5.10 6.33
final capital 1.45 2.40
Table 2.10. Example 3.
FBS~OLS Pareto (u - 0.75)
inv. switch 3.50 4.10
tax switch 2.89 3.83
total div. 16.70 17.48
total tax rev. 13.16 24.54
final capital 16.70 29.13
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Propositíon 2.2. The market value of the firm, which equals the remaining
stream of dividend over the planning period (cf. Ludwig (1978)) is equal
to the marginal value of capital i.e. g(t) times the capital stock:
T
VF(t) - J D(t)dt - q(t)K(t)
t (2.37)
In the open-loop Stackelberg eguilibrium this market value is higher (or
equal) than in the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium.
Proof: Let us first give the proof for the feedback equilibrium. If
~2 ~ Z, from table 2.1 it follows that
T
VF(t) - f D(t)dt - KN , 0 5 t s t~s,
t
- K~`a(1-T2)(T-t), t~s S t S T. (2.38)
A formula for the marginal value is given in appendix 2. From equation
(A2.33) and from table 2.1 it follows that




t ~ tI- Fss
, t ~ tr-es
a(1-T1)t Ie K~ . t ~ tFBs
(2-39)
(2.40)
It is a straightforward calculus to check that VF - qK. If T2 ( Z, from












, t ~ tFBS
' tFBS ~ t ~ t~S. (2.42)
ea(1-T2)(tFB5-t~S)ea(1-T1)(tFBS-t) t s tTFBS
Kw~
a(1-21)tFBS a(1-T2)(t-t~S)e e KO
, t ~ tFBS
' tFBS s t s t~s, (2.43)
a(1-T1)t Te KO , t s tFBS
which implies VF - qK.




I' t 2 tOLS
T
K"~" J a(1-T(t))dt, t S tOLSt








I' t 2 tOLS
a(1-T1)t Ie KO , t 5 tOLS




If tOLS ~ tFBS then 90LS(t) ) q~S(t) and VF,OLS 2 VF,FBS. q.e.d.
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Proposition 2.2 implies that the average and marginal q are equal, where
average q or Tobin's q can be observed (on the stock market). This is a
similar result to Hayashi (1982), although there are no adjustment costs
in this model. Because of the fact that corporate tax policy of the
feedback- and open-loop Stackelberg equilibria will be different, the
market value of the firm depends on the choice between open-loop or
feedback. For both players it is better to play open-loop, but this only
makes sense if the firm believes that the government will stick to its
initial plan. Thus, credibility or reputation of government's policy can
play an important role in the market value of the firm and a change in
this credibility can cause a rise or fall in the share prices, i.e. the
average price of capital V(t)~K(t) (- q(t): shadow price). Various
reasons can cause the credibility of government policy to change. For
example, the government has announced a policy of low tax, but because of
its high deficit this policy is no longer credible.
2.5. A Further Comparison of Open-Loop and Feedback Stackelberg Equilibria
In appendix 2 we show that the firm will switch from investment to
dividend at exactly the same moment that its valuation of a marginal in-
crease in the capital good stock, i.e. q(t), falls below unity. In other
words the firm continues to invest if the marginal earnings of an extra
dollar investment, i.e. q(t), are greater than the initial investment
outlay, i.e. one dollar. In terms of finance theory we can conclude that
investment is profitable as long as the present value of marginal invest-
ment is greater than one. The present value is defined as the (discounted)
earnings resulting from an investment proposal. If the earnings are
greater than the investment outlays, the proposal is profitable. In our
framework we can defíne the marginal present value for the firm as fol-
lows: the stream of dividend (the cash receipts for the shareholders) over
the remaining part of the planning period due to one dollar extra invest-
ment. If this value is greater than one (i.e. the initial outlay of mar-
ginal investment), investment is profitable. In the basic model we have
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assumed that the discount rate is zero, so we can take the (undiscounted)
values of dividend. In chapter 3 we relax this assumption.
In the same way, we can define the marginal tax earnings for the
government: the extra stream of tax earnings over the remaining part of
the planning period, due to one dollar extra investment of the firm. The
government must choose between leaving as much money as possible in the
firm, which it achieves by introducing the low rate, or collecting a large
amount of money immediately, which it can achieve by introducing the high
tax rate. To make this choice, the government compares the revenues of
keeping one dollar in the firm, which it uses for investment and which
results in an extra stream of future tax earnings, and receiving one
dollar out of the firm immediately as tax earnings (the opportunity costs
when it leaves the dollar in the firm).
Tabel Z.11 shows the present value of marginal investment for the
firm and the marginal tax earnings for the governmeht at the switching
points for the different solution concepts.
Table 2.11. Future earntngs due to a dollar fnvestment.
invest
firm
FBS TZ 2 2
1
T2 C 2
OLS il ~ 2























The firm switches from investment to dividend at the moment that the pre-
sent value equals one. This is optimal for the firm because in the period
before the present value equals one, it is greater than one, which implies
that marginal earnings are greater than marginal costs. After the switch-
ing time the present value is less than one, which means that the firm
suffers a loss if it continues investing. Only in the Pareto case does the
firm still continue investing, because we then have a cooperative solution
and the sum of both values must be equal to one.
We now focus on the situation T2 ) 2. At the moment in the feed-
back case that the firm stops investment, the marginal tax revenue due to
an extra dollar investment for the government is still greater than one.
Therefore, the government wants more investment, but it cannot force the
firm to do so. In the open-loop case the government can force the firm to
postpone the switch from investment to dividend by announcing a longer
period of low tax rate at the beginning of the planning period. The gov-
ernment fixes its switching point from low to high rate in such a way that
the moment the firm switches from investment to dividend, the tax revenue
due to one dollar investment equals one. The government uses its tax pol-
icy to manipulate the firm's investment policy in such a direction that at
the investment switch this marginal tax earnings equals one. Now, the
government also has reached an optimal situation. However, in the case
that T1 ~ 2 the low rate during the whole planning period is not enough to
have marginal tax earnings of one at the switching time. Therefore, the
optimal policy is to maintain the low rate during the whole period in
order to tempt the firm to invest as much as possible.
If T2 ~ 2 as is shown in sectíon 2.3.2 the open-loop Stackelberg
equilibrium coincides with the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium. Now, the
government switches earlier than the firm due to the fact that its mar-
ginal tax earnings equals one sooner. Therefore, at the switching time of
the firm, the marginal tax earnings of the government are less than one,
hence, the government cannot reach an optimal situation with respect to
investment. These findings are not only interesting because they give a
better economic interpretation of the results, but because we have also
derived decision rules for government policy and firm's behaviour. The
decision rules can be used to derive the Stackelberg equilibria for more
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complex models. In chapter 3 we use these decision rules to derive the
equilibria for a more complex model.
2.6. A Method to Derive the Stackelberg Equilibria
In this section we present a solution method for finding the feed-
back and open-loop Stackelberg equilibria for the model specified in this
chapter. In the previous section we have argued that in the case T1 s 2
and T2 2 2 the marginal present value and the margínal tax earnings are
one at the moment of the investment switch. If the investment switch takes
place at tOLS (I(t) -(1-T)aK, t E[O,tOLS)' I(t) - 0, t E[tOLS'T]) and
the tax switch takes place at tOLS (T(t) - il, t E[O,tOLS)' ~(t) -~2'
t E[tOLS'T]), we can derive, taking into account that tOLS 5 tOLS'
T




- If a(1-T1)dt t Tf a(1-22)dt - 1
tOLS tOLS
~ (tOLS-tOLS)a(1-T1) t (T-tOLS)a(1-TZ) - 1, (2.47)
MTEG(tOLS) - 1 ~ (tOLS-tOLS)aTl t (T-tOLS)aT2 - 1, (2.48)
From (2.4~) and (2.48) tOLS rnd tOLS can be calculated, because there are
two equations which are independent (if Ti ~ i2), and two unknown vari-
ables. With tOLS ~d tOLS we have the solution of the model. If T1 ~ 2
then it turns out that tOLS ~ T, so there will be no tax switch. If T2 ~ 2
then tOLS ~ tOLS rnd for these parameter values the open-loop Stackelberg
equilibrium is equal to the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium.
The feedback Stackelberg equilibrium can easily be found by sol-
ving the equation
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PVF(tFBS) - 1 ~ (T - t~S)e(1-T2) - 1. (2.49)
because we know that after this switch the government introduces the high
rate. It now depends on the marginal tax earnings of the government,
whether the tax switch takes place before or at the moment of the invest-
ment switch. If these marginal earnings are greater than one, the invest-
ment and tax switch occur simultaneously. If they are less than one, the
tax switch occurs before the investment switch.
Summarising, we can present the following method for finding open-
loop and feedback equilibria:
- step 1) PVF(t~S) - 1~ t~S.
- step 2) If MTEG(t~S) Z 1~ t~S - tFBS
If MTEG(t~S) ~ 1~ t~S follows from
MTEO(t~S) - 1 and open-loop - feedback.
- step 3) If MTEO(t~S) Z 1, than
PVF(tOLS) - 1 I T
~ tOLS' tOLS
~(tOLS) - 1
- step 4) If tT ~ T, than tT - T and tI follows from PV (tI )- 1.OLS OLS OLS F OLS
In figure 2.3 we give this solution scheme for the method presented here.
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START
Calculate t~s from PVF ( t~s) - 1
yes






1 -tI tT :tT
OLS FES ' OLS FBS
END
to~ - T and calculate t~
from PVF (t ~ ) - 1
END
Figure 2.3. A solution scheme.
END
In appendix 3 we use this method to solve some of the models presented in
chapter 3.
2. ~. Stvonary
MTE o (t ~ ) - 1~ PVF (t~ ) - 1
In this chapter our first step is to model the interactions
between government and firms as a differential game. By using the tech-
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nique of differential games we take into account the behavioural relation-
ships within a dynamic environment. Within this game, different solution
concepts (Pareto and Stackelberg) and information structures (open-loop
and feedback) are studied. We have compared the noncooperative equilibrium
(Stackelberg) with the cooperative equilibrium (Pareto) and the times that
the firm and government will change their policy. Eurthermore, we have
presented an economic interpretation of the results.
Special attention is paid to the difference between the time-in-
consistent policy, i.e. open-loop Stackelberg, and the time-consistent
policy, i.e. feedback Stackelberg. In general the solution of the dynamic
game leads to a period with a high investment level, and a subsequent
period with zero investment. Both players are willing to be modest for a
while in order to accumulate capital stock, which is beneficial for both
of them. Under the requirement of time-consistency the policy switch from
low to high tax rate occurs earlier with lower total government consump-
tion and lower total dividends. If the government can commit itself to its
announced plan or if there are some reputatíonal forces, then the policy
switches occur later with higher government consumption and dividends. In
the commitment case the market value of the firm, which equals the stream
of future dividends, is greater. So, the main conclusion is that the cre-
dibility of the government's policy can have a great influence on the
market value of the firm.
Of course, the model we presented in this chapter is simple. In
the next chapter we extend the model presented in chapter 2. In spite of
the simplifying assumptions, the model in this chapter is a nice example
of modelling the interactions between government and firms. Compared with
the recent stream of literature (e.g. Van Schijndel (1988), Van Loon
(1983)) the government is modelled endogenously. This will also be the
main issue in the next chapters.
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CHAPTER 3. SOME MODIFICATIONS ON TFD; BASIC MODEL
3.1. Introduction
In chapter 2 we presented a simple model to describe interactions between
the government and the firm. Several features are worth pointing out:
- The firm is characterised by a linear relation between profit and the
capital stock.
- There is no depreciation of the capital stock.
- There is no salvage value for the firm.
- The government and the firm's shareholders do not discount Future earn-
ings.
- The government has a linear objective function, which only depends on
government's consumption.
- Investment is irreversible.
In this chapter we extend the basic model of chapter 2 by relaxing some of
the above assumptions. Do the conclusions we have drawn from this model
depend on its features, or do they survive into more complex models? This
is the question to which we address ourselves.
In this chapter we extend step by step the basic model of the
previous chapter, which was a first attempt to model the interactions
between government and firms. We first introduce a discount rate, a
salvage value and depreciation. In this way, we make the part of the model
concerning the firm more realistic. Secondly, we replace the linear rela-
tion between profit and capital by a concave relationship. In general
there can be two reasons for such a concave relationship:
- The firm operates on an imperfect output market (cf. Van Loon (1983))
with a declining sales price function.
- There is a neoclassical production function, which satisfies the condi-
tions of decreasing returns to scale.
In appendix 3 it is shown that this extension leads to some technical
difficulties in the derivation of the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium.
Thirdly, we replace the government's linear utility function by a loga-
rithmic one. In this case the optimal policy appears to be a smoothed tax
policy, which is of course more realistic. Fourthly, we include some other
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policy instruments into the framework. The effects of introducing a pay-
roll tax, investment grants, unemployment paymentsl) and a debt policy are
analysed. Finally, a discussion, based on Public Choice theory, about the
form of the objective for the government, is presented. Furthermore, the
solution of the model is shown if employment is taken to be the objective.
In this chapter, we show that the conclusions of the previous
chapter still hold if we allow for the extensions as described above. Our
interest is especially focussed on a comparison between open-loop and
feedback Stackelberg equilibrie. In the next chapter, the model is embed-
ded in a more general macroeconomic context.
This chapter is organised as follows. In section 3.2 we give the
equilibria for the extended model with discounting, depreciation and a
salvage value. In section 3.3 some other extensions, like a concave profit
function and a logarithmic utility function, are discussed. In section 3.4
we introduce other policy instruments for the government into the model.
In addition, the issue of government debt policy is analysed within this
framework. In section 3.5 the issue of the government's objective is
discussed. Finally, a summary is given in section 3.6. The derivations of
the several equilibria are given in appendix 3.
3.2. A More General Model
3.2.1. The Model
Assuming that the shareholders' discount rate equals the market interest
rate and assuming that at the planning horizon the shareholders will value
the capital good stock as bK(T)-rT, where it is reasonable to assume that
0 5 b s 1, the objective becomes
T
max f D(t)e-rtdt ; bK(T)e-rT
I(.) o
where: r- the market interest rate.
-------------------------------------------------------
(3.1)
1) The effects of investment grants and unemployment payments have been
analysed in Gradus (1988b, pp. 2~~-283).
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The case of discounting is also briefly discussed by Lancaster (1973.
p. 1107) for his model. Furthermore, the impact of investment on the pro-
duction capacity is now described by
K(t) - I(t) - bK(t), (3.2)
where: b- the depreciation rate.
Taxation is assumed to be no longer proportional to gross profit, because
we can deduct for depreciation. The tax payments paid by the firm are
given by: ~
TX(t) - T(t)(0(t) - bK(t)).





a - (~,s s. (3.5)
Q(t) - x(t)SL(t)1-A. (3.6)
0(t) - TX(t) - D(t) t I(t), (3.7)
D(t) ~ o. (3.8)
I(t) ~ o. (3.9)
If we assume that the government's discount rate also equals the market






The government maximises (3.10) with respect to all behavioural con-
straints of the firm. Furthermore, similar to chapter 2 assume






The last equation ensures that the marginal rentability of investment
exceeds the rate of time-preference.
To obtain the feedback and open-loop Stackelberg equilibria we
rewrite the model as follows:
- objective function government
T
max f(a-b)~C(t)K(t)e-rtdt, 0~ T1 s T s T2 ~ 1, (3.14)
2(.) 0
where T is the tax rate.
- objective function firm
T
max f (1-i(t))(a-t(t)(a-b))K(t)e-rtdt t bK(T)e-rT
i(.) 0
o s i s 1, (3.15)
where i is the investment rate of net profits.
- state equation
K - {(a-2(t)(a-b))i(t)-b}K(t), K(0) - K0. (3.16)
With the specification as given in equation (3.14) -(3.16) the whole
exercise of appendix 2 can be repeated to obtain the solution. This is
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done in appendix 3.1. In the next subsection we describe the open-loop and
feedback Stackelberg equilibria.l)
3.2.2. The Open-Loop and Feedback Stackelberg Equilibria
The structure of this solution is more or less the same as for the basic
model. Again there are two possible situations depending on the value of
i. If 2 C a- b(ótr) the firm has a greater affinity to investment than2 2 (2-b)(a-á)
the government. In that case there is no difference between the open-loop
and feedback situation. The firm switches from investment to dividend at
I 1 (a-b)(1-T2) - r
tFBS - T i b t r~n a- T2(a-b) - b(btr) '
I I I I Idt~S C O, dt~S ( O' dt~S , o, dt~S ) O' dt~S (
O, (3.17)dr dó db da dT2
while the government switches from the low to the high tax rate at
T I I 1t~S - min t~S' tFBS }( a-ó )(1-T2)- r
~nj(a-b)t2((2-b)((a-b)(1-T2)-r) t (átr)(1-b))~~'
T T T T T
dáFBS ~ ~ dáFBS ~ ~ dáFBS ) 0. dabS) p~ ddFBS ~ 0.
2
(3.18)
In equation (3.1~) also the derivative of t~S with respect to the para-
meters are given. Thus, the switch of investment occurs at an earlier
point of time, if r increases. This seems quite reasonable, because the
firm is less interested in collecting dividend at the final stage. If the
rate of depreciation increases, there will also be an earlier switch.
(a-b-r)(a-T2(a-b)-b(btr))
1) The switching points for the Pareto equilibria are given in Gradus
(1989b, pp. 245-246).
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Because of a greater depreciation, capital accumulation becomes less inte-
resting. If b increases, the interest of the firm in capital, at the end
of the planning horizon, will be greater and, therefore, the switch takes
place at a later point in time. If T 5 a-b(btr) then from2 (2-b)(a-b) (3.18) we can
derive t~S C t~S, otherwise t~S - t~S.
If T2 ~~2-b~~é}b~ there is a difference between the open-loop and
feedback equilibria. In the feedback equilibrium the government and the
firm switch their policy at the same time-point t~S. In the open-loop
equilibrium, the government postpones the applícation of the high rate to
the time-point
tOLS -
min LT, T -
(b-r)(a-b(b.r)) tT ( a-b)(a-2(ótr))(a-b)-t (a-ó)(a-b(ó.r)) l11 II
b ' r ~n 2 (T2-T1)(a-b)(a-2(btr)) III
dtT dtT dtT dtT dtT dtTOLS S 0 OLS S 0 OLS 2 0 OLS 2 0 OLS z 0 OLS 2 0dr db da db diZ dTl
(3.19)
From (3.19) it can be calculated that tOLS - T if T1 Z
a-b(btr) In that(2-b)(a-b)'
case, the minimum tax is so high, that it is better for government to
stimulate accumulation and stick to the low rate. As a consequence the
firm switches from investment to dividend at
I I 1 ~n~a - 2(S4r)~ T} 1 ~n( (a-b)(1-il) - r l
tOLS - minLT t S t r a- b(ótr) b t r jla - T1(a-b) - b(btr)~J'
dtI dtI dtI dtI dtI dtIOLS C 0 OLS C 0 OLS ~ 0 OLS ~ 0 OLS - 0 OLS 5 0,dr db da db dT2 dTl
(3.20)
where tOLS ~ tOLS ~ tFBS - t~S. The reason for this is the same as given
in section 2.3.
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One of the nice features of the extended model is that it is more
flexible. In the basic model the government has a greater affinity towards
investment for the values of i2 greater than a half and less affinity for
T2 less than a half. In the extended version, this value, where affinity
changes, has become a function of the parameters of the model. This seems
more reasonable.
If for example, b increases, the affinity towards investment by
the firm increases. It is obvious, that in this case the value of T2,
where the government has a greater affinity than the firm, also decreases.
If the rate of depreciation, i.e. b increases, the affinity towards in-
vestment becomes less and this value of T2 increases. If the rate of
interest, i.e. r increases, this affinity of the firm comparing with the
government, decreases. However, it should be noted that this is only true
if b is positive. In that case an increase in the interest rate means that
the capital stock's valuation at the end of the planning horizon, i.e.
be-rT, has become less. If b equals zero, because both players discount
against the same rate, the affinity of the firm and the government de-
creases with the same rate.
3.3. Some Further Extensions
3.3.1. A Concave Relation between Profit and Capital Stock
In chapter 2 we assumed that the firm operates under a constant returns to
scale production technology of a Cobb-Douglas type and that the wage rate
and the output price are constant. This leads to a linear relation between
profit (before taxation) and the capital stock. In this section we relax
this assumption by introducing a decreasing returns to scale technology
Q- K~L~; ~' X~ 1; S.X ) 0. (3.21)
Assuming that there are no problems with attracting labour we get
1 ~
p ~Q - w --i L- L(K) -(p~ll-ë.Kl-~. (3.22)
L' ) 0, L" C 0.
Substitution of equation (3.22) into (2.4) gives the following relation
between gross profits and capital
~
0(K) - aKl-~.
where a ( i.e. marginal productivity of capital) equals
1
- ~wl~r-1 w 1-
8 YJ ~ .
(3.23)
(3.24)
It is rather complicated to calculate the open-loop and feedback
Stackelberg equilibria for this extension. In the previous sections we
used the fact that the game is state separable. However, because of the
concavity this is no longer the case. In particular, the feedback equilib-
ria are very hard to calculate. Therefore, we only derive the open-loop
Stackelberg equilibria. The calculation of the feedback equilibria is a
topic of future research.
If we compare, for a given value of p, the decreasing returns to
scale model to the basic model, it is not difficult to verify that in
general, the investment switch in this model occurs at an earlier time-
point. The intuition behind this is clear: if the capital stock increases,
the marginal productivity of capital declines. In the open-loop Stackel-
berg equilibria, not only do the time-points, at which the different
switches take place, change, but the boundaries of T1 and 22, which tell
us whether the tax switch occurs before or after the investment switch,
change as well (see figure 3.1). In the basic model for T2 ( Z the tax
switch occurs before the investment switch. In the model with decreasing
returns to scale the tax switch occurs before the investment switch when
T2 ~ ~1 t (1-R-~)(1-?f)1,r2 ~ (1-~-2)(1-X)1(:- ;~ ~ ~,.
~ J Il P J (3.25)
Thus, there is a smaller interval for T2 in which the investment switch
occurs before the tax switch. Hence, for a given value of i2 the govern-










tax switch ~ inv. switch
tax switch ~ inv. switch
no tax switch
Decreasing retums to scale
i
Figure 3.1. The different types of solutions by dtfferent values of T1 and
22.
For T2 ) T the tax switch is situated at a later time-point than the in-
vestment switch. For 21 ) T there will be no tax switch at all and the
government sticks to the low rate during the whole planning period. A
derivation of these switching points is given in appendix 3.2.
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The nature of the solutions examined may be further clarified by a
numerical example. The following values are chosen:
p- 2, w - 1, KO - 1, T- 6. ~l - 1~4, T2 - 3~4.
In table 3.1 the switching time for four possible situations of the tech-
nical parameters
a) p- 3~4, ~- 1~4 (constant returns to scale, capital intensive)
b) p- 1~4, ~r - 3~4 (constant returns to scale, labour intensive)
c) g- 1~2, ~r - 1~4 (decreasing returns to scale, capital intensive)
d) p- 1~4, y- 1~2 ( decreasing returns to scale, labour intensive)
are given.










~- 4, ~- 4 1.19 0.50 4.32 5.16
s- 4, ~- 4 1.69 0.50 4.82 5.40
s- 2, ~- 4 1.19 0.64 2.12 3.44
~- 4, ~- 2 1.b9 0.~5 3.33 3.33
This table clearly points out that in the case of decreasing returns to
scale, the switching points occur at an earlier point of time. Further-
more, if we compare both situations of constant returns to scale, we see
that in situation (a) the switches take place earlier. The reason for this
is, that in the first situation the capital goods are less profitable
(i.e. 1.69 ) 1.19). In situation (a) and (b) we are in area II of figure
3.1e, so that the tax switch occurs after the investment switch. It should
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be noted, that in the case of constant returns to scale for all sets of
technical parametersl) we are in area II of figure 3.1a.
In situation (c) we are in area II of figure 3.1b. So, the tax
switch still occurs after the investment switch. However, this will change
in situation (d). Because of a decrease in p the tax switch will take
place at the same moment as the investment switch and we are now in area I
of figure 3.1b.
3.3.2. A Logarithmic Utility Function
In this section we replace the linear utility function of the government




The more government's consumption there is, the less utility one extra
unit yields. In appendix 3.3 we have given the derivation of the open-loop
and feedback Stackelberg equilibria. The case of a concave utility func-
tion for the Lancaster model is investigated by Hoel (1978). We still
assume that firm's objective is maximising dividend. This implies that the
firm starts with investment and at the end there is a period of dividend
pay out.
For the feedback equilibrium, it is still applicable that at the
moment that the firm stops investment, there is no incentive to introduce
a tax rate lower than the maximum tax rate. This implies that the firm
also now switches from investment to dividend at the time point t~S as
defined in equation (2.17). However, the tax policy will be different from
the basic model. If Z2 C 2 then the government smoothly switched from the
low to the high tax rate before the investment switch (see figure 3.2a).
The firm is much more interested in investment than the government. If
T2 ) 2, and T1 t T2 C 1, then the government starts to raise the tax rate
at the time-point
1) If T is big enough.
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the firm stops investment and the government immediately raises the tax
rate to T2 (see figure 3.2b). If T1 t t2 ) 1 the investment switch has
taken place before the moment that the government has to raise taxes (see
figure 3.2c). In that case the government is more interested in investment
than the firm.
For the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium, there are also some
interesting differences with the basic model. Hereby, we distinguish
between four possible situations:
a) T2 ~ 2,
b) T2 ) 2, T1 t t2 C 1,
c) 21 ~ 2, T1 t T2 ) 1,
d) T1 ) 2.
In the first situation, for the same reasons as in chapter 2, there are no
differences between the open-loop and the feedback equilibria. In the
second situation, where 22 ) 2 and T1 t T2 ~ 1, the government starts with
the low tax rate. At the time-point ti it raises the tax rate till this
rate has reached 2(see figure 3.2b). At this moment, when the tax rate
has reached 50X,
I 2
tOLS - T - a (3.29)
the firm stops investment. This is at a later point in time than in the
feedback case. Also, in the third situation the government starts to raise
the tax rate from ti till it reaches the point 2. In the case that T1 ) 2
the government sticks to the low tax rate.
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OLS: open-loop Stackelberg
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Figure 3.2. Tax rate by Zogarithmic utiltty function.
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Thus, for the open-loop equilibrium, the bang-bang structure for
the tax rate disappears. Depending on the exact values of T1 and ~r2 the
government raises the tax rate smoothly to the desired level. In the
feedback solution, it depends on the value of T2, whether there will be a
smooth or bang-bang behaviour of tax rates. Of course, from a practical
point of view, a smooth behaviour of the tax rates seems to be more rea-
listic. Another way to avoid this bang-bang structure is to introduce
collection costs (e.g. Barro (1979)).
3.4. Other Instruments for the Government
3.4.1. Introduction
Until now the only government instrument that we have treated is the
corporate tax rate. In this section the effect of other government in-
struments like a pay-roll tax, is analysed. Furthermore, we study the case
where the government has the opportunity to borrow or lend money. We still
work within a partial equilibrium framework. Extending our analysis to a
general equilibrium framework will be the topic of the next chapter.
3.4.2. A Pay-Roll Tax
In this section, we analyse the consequence of introducing a pay-roll tax
into the model. A pay-roll tax is a proportional tax on labour, which in
general will be used for social security. Under the assumption of fixed
real wages this pay-roll tax has been paid by the producers or employers.
In this case the well-known condition of marginal productivity of labour
implies
p ~Q - w(8t1). (3.30)
where 8 is the pay-roll tax.
So, in this case the maximisation of profit leads to the following




L - lw(ltg)) .K. (3.31)
Substituting this back into the profit function (cf. equation (2.4)) shows
that the rentability of capital
1
a- PP P~Z1 S 1(W(841) J -- (3.32)
has become a decreasing function of this pay-roll tax. F~rthermore, we
assume that this pay-roll tax will be used for government's consumption.
For the government, the introduction of a pay-roll tax has two effects:
- The pay-roll tax earnings gives the government opportunities to spend on
government consumption.
- The pay-roll tax decreases the marginal productivity of capital stock.
In general, it is not possible to say which of these two effects will be
the strongest. This depends on the specific set of parameter values of the
model. In the case of the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium we can write
down the following expression for the optimal value of 81)
g"(t) - max s- sT(t) - a(t)pi(t)(1-t(t)) o. (3.33)(1-P) t Hi(t) 4 ~(t)Pi(t)(1-T(t))~ ~
where a is the shadow price of capital and i- 1 if I is positive and
i- 0 if I is zero. In the appendix a derivation of this formula is given.
Note, that after the moment that the firm stops investment it holds that
" S - ST2g (t) - (1-P) ' ATZ'
Substituting this back into equation (2.1~) gives the switching time




1) Assume p - 1.
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It should be noted that there are no guarantees that 9 calculated from
(3.33) is positive. Especially, if the firm invests, the optimal value of
the pay-roll tax is zero. The reasoning is as follows: an introduction of
a pay-roll tax would cause decrease of the marginal productivity of cap-
ital stock, so it is better not to apply this tax and only introduce the
profit tax, if the firm invests.
In the same way as in the feedback solution the optimal value for
9~ in the open-loop solution can be derived. In addition, it can be shown
that the pay-roll tax is always at a lower level than in the feedback
case. From this exercise we can conclude, that in some special cases it is
profitable to raise pay-roll tax, in others not.
3.4.3. Issuing Public Debt
So far we have assumed that the government's budget is balanced. It would
be interesting to explore into what would happen if the government had the
possibility to borrow or to lend money. It is well-known in the literature
that in the case of distortionary taxation, like a capital or wage tax,
the assumption of debt neutrality does not longer apply, the debt policy
is not neutral and can have real effects (e.g. Barro (1979), Blanchard
(1985)). In the paper by Barro the government uses the debt policy to
smooth out the tax burden over time. We now turn to the question of
whether such a policy is possible in our model or not.
The only equation which changes is equation (2.8). Replace this by
the evolution of public debt
z(t) - c(t) - Tx(t), (3.36)
where Z(t) is the stock of outstanding debt. However, if we assume that
the amount of public debt at the beginning and at the end of the planning
horizon are equal
z(T) - z(o), (3.37)
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there is no role for a debt policy and the proposition of debt neutrality
still applies. This is not difficult to establish, because integration of
equation (3.36) gives
t t




f G(t)dt - f TX(t)dt.0 0
(3.38)
(3.39)
From thís we conclude, that it makes no difference if we replace the
objective function by the stream of future tax earnings. Since it wants to
maximise the second part of (3.39), the government chooses the same tax
ratel) as in the basic model in the case of borrowing and lending. The
difference is, that in the basic model the level of G(t) was determined by
the choice of the tax rate; in this subsection the level of government
consumption is independent of the level of taxation. The only restriction
is, that the sum of government consumption in the planning period is the
sum of tax earnings (see figure 3.3 for a possible path of government
consumption). Thus, debt policy in this model has no effect on the level
of investment.
Moreover, it should be noted that this conclusion also applies for
the extended model with discounting if the interest rate on government's
debt equals the government discount rate. In that case there is still no
role for a debt policy. However, whether or not this kind of debt neutral-
ity exists depends on the model assumptions. Especially, the assumption of
finiteness of the planning horizon, the objective function of the govern-
ment and the fixed price assumption are crucial for this result. There-
fore, in chapter 6 we will give a more rigorous analysis of the problem of
optimal government debt.
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Figure 3.3. A possible path of government's consumptíon.
3.5. Another Objective for the Government
3.5.1. Introduction
In this section we discuss the government's objective function. Until now
we have assumed that the government maximises utility derived from public
consumption. Contrary to the objective of the firm, where the assumption
of profit maximising behaviour seems quite common, the choice of the gov-
ernment's objective is not without debate.
Starting point of the debate was the pioneering work by Tinbergen
(1952), in which, for the first time, government's behaviour was modelled
within an economic framework. Although there was no explicit foundation of
the government's objective, Tinbergen searched for instruments to sustain
some given targets. Later on Theil (1964) was the first to formulate ex-
plicitly the government as an entity with a single objective function. To
be precise, the government was assumed to have a quadratic objective,
being the weighted quadratic sum of some well-known targets of economic
policy.
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We adopt the same approach as Theil by modelling the government's
objective, and by assuming that this objective is maximised with respect
to firms' behaviour. However, the objective of the government seems to be
a little bit arbitrary. In the literature, the government's objective is
often taken as the utility of a representative consumer. However, to apply
this approach we in fact have to model the consumer side of the economy
more explicitly. This will be done in the next chapter. In this section we
change the objective of the government into maximising employment, because
nowadays in many countries, unemployment is considered to be one of the
most severe economic problems.
3.5.2. Maximising Employment
In this subsection we briefly discuss the model in which the government
maximises employment (for a more detailed discussion, derivation and
proofs of the equilibris see Gradus and De Zeeuw (1989c)). The government
has to make a choice, among other things, to rely on the private sector to
create employment or to create employment in the public sector. The second
possibility is subject to more direct control but has to be financed by
taxation. The government's problem focusses on the question of whether or
not the creation of extra public employment with high taxation is a good
employment policy. For a given level of net wages in the private sector,
high taxation implies less investment possibilities for the firms and that
might imply less employment in the private sector and less future tax
revenues. Thus, the dilemma for the government is much the same as in
chapter 2.
The government is assumed to maximise total employment, í.e. the
sum of private and public employment, over the planning period. Further-
more, it is assumed that the government can use tax income to create pub-
lic employment at the same wage rate as in the private sector. The govern-







The first part in equation (3.40) is the amount of labour in the private
sector, while the second part represents the amount of labour in the pub-
lic sector. The firm's objective stays unchanged and from maximising pro-
fit with respect to labourl) it follows that
L-~iK,~aw
(3.4~)
with p the parameter of the Cobb-Douglas production function. It would be
straightforward to calculate open-loop and feedback Stackelberg equilibria
for this extended model. Substituting (3.4~) back into (3.40) and using
that for the government TX - TaK gives the following objective function
max fT(~ ~ T (t))W K(t)dt, 0 ( T1 5 T(.) 5 T2 ( 1. (3.42)
T(.) 0
Without going into details it is easy to see that the solution differs in
a quantitative but not in a qualititatively way. If we compare the open-
loop with the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium then both solution methods
lead, in general, to an initial period with a low corporate tax rate and a
high investment rate, and a subsequent period with a high corporate tax
rate and a low investment rate. Both players are willing to be modest for
a while in order to accumulate capital stock, which is beneficial for both
of them. Under the requirement of time-consistency, the policy switch
occurs earlier with lower total employment and lower total dividends. This
is the correct model, if the government can not commit itself to an
announced policy and if the firm expects rational behaviour of the govern-
ment at ell times. The time-consístent outcome is never Pareto optimal and
the time-inconsistent outcome is only Pareto optimal, if the production
technology is labour intensive or if the tax rate cannot drop too low. The
parameter for capital in the Cobb-Douglas production function p plays a
crucial role in this model. If p is close to one the economy is capital
intensive and we may expect that the government wants to stimulate employ-
ment by taxation, and for values of p close to zero, it sticks to the low
1) Since labour L is a static variable in the optimisation problem, it is
correct to first maximise profit with respect to L at every time-point
(see e.g. Feichtinger and Hartl (1986, p. 366)).
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tax rate in the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium. However, this also
depends on the value of a(i.e. the productivity of capital). From equa-
tion (3.5) we can derive that the rentability of capital stock is minimal
for p- 1-w with value 1-w and that lim a- m and lim a- 1. From this we
~.~.0 pT 1
can conclude, that in the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium for values
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Figure 3.4. The szJitch potnt from investment to divtdend
and the tax slJitch.
to the low tax rate (see figure 3.4).1) If ~ rises, capital productivity
falls and the economy becomes more capital intensive, so the government
becomes less interested in capital. Whether it will raise taxes depends on
the parameters of the model. In figure 3.4 we see that there is a period
of high taxes, if S Z 3. If ~ goes to one, we see a small decrease in the
period of high taxes, due to the fact that the capital productivity is
rising again.
Introducing a pay-roll tax into this model just makes things
worse. This distortion leads to a higher producer wage and thus to a
deterioration of private employment, which is not compensated by the extra
possibilities in the public sector. The introduction of a pay-roll tax
would give a lower value for the rentability of capital and thus for the
objective functionals of both the government end the representative firm.
Therefore, it is optimal to put the pay-roll tax in this model equal to
zero.
3.6. St~ary
In this chapter we have extended the basic model of chapter 2. First, we
incorporated discounting, depreciation and looking beyond the time-hori-
zon. In this extended model we show that the main conclusion of chapter 2,
which says that the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium yields a better
solution for both players than the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium, still
applies. One of the nice features of this model is, that the affinity of
the government towards investment of the firm has become a function of the
parameters of the model. Furthermore, we extended the basic model by
introducing a concave relationship between profit and capital stock. For
the model with this extension we only derived the open-loop Stackelberg
equilibrium, because it is almost impossible to obtain the feedback equi-
librium for this game. In the previous models we used the feature that the
1) In this figure we have assumed that w- 2, K~ - 1, T- 8, T1 - 0.25,T2 - 0.75.
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game was separable, consequently the feedback Stackelberg equilibria were
easy to obtain. In the next chapter, the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium
is derived for a model which is not state separable.
The basic model was also extended by a utility function with
diminishing marginal utility of government's consumption. In the open-loop
case the bang-bang structure of tax rates disappears, but we still have
the appealing difference between the open-loop and feedback equilibria.
Also other policy instruments are included. The introduction of pay-roll
tax is investigated. It is argued, however, that in most cases it is not
profitable to raise pay-roll tax. In addition, the issue of public debt is
discussed. We showed that under certain model assumptions there is no role
for a debt policy at all. However, a more rigorous analysis of the problem
of optimal public debt is given in chapter 6. Finally, we discussed the
government's objective function. It is derived, that for a slightly dif-
ferent objective function, like maximising employment, the same results
occur.
In this chapter we have extended the basic model from chapter 2
step by step. The conclusions drawn in the previous chapter seem to be
robust for these extensions. In spite of these extensions, which of course
made the model more realistic, there are some features which need some
further discussion:
- It is a partial equilibrium framework.
- T'he wage and the interest rate are fixed.
- The only source of savings for the firm is retained earnings.
In the following chapters we discuss these features.
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CHAPTER 4. A MACROECONOMIC MODEL OF OPTIIKAI. PROFIT TAXATION
4.1. Introduction
In the previous chapters we have given a partial equilibrium model des-
cribing the relationships between government and firms. In this chapter we
embed this model into a macrceconomic (or general equilibrium) framework.
Therefore, we model three sectors of the economy: i) consumers, ii) firms,
iíi) government and markets. The parts of the model concerning the firms
and the government are slightly different from those in chapters 2 and 3.
We introduce adjustment costs to obtain well-behaved investment behaviour
for the firm and savings behaviour for the consumer. We assume that the
goods market clears and that the interest rate is determined by the goods
market equilibrium. As in the previous chapters we assume that wages are
fixed. This implies that unemployment corresponds to classical unemploy-
ment in the sense of Malinvaud (1977). Furthermore, for reasons of analy-
tical tractability we assume that there is only one type of consumer and
firm. Furthermore, the government chooses its instruments in such a way,
that its own objective is maximised.
In this respect we extend the current stream of macroeconomic
literature, where perfect foresight models are used to study the dynamic
evolution of the economy in order to analyse effects of fiscal policy (cf.
Turnovsky (1982), Abel and Blanchard (1983), Judd (1985), Van de Klundert
and Peters (1986), and Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987)). In these papers,
however, the tax rates are given exogenously. In the literature there are
some examples of optimal taxation in macroeconomic models (e.g. Turnovsky
and Brock (1980), Kydland and Prescott (1980), Fischer (1980), Persson and
Tabellini (1990)), but generally the problem of optimal profit or capital
taxation does not get so much attention. An example can be found in
Fischer (1980), who analysed a two-period model. However, as there is no
taxation in the first period and no separation between the decisions of
the firm and the consumer, Fischer's model disregards some aspects of the
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time-inconsistency problem. Nevertheless, it is a nice example illustra-
ting the time-inconsistency in dynamic optimal taxation. An other example
is Chamley (~986)1), where a Cass-Koopman's economy is analysed. In this
and the following chapter we extend the decentralised model of Abel and
Blanchard (i983) by incorporating optimal government behaviour.
As in the previous chapters we develop a game theoretic framework.
Firms and consumers take the decisions of the others as given, but the
government takes into acount the way in which the other agents take their
decisions. Thus, the solution corresponds to a Stackelberg game with the
government as leader and the firms and the consumers playing Nash against
each other (cf. Ba~ar and Olsder (1982, chapter 7)). As in the previous
chapters we calculate two possible solution concepts. The first solution
concept used is the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium. The second solution
concept corresponds to s feedback Stackelberg equilibrium. What is more,
it will turn out that the outcome of the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium
depends on the number of firms in the economy. If the number of firms is
large, the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium equals the open-loop Nash
equilibrium.
This chapter is organised as follows. In section 4.2 we describe
the behaviour of the firm, while in section 4.3 the consumer's behaviour
is modelled. The behaviour of the government is modelled in section 4.4.
In subsection 4.4.2, the solution is given for the case that there is an
open-loop information structure. Also, the issue of time-inconsistency is
discussed. In subsection 4.4.4, the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium is
presented. The derivations of the feedback Stackelberg equilibria and the
interest function are given in appendix 4. In section 4.5 the paths of the
economic variables are given when the economy changes from its open-loop
to its feedback steady-state. Finally, section 4.6 contains a summary.
4.2. The Firm's Decision Problem
In this section we describe the model for the firm. In comparison with
chapter 2 there are three differences:
1) In this paper the problem of time-inconsistency is neglected.
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- The planning horizon is infinite.
- There are adjustment costs for investment.
- The interest rate is no longer a constant.
Again we assume that the firm maximises the discounted stream of net cash
flows:
m




- 9o(I(t))]e ~ dt,
where: 9~(I): internal adjustment costs,
~(~) - 0. siBn(~') - sign(I)~ ~" ) 0.
(4.1)
With respect to the production function we assume that capital and labour
are substitutes and production is characterised by constant returns to
scale (so that QLL'KIC-QKL - 0). The strictly convex function ~(.) captures
that internal adjustment costs increase with the absolute size of the rate
of investment or disinvestment and are zero only if gross investment is
zero. They ensure that capital adjust in a sluggish manner to changes in
interest rate and corporate tax rate. Following Van de Klundert and Peters
(1986) and Abel and Blanchard (1983) in (4.1) we assume that the firm
cannot deduct for depreciation, if it pays (gross) profit or corporate
taxation. However, the whole exercise of this chapter can be repeated by
allowing for deduction without changing the major conclusions. The firm
maximises (4.1) subject to the capital accumulation equation
K(t) - I(t) - bK(t), (4.2)
where: b- the rate of depreciation.
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The necèssary conditions for the firm's optimal control problem are:l)
s
-f r(v)dv
q(t) -(r(t)tb)9(t)-QK(1-T(t)). lim e t q(s)K(s) - 0, (4.3)
s~
~'(I(t)) - q(t) - 1. (4.4)
(4.5)
K(t) - I(t) - bK(t), (4.6)
in which: q- the (current value) shadow price of capital.
If we assume that wages are constant, then labour is a linear function of
capital and the partial derivative of the production function with respect
to capital is a constant, say a. So (4.3)-(4.6) can be rewritten as
follows (dropping time-arguments):
9 - (rtb)q - a(1-T).
I - ~(q), ~' ~ 0, ~(1) - 0.
L - hK,





where a and h are positive constants.
The steady-state investment level is just sufficient to provide
for replacement investment, I' - bK", so that the steady-state shadow
price of capital exceeds one, q' - 1 t~'(bKM). This means that the shadow
1) To be precise, we have to distinguish between open-loop and feedback
information structure for the firm. However, as we will see in section 4.5
this makes no difference for an economy with many firms.
price of a unit of capital equals the costs of purchasing investment goods
plus the marginal costs of adjusting the capital stock. The steady-state
capital follows from (4.~)-(4.10) and can be expressed as
KM - 1.~(a 1-YM ) K~ ( 0, K~ ~ 0.
- b r;b T r
Thus, if the corporate tax rate increases, capital formation decreases,
resulting in less employment.
4.3. The Consumer's Decision Problem
In this section we model the consumer side of the economy, similar to, for
example, Abel and Blanchard (1983) or Van de Klundert and Peters (1986).
The consumer can choose between consumption now or in the future given his
income from labour, dividend and interest. In this way consumption is an
increasing function of total wealth and an equilibrium between aggregate
demand and supply is achieved by the endogenous adjustment of the sequence
of current and future interest rates. We assume that the consumer takes
the decisions of the firm and the government as given.
2'he consumer chooses a path of consumption, which maximises the
present value of utility over time
max f U(C,G)e-otdt,
c o
where: v - social discount rate (-constant),
C - private consumption,
G - public consumption,
U(C,G) - utílity function.
(4.~2)
We assume that U is strictly concave and hence continuously differen-
tiable. The consumer obtains his income from wages, interest on savings




where: B- amount of bonds held by consumer,
D - dividends.
The current value Hamiltonian for this problem is
H - U(C,G) t x(rBtwLtD-C), (4.14)
in which: x- the costate variable associated with the dynamic budget
constraint.
The optimality conditions are:
UC - x, (4.15)
x - (o-r)x, lim e-ótx(t) - 0. (4.16)
t~




lim e~ B(t) - 0.
t~
(4.1~)
In section 4.2 we did not say anything about the way the firms finance
their investment. After paying wages to the worker, the firm has to decide
how to distribute profit and finance investment by retained earnings or by
issuing new shares or bonds. For example, we can assume that replacement
investment is financed out of retained earnings and that net investment is
financed by bonds. However, because equity and bonds are treated equally
by the tax system and there is no uncertainty, the conditions of the
Modigliani-Miller theorem apply, thus all financing schemes are equivalent
in the sense that they lead to the same path of total consumption and
investment; they differ, however, in terms of institutional arrangements
(for proof of this see Abel and Blanchard (1983, pp. 680-681)).
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4.4. The Behaviour oP the Covernment
4.4.1. Introduction
In this section we describe the behaviour of the government. We assume
that the government has the same utility functions as the consumer (cf.
Turnovsky and Brock (1980)), that public consumption will be financed from
profit taxation and that there is no debt:
G - t(Q(K,L) - wL). (4.18)
Furthermore, it is assumed that the government takes into account all
behavioural constraints of firms, consumers and goods market. The condi-
tion for equilibrium in the goods market is that output equals spending:
Q(K.L) - C t G t I t P(I). (4.19)
This condition determines the interest rate at any instant. In the sub-
section 4.4.2 we first give the open-loop equilibrium. The issue of time-
inconsistency is discussed in subsection 4.4.3. In subsection 4.4.4 we
present the feedback Stackelberg equilibria. A derivation of these feed-
back Stackelberg equilibria is given in appendix 4.
4.4.2. Open-Loop Stackelberg Equilibrium
The government's problem for the case of open-loop information
structure can be formulated as the following control problem:
m
max f iJ(C,G)e-ótdt, (4.20)
T 0
s.t.: q - (rtó)q - a{1-T},
K - I - bK,









x - (6-r)x, (4.26)
I - ~(q). (4.27)
Before calculating the optimal tax strategy, let us first rearrange the
equations (4.21)-(4.27). Firstly, remember that labour is a linear func-
tion of capital
L - hK. (4.28)
Secondly, for reasons of analytical tractability, assume that the con-
sumers' preferences are of Cobb-Douglas type
U(C,G) - a~n C t(1-a)~n G, 0~ a( 1. (4.29)
It should also be noted that we can eliminate x. Substituting (4.23) into
(4.25) gives us a value for x. This eliminating of x stems also from the
fact that the stream of consumption and investment will not be influenced
by financial streams. Similar to the Abel and Blanchard model the con-
sumers play only a passive role through clearing the goods market.
Furthermore, the equilibrium in the goods market gives us the
interest rate. The interest rate in general will depend on the state
variables and the instrument
r - r(K.q.T). (4.30)
However, it is not straightforward to compute the rate of interest that
clears the goods market. The adjustment costs in particular make the prob-
lem very complex. After some simplifying assumptions the interest function
and its derivation is given in appendix 4.1.
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So, rewriting (4.20)-(4.27) gives us
max f (a~n({1-T}aKtwhx-~(q)-y~(4(q))).(1-a)~n(TaK))e-~tdt, (4 31)
T 0
s.t.: 9 - (r(K,9.T).b)q - a(1-T), (4.32)
K - ~(q) - bK. (4.33)
The Hamiltonian is defined by
H- aln[{1-T}aK t whK -~(q) - 9~(~(q))] f(1-a)ln(TaK) ;
a(~(q)-bK) t v((rtb)q-a(1-T)). (4.34)
The maximisation of (4.31) with respect to (4.32)-(4.33) yields, assuming
an interior solution, the following necessary conditions:
a ~C 1-a ~G
C'~T ` G '~2 } v(a~rTq) - 0, (4.35)
v- vv - (rtb)v -~~'(q) t a~~ - vrq9. v(0) - 0, (4.3b)
a-(mtb)~ - a[(1-T)a t wh]~C -(1-a)~K - vrKq,
lim e-óta(t)K(t) - 0,
t~
(4.37)
where: ~- the government's undiscounted marginal value of capital,
v- the government's undiscounted marginal value of the firm's
shadow price of the capital (- q).
The solution of the model can be found from equations (4.35)-(4.37). From
equation (4.35) the optimal tax rate can be derived:
t- T(K,v,q), TK ) 0, Tq C 0, Tv ~ o. (4.38)
7z
It should be noted, that the optimal tax rate will be chosen in such a
way, thát the following equation is applicable, along the equilibrium path
(cf. (4.35)):
vG(atr q)G 1-a 1~ T 5 1-a
C - a a(1-a)K a ' (4.39)
The costate v, which gives the marginal value to the government of the
firm's investment rate, plays an important role in the analysis. It is
typically negative, because the government and the firm have conflicting
objectives (cf. Van der Ploeg (1987, p. 4171)). Thus, under the
assumption that r~q is relatively small the term between the brackets is
less than one. Equation (4.39) effectively says that the marginal utility
from public consumption is less than the marginal utility from private
consumption. The government gives up a piece of its government consumption
to stimulate capital accumulation. This is contrary to the result in
Fischer (1980) where marginal utility from private consumption equals
marginal utility from public consumption.
Determining the stationary state of this economy can be done by
putting q- K- v- a- x- 0 to zero. From x- 0 it follows, that in the
steady-state the rate of interest equals the social discount rate and
personal savings are zero. The steady-state values of A and v follow from
eqs. (4.36) and (4.37) and can be expressed as:
v" - - ~"~~(q")-(a~C"){q"~'(q")} ( 01),
S'rq9
(4.40)
a" - {a[(1-~")atwh]~C" 4 (1-a)~K" . v"rKq"}~(ótó) ) 0. (4.41)
Thus, also in the steady-state the part of public consumption in total
consumption is less than 1- a (cf. (4.39), ( 4.40)). Using equations
(4.11), (4.40) and (4.41) the optimal tax rate in the steady-state follows
directly from (4.38).
1) Assuming that a~' -(a~C){q~'} ) 0, which is quite reasonable.
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4.4.3. On Time-Znconsistency
Zn the previous section we described en optimal profit taxation plan for
the government. However, this optimal plan is time-inconsistent, because
there is an incentive for the government to reoptimise and reconsider its
tax strategy at some later date. To stimulate capital accumulation the
government announces a policy of low profit tax rate. Once the capital is
installed, the government has an incentive to renege on its announcement
and introduce a higher tax rate. Thus, contrary to Fischer (1980), also in
an economy with only one tax instrument there can be time-inconsistency.
Note, that the government's marginal value of the firm's shadow price must
equal zero at the start of the planning period, because the firm's shadow
price is free to jump at that point of time and, therefore, becomes ef-
fectively an additional policy instrument for the government. If the
government has the possibility at some later point of time to make a new
initisl plan, this shadow price again becomes zero. At a moment that
almost all capital is installed, there is an incentive for the government
to introduce a higher tax rate, so much that marginal utility from private
consumption equals marginal utility from public consumption, i.e. G- 1-aC a
The extra gain of increasing the tax rate, such that q decreases by 1, is
equal to -v. Hence, -v equals the marginal value of cheating the firm by
suddenly raising the tax rate. In this way -v can be interpreted as the
government's cost for sticking to its announced plan. Thus, the shadow
price v in this model can be interpreted as a price of time-inconsistency.
If the firm has no reason to believe that the government will
stick to its initial plan, the concept used in the previous section, which
corresponds to an open-loop equilibrium of a Stackelberg game, is no
longer a useful concept. In the literature three main streams can be qual-
ified for solving the problem of time-inconsistency. The first attempt is
what is called the loss of leadership (cf. Buiter (1983)). In this view
the government gives up its role as leader and the interactions between
private sector and government are viewed as a Nash rather than a Stackel-
berg dynamic game. The acceptance oF this view, however, would mean the
denial of the existence of policies which have announcement effects, such
as tax policies. Secondly, memory strategies, threats and incentives can
be used to sustain the time-inconsistent solution (cf. Backus and Driffill
(1985), Barro and Gordon (1983)). Thirdly, we can use recursive or so-
called feedback methods. The present government's leadership is preserved
with respect to the private sector, but it is lost with respect to future
governments, which are free to optimise.
The aim of the next subsection is to use the third approach to
solve the time-inconsistency problem. We derive the feedback Stackelberg
equilibrium for the model given in the previous sections.
4.4.4. Feedback Stackelberg Equilibria
In general it is not easy to derive the feedback Stackelberg equilibria
for a continuous time game, which is not of a linear-quadratic structure.
Some examples can be found in the literature (e.g., BaSar, Hauri, Ricci
(1985), Van der Ploeg and De Zeeuw (1989)). In appendix 4.4.2 the deriva-
tion is given for the model presented in section 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4.1. By
constructing this equilibrium we assume that the firms (or the representa-
tive firm) ignore their influence on the level of taxation. So, this equi-
librium can be interpreted as the nocommitment equilibrium with "atomis-
tic" behaviour of firms and consumers.
Proposition 4.1. If we assume that the firms do not take into account
their influence on the aggregate level of taxation then for the
macroeconomic model described in this chaater the open-loop Nash
equilibrium between Qovernment and firms coincides with the feedback
Stackelberg equilibrium ( for a proof of this proposition see appendix
4.2).
The open-loop Nash equilibrium between government and firms, which is,
under some conditions, the same as the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium,
is easy to calculate, because in derivation of subsection 4.4.2 it
effectively sets v(t) - 0 and ignores (4.21). The Nash equilibrium is
time-consistent (cf. Pohjola (1986, p. 106)). The open-loop Nash equilib-





subject to: K - ~(q) - bK,
C - (1-t)aK t whK - ~(q) - 9~(~(q)).
G - iaK.
This gives the following necessary conditions
-~aKt 1GaaK-O,






From (4.46) it follows that along the equilibrium the following equation
applies: C- láa. The optimal tax rate can be derived from (4.46) and it
turns out that
T- T(K,O,q), TK ) 0, Tq C 0, (4.48)
where T(.) is the optimal tax rate rule as defined in equation (4.38).
From this equation it follows that, given a certain level of capital, the
tax rate in the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium is higher than in the
open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium, because the second argument in the
optimal tax function is zero. Hecause there is open-loop information
structure, the behaviour of the firms and consumers are the same as in
section 4.2 and 4.3. From equations (4.7)-(4.10) it follows that since the
tax rate is higher the marginal productivity and the shadow price of
capital, i.e. q, is lower in the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium. Hence,
less capital is accumulated and unemployment is higher. In this regime
there is a reduction in the government's utility and a reduction in the
stream of the firm's cash flow compared with the open-loop Stackelberg
equilibria (see table 4.1).
Table 4.1. A compartson of the open-Zoop and feedback equilibrta.
Feedback Stackelberg Open-loop Stackelberg
No binding contracts Binding contracts
time-consistent time-inconsistent
G" 1-a G" 1-a v"GN(atrT)





For all players it is better that open-loop is played (see table 4.1), but
at the moment that the capital stock is built up, there is an incentive
for the government to reoptimise and ask a higher tax rate. The firm's
outcome is, of course, lower, if the government cheats the firm by
suddenly asking the high rate instead of sticking to its announced plan.
Therefore, a time-inconsistent plan requires binding commitments to force
the government to stick to its announced tax strategy.
The nature of the solutions examined may be further clarified by a
numerical example. Assume quadratic adjustment costs
VÍI) - n-I2 (4.49)
and choose the following parameter values: w- 0.5, ~- 0.375, ~, - 4.0,
b- 0.05, c- 0.03 and a- 0.8.1) After some calculations, the following
expression for the tax rate in the steady-state can be obtained
-------------------------------------------------------
1) In the numerical examples we have neglected the derivative of the inte-
rest function with respect to K, q, and T. Moreover, it is our guess that
these effects are relatively small.
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(1-a) a4wh - 2 (1 ~ óas)
M
~FBS - á 1-oc ~1 - 2(o.b) a
(4.50)
The open-loop solution, TOLS' is found by a numerical procedure. It should
be noted that the optimal level of taxation in the feedback steady-state
is independent of the size of the adjustment costs. In the numerical ex-
amples we considered, this is also the case for open-loop steady-states.
In table 4.2 the steady-state values of the different solution concepts
are given.

























This example clearly reveals the difference between the open-loop and the
feedback equilibria. The feedback equilibrium yields a higher value of the
steady-state tax rate and a lower level of the capital stock than the
open-loop equilibrium (see table 4.2). This lower level of capital stock
in the feedback case yields a lower level of steady-state utility. In the
open-loop case the share of public consumption goods in total output is
lower, but private consumption and total utility will be higher because
there is more capital.
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In the derivation of the feedback equilibria, we have assumed that
the firm is atomistic. In other words, each firm ignores the effect of his
own choices on economy wide variables like the tax rate. If this is not
the case the open-loop Nash equilibrium and feedback Stackelberg equilib-
rium do not coincíde. It is also possible to derive the feedback Stackel-
berg equilibrium, if the firm takes into account the effect of its actions
on the tax rate. This can be represented by assuming one representative
firm, which has feedback information structures. In appendix 4.2.2 we
derived the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium for this case. However, a
numerical exercise based on the parameters of table 4.2 suggests that the
difference is relatively small.
Table 4.3. A numertcaZ esample.
Feedback Stackelberg Feedback Stackelberg
1 Ít~ many ftrms
T" - 0.495 T" - 0.492
q' - 3.173 q" - 3.541
a" - 2.47 a" - 2.21
K" - 5.43 x" - 6.i3
C" - 5.85 C" - 6.57
G" - 1.46 G" - 1.64
I" - 0.27 I" - 0.31
~(I") - 0.30 ~(I") - 0.38
Q(K".L") - 7.88 Q(K",L") - 8.89
u" - 1.49 u" - 1.60
~"IC" - 0.250 c"~c" - 0.250
In the sequel we assume that the private agents behave atomistic.
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4.5. The Dynamic Ewlution of the Economy
In sections 4.4.2 and 4.4.4 we described the steady-states for the feed-
back and open-loop Stackelberg equilibria. In this section we describe the
paths of the economic variables, when the economy goes from its feedback
to its open-loop equilibrium. This path can be interpreted as an economy
where the government builds up credibility. Because of adjustment costs,
the economy moves slowly to its new steady-state. The solutions can be
obtained numerically by solving the two-point boundary value problem
(4.7)-(4.8), (4.36)-(4.37), where K and v are backward looking and q and a
are forward looking variables. An analytical solution is not possible,
because of the complexity of the equations, therefore, we use multiple
shooting methods. Before calculating the solution, we should first check
if the system satisfies the saddle point properties of perfect foresight
systems (e.g. Buiter (1984)). This can be done by calculating the eigen-
values of the system evaluated at its initial steady-state and its new
steady-state (see table 4.4). From table 4.4 we can conclude that the
number of backward looking variables equals the number of negative eigen-
values and that the number of forward looking variables equals the number
of positive eigenvalues, so the required properties are satisfied.
Table 4.4. The etgenvaLues.





In table 4.5 we give the dynamic paths linking the feedback steady-state
of table 4.2 with the open-loop steady-state, that can be found in the
same table.
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Table 4.5. The dynamic paths from feedback steady-state (FBS) to open-Zoop
steady-state (OLS).
K~b I ~(I) t C
FBS o.307 0.307 0.380 0.492 6.570
0 0.307 0.375 0.562 0.477 6.363
1 0.310 0.398 0.633 0.389 6.660
5 0.332 0.448 0.803 0.246 7.479
10 0.362 0.482 0.930 0.189 8.33450 0.532 0.582 1.354 0.132 12.740












FBS 11.114 0.250 0.030 2.210 6.130 0.000 3.451
0 11.114 0.250 0.076 1.946 6.130 0.000 3.9991 11.257 0.197 0.066 1.919 6.209 -o.i71 4.1835 12.025 0.119 0.055 1.810 6.632 -0.711 4.58610 13.113 0.089 0.050 1.689 7.233 -1.162 4.85850 19.304 0.06o O.o35 1.262 10.647 -2.004 5.656lo0 21.644 0.059 0.031 1.159 11.938 -2.043 5.862200 22.189 0.059 0.030 1.140 12.238 -2.046 5.879OLS 22.120 0.061 0.030 1.140 12.200 -2.054 5.879
In table 4.5 we see that the economy slowly adjusts to its new
steady-state. At time-point 0 the level of government's and consumers'
consumption is lower and the level of investment has increased by more
than 22x. Furthermore, the government reduces the level of profit taxa-
tion. In the beginning there is a fast decrease of taxes. With respect to
the state variables we see that the forward looking variables have a jump
at time-point 0. Thus, q which is the shadow price of capital for the firm
jumps from 3.451 to 3.999. The reason for this jump is that the firms at
time-point 0 anticipate a decrease in the profit tax rates in the near
future. Also the interest rate has a jump at time-point 0. It should be
noted that the interest rate clears the good market. At time-point 0 there
is a growing interest in investment and the interest rate goes up. Because
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of the fact that the capital stock increases, the interest rate decreases
smoothly to its steady-state value.
In table 4.5 we have presented the simulation for a labour inten-
sive economy, i.e. L~K - 1.8. Hereby, not only p, the parameter of the
Cobb-Douglas function, but also the fixed wage rate plays a crucial role.
A low wage rate, i.e. }, will encourage the firms to hire more employees
and profits will be higher. In table 4.6 we have given a simulation for a
more capital intensive economy with L~K - 0.286. To reach this result we
put wages equal to unity.
Table 4.6. The dynamic paths ij ru - 1.
K~b I 9~(I) Y C
FBS 0.017 0.017 0.001 0.471 0.107
0 0.017 0.021 0.001 0.452 0.103
1 0.017 0.029 0.003 0.265 0.108
5 0.020 0.039 0.006 0.l01 0.133
10 0.025 0.047 0.009 0.072 0.169
50 0.072 0.092 0.034 0.073 0.512
100 0.104 0.112 0.050 0.084 0.762
200 0.118 0.119 0.056 0.088 0.867
oLS o.119 0.119 0.056 0.090 0.873
Fss o.095 0.250 0.030 42.650 0.332
0 0.095 0.250 0.132 31.765 0.332
1 0.097 0.143 0.081 30.640 0.341
5 0.116 0.052 0.078 26.084 0.405
10 0.144 0.037 0.075 21.558 0.505
50 0.410 0.035 0.045 9.138 1.435
loo 0.596 0.039 0.034 6.765 2.089
200 0.674 0.041 0.030 6.113 2.359





















Comparing table 4.6 with table 4.5, two results should be underlined.
Firstly, note that the capital stock in the open-loop steady-state is
seven times as large as in the feedback steady-state. In table 4.5 this is
only twice as large. Thus, the credibility of government policy is more
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important in a capital intensive economy than in a labour intensive econ-
omy. Secondly, to reach the new steady-state there is undershooting of the
tax rate (see figure 4.1). The tax rate is at it lowest level after 20
periods. The reason for this is that the government wants to stimulate
accumulation. This is achieved by introducing a lower tax rate than the
steady-state value.
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180
Figure 4.1. The tax rate for dffferent wage rates.
t
Thus, the difference between the time-consistent solution and the time-
inconsistent solution depends on the wage rate. Therefore, extending our
game theoretic model to a setting where wage formation and union behaviour
is modelled (cf. Oswald (1985), Van der Ploeg (1987)) could be an interes-
ting topic of future research.
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4.6. Summary
In this chapter we have embedded the model of chapters 2 and 3 describing
the relationship between government and firm into a macroeconomic frame-
work. Actually, we have extended the model of Abel and Blanchard (1983)
with the notion of dynamic optimal taxation. In this model a market econ-
omy with infinitely long-lived utility maximising consumers and value
maximisíng firms, which face adjustment costs for capital, is described.
This model is related to standard macroeconomic theory. Consumption is a
function of wealth, investment is related to the value of firms; equilib-
rium between aggregate demand and supply is achieved by the adjustment of
interest rates.
In this chapter the government maximises the utility of a repre-
sentative consumer. Moreover, we assume that the government takes into
account the way in which firm and consumer react on its tax policy, while
the firm and the consumer take the decision of the other agents as given.
Thus, the formal outcome corresponds to a three persons Stackelberg game
with the government as leader and the firms and consumers playing Nash
against each other.
Two possible solution concepts are considered. The first solution,
which is the formal outcome of an open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium, is
time-inconsistent and therefore requires binding contracts or reputational
forces. The second solution corresponds to a feedback Stackelberg
equilibrium and is time-consistent, but yields a lower value of social
welfare. This result is similar to previous chapters. Moreover, the
dynamic paths when the economy evolves from its feedback steady-state to
its open-loop steady-state are shown. Contrary to chapters 2 and 3, there
is no need to impose an upper- or lowerbound on the tax rate. The
government's objective function guarantees smooth behaviour.
In appendix 4 we give some insight into the derivation of feedback
equilibria, which can be of interest for other macroeconomic models too.
If the firms behave atomistic (i.e. a single firm has no influence on
aggregate variables), the open-loop Nash equilibrium of a game between
government and firms coincides with the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium.
In the literature the issue of time-inconsistency by profit or
capital taxation has already been stated (e.g. Fischer (1980)). However,
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it should be noted that in his paper time-inconsistency occurs, because of
the trade off between labour and capital taxation. In our model there is
only profit taxation. Fischer did not find this source of time-inconsist-
ency, because in his model there is only taxation in the second period.
Our model shows that the time-inconsistency may arise in a perfect
foresight framework with separation between consumers and firms. The gov-
ernment's costate variable corresponding to firm shadow price of capital
can be interpreted as the shadowprice of time-inconsistency.
A shortcoming of the model in this chapter is that the wage rate
is treated as an exogenously given constant. In the next chapter, we
extend the model in such a way that it also explains the wage formation.
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CHAPTER 5. A MACROECONOMIC MODEL OF OPTIMAL TAXATION, SAVING AND INVEST-
MENT
5.1. Introduction
In the previous chapter we have extended the decentralised market model of
Abel and Blanchard (1983) by modelling the government endogenously. The
government chooses the profit tax rate in such a way that the utility of a
representative consumer is maximised. Furthermore, the issue of time-in-
consistency, which arises with dynamic profit taxation, is analysed and
the feedback equilibria, which satisfy Bellman-principle, are derived.
In this chapter we extend the model of chapter 4 in three direc-
tions. In the first place we assume that wages are no longer constant but,
instead, they can be derived from the equilibrium in the labour market. In
that case wages depend on the tax policy and there will be additional
sources of time-inconsistency.
Secondly, profit tax is no longer the only tax to be considered.
In macroeconomic models of tax incidence other tax rates are also
analysed. Following Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987), who analyse the effects
of a wage tax, a consumption tax, a sales tax and a profit tax rate, we
derive the optimal level of these taxes. Furthermore, we try to compare
the incidence of different tax rates.
In the third place we consider labour supply as an endogenous
variable. Consumers are supposed to determine the amount of leisure they
want at any point in time. By doing this we take into account the so-
called supply side effects of labour taxation (cf. Laffer (1981)). As
usual in the literature modelling endogenous labour supply will be done by
taking a general utility function, with leisure as one of the components.
The modifications mentioned above make the model more realistic,
but the calculations become quite complicated. A well-known disadvantage
of studying a number of aspects simultaneously in macroeconomic models is
the complexity. In general such models can only be solved numerically. In
our analysis concerning the comparison between different tax rates we have
to rely on numerical examples. Only for the case where the weight oF
leisure in the utility function is almost zero, are we able to derive a
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where TL and tc denote the proportional tax on labour and consumption
respectively. With respect to the utility function we assume that it is
concave and increasing in its arguments. Applying the solution technique
of the maximum principle, the following necessary conditions for the
consumer's optimum are obtained:l)




x - (6-r)x, lim e-~tx(t) - 0, (5.10)
t-~
where x is the adjoint variable of B.
From equation (5.8) the optimal supply of labour can be derived and from
(5.9) the consumption level can be obtained. It should be noted that under
the assumption made above the supply of labour is increasing function of
wages, x and a decreasing function of TL.
5.2.4. The Markets
As in chapter 4, the interest rate is determined by equilibrium in the
goods market
Q(K.L) - C t G t I t p(I). (5.11)
The condition for labour market clearing
Ld - Ls, (5.12)
where Ld (i.e. labour demand) can be obtained from equation (5.4) and Ls
(i.e. labour supply) can be obtained from equation (5.8), determines the
wage rate. So, if the tax rates are given the solution of the model is
1) For a discussion about the use of this technique see chapter 4.
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specified. In the next section the optimal level of the different tax
rates are derived under the condition that the government maximises the
utility as specified in (5.6).
5.3. Optimal Government Policies
In this section we present the way to derive the optimal levels of the
different tax rates. We assume that there is a balanced budget policy.
Given the behavioural constraints of consumer and firm as formulated in
the previous section, the government problem can be formulated as follows:
TL T ,TZ,tc 0. y
(5.13)
subject to
C - {(1-TZ)(1-Ty)Q(K,L) - I - ~(I) . wL(TZ-TL)}~(1tTC), (5.14)
G- CTC . TyQ(K,L) t TZC(1-Ty)Q(K.L) - wL] . wLTL, (5.15)
9 - (rtá)q - QK(1-TZ)(1-Ty), (5.16)












In a perfect foresight equilibrium the government by maximising (5.13)
takes into account (5.14) -(5.21) and the fact that wages are a func-
tionl) of the government's instruments and state variables (cf. Turnovsky
and Brock (1980)):
w- W(TL. Tc. Ty. TZ. K. 9).2) (5.22)
In appendix 5.1 a derivation of the optimal government policy is given.
The necessary conditions for the government's optimum are very complex and
it is very hard to interpret the solution. Therefore, for reasons of ana-
lytical tractability we make some further assumptions: take Cobb-Douglas
preferences, a Cobb-Douglas production function and quadratic adjustment
costs:
U(C, G, Lm - L) - a,in C t(1-a),~n G t y.~n(Lm-L), (5.23)
Q(K.L) - K~L1-~ (5.24)
~(I) - nI2. (5.25)
Now we state the following proposition.
Proposition 5.1. If y i.e. the component of leisure in the utility func-
tion is small and a i.e. the weight of private consumption in the util-
ity function is not too small then the government only asks wage tax and
consumption tax to finance its expenditures and it will not use sales tax
or profit tax at any stage of development (for a proof of this proposition
see appendix 5.2).
Thus, if the component of leisure in the utility function is small, the
government is in favour of a wage or a consumption tax. The reason for
this is that these two taxes are less distortionary than the other two. If
supply of labour is exogenous, wage and consumption taxes behave similarly
1) Similar to the previous chapter we will assume that the government
takes the interest rate as given.
2) The function w- W(.) can be obtained from equations (5.20) and (5.21).
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as lump sum tax. If y is small, labour supply will, irrespective of the
wage rate, be almost equal to Lm and thus the case of exogenous labour
supply is approximated. This point has also been recognised by Abel and
Blanchard for a consumption tax. However, if the weight of public consump-
tion in the utility function becomes large and the need for taxation is
great, the marginal tax burden for wage and consumption taxation may
become large. In that case the government raises the profit or sales tax.
If y increases, wage and consumption taxation become more distor-
tionary and it seems reasonable that the government increases the profit
or the sales tax and decreases the wage and consumption tax rates.
Although this result seems reasonable, a general proof is difficult. In
particular, the wage function adds some additional difficulties to the
analysis. In the next section we will clarify this issue with some
numerical examples.
An important role plays the parameter y. In the empirical litera-
ture there has been some discussion about the size of the effect of
taxation on the supply of labour (cf. Fullerton (1982), Barro (1984)).
Fullerton suggests that there is no empirical evidence for these "Laffer
curve" considerations. However, in his book about macrceconomics Barro
(1984, pp. 48-49) argues that this is the outcome of two opposite effects:
the wealth (or income) effect and the substitution effect and he gives
some evidence for U.S. and U.K. data. Recent policy reforms of income
taxation suggest that there is at least some effect on leisure. In the
next section we consider different values for this parameter w.
Similar to chapter 4, the optimal tax policy, which can be
obtained by maximising (5.13) subject to (5.14) through (5.21), can be
time-inconsistent, because there is an incentive for the government to
renege its tax policy, once the capital stock is accumulated. If the
government asks a low level of profit or sales taxation to stimulate
accumulation, then it is obvious that if the equilibrium comes near to its
steady-state, it is better for the government to raise the profit or sales
tax rate instead of the wage or consumption tax rate. Therefore, if the
firms and the consumers have no reason to believe that the government will
stick to its announced policy, the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium is no
longer a useful equilibrium. In that case the feedback Stackelberg equi-
librium is a good alternative. For this special model, this equilibrium
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can be obtained by putting v(t), the shadow price of q for the government
(see appendix 5), equal to zero at every time-point.l) In the feedback
Stackelberg equilibrium savings and investment are disencouraged and the
utility will be lower than in case of the open-loop Stackelberg equilib-
rium.
If y is small, it follows from proposition 5.1 that in the open-
loop Stackelberg equilibrium the profit or sales taxes are zero and the
wage and consumption taxes are positive. In the feedback equilibrium for
small values of y this is the reserve. The government is in favour of
introducing the sales or profit taxes. Therefore, if the government can
commit itself to only wage and consumption taxes, it achieves more wel-
fare. From this point of view there is an incentive to implement such a
policy rule.
5.4. Some Numerical Examples
In this section we present some numerical exemples of the optimal level of
taxatíon. Hereby, we focus on the case that there is only wage and profit
taxation and only consider the steady states. The following parameter
values will be chosen: ~, - 10, 6- 0.03, b- 0.05, p- 0.5, Lm - 0.044. In
this section we consider three simulations:
- An increase of the weight of public expenditure (1-a) in the utility
function from 0.25 to 0.75 for the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium.
- An increase of the weight of leisure (w) in the utility function from
0.02 to 0.20 for the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium.
- An increase of the weight of leisure (y) in the utility function from
0.02 to 0.20 for the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium.
In table 5.1 we give the optimal open-loop Stackelberg levels of
profit and wage taxation if the weight of public expenditures increases.
Here y is equal to 0.02. If the weight of public expenditures is small
(i.e. a- 0.75), then the government only asks wage tax and no profit tax
(see table 5.1). Profit tax decreases the capital stock and, consequently,
1) Here we use the fact that the firms' level of investment does not
depend directly on the tax rates and that the firms are so small that they
can not influence the aggregate level of taxation (see appendix 4.2.3).
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the financial wealth (the sum of human and nonhuman wealth) in the econ-
omy. Therefore, it is better to tax direct on wages. Although consumers
then have to pay more tax on their wage income, the total income will be
higher.
Table 5.1. The steady-states by different leael
of publtc expendttures.
a- 0.25 a- 0.50 a- 0.75
T o.690 0.686 0.370L
2 o.233 0.000 0.000Z
Q 1.439 1.605 1.623
x o.439 0.605 0.623
C o.029 0.063 0.091
G o.076 0.053 0.030
L o.0395 0.0399 0.042
I o.022 0.030 0.031
~(I) 0.005 0.009 0.010
Q o.132 0.155 0.162
w 1.666 1.947 1.926
v -17.249 -3.967 -1.520
~ 25.159 16.775 14.895
G~C 2.642 0.851 0.329
If the amount of public expenditures increases, the government raises the
wage tax. Because of this higher wage tax the demand for leisure increases
and wages go up. This effect will partly be compensated by a decrease in
financial wealth, which implies a lower demand for leisure, and a lower
capital stock, which implies a lower demand for labour by the firms (see
figure 5.1). The increase in wage tax shifts the supply curve to the left,
while the decrease in financial wealth shifts the supply curve to the
right. The decrease in capital shifts the demand curve to the right (see
figure 5.1). It should be noted that for this particular example the
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supply curve is relatively inelastic, since we are in the upward sloping
part of the curve. Thus, the wage tax behaves more or less as a lump-sum
tax (cf. Abel and Blanchard (1983, p. 688)).1) This changes at the moment




Figure 5.1. Labour market equilibrium.
If we further increase the weight of public expenditures in the utility
functíon, from a certain point on the government will then raise the
profit tax. In table 5.2 we see that if the weight of public expenditures
1-a is 0.~5 the government introduces the profit tax. Raising the profit
tax instead of the wage tax has two consequences. First, the wage rate
goes down and the marginal productivity of capital goes up. Second, the
firm's demand for labour increases. These two effects compensate the
decrease of capital stock and financial wealth caused by the higher profit
tax. Thus, if the wage tax becomes larger we approximate the top of the
Laffer curve and further tax increases have to be financed by profit
taxation.
If we compare our results with Chamley (1986), where for a Cass-
Koopmans economy the optimal trade off between capital and labour taxation
-------------------------------------------------------
1) The consumption tax in the Abel and Blanchard model, where there is
inelastic supply of labour, works out in the same way as a wage tax.
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in the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium is described, we see one impor-
tant difference. In his model the capital tax in the steady-state is
always zero, while in our model this is not necessarily the case. The
reason for this is that there is a profit tax rate, which works out in a
slightly different way than the wealth or capital tax paid by the con-
sumers (cf. Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980 p. 129)). If the labour market is
clearing, the incidence of profit tax can be shifted to the consumers by
paying lower wages. Therefore, it is better to tax labour right away,
because profit taxation only contributes additional distortions. However,
if the supply of labour becomes very elastic the ability for the firm to
lower wages becomes less. Furthermore, it should be noted that a positive
profit tax rate makes credibility more important (v has in the case of a
positive tax a value of -17.249 and a value of -3.967 or -1.520 when
profit tax rate is zero).
Table 5.2. The OLS steady-states by tncreasfng y.
~- 0.02 w- 0.08 y- 0.14 y- 0.20
~ o.000 0.000 0.141 0.153Z
TL o.384 0.372 0.116 0.092
q 1.623 1.579 1.471 1.442
x 0.623 0.579 0.471 0.442
C 0.0898 0.0816 0.0742 0.0694
G o.0310 0.0272 0.0256 0.0239
L o.042 0.037 0.035 0.033
I 0.031 0.029 0.024 0.022
~(I) o.olo 0.008 0.006 0.005
Q 0.162 0.146 0.129 0.120
w 1.926 1.980 1.826 1.836
v -1.587 -2.069 -5.052 -6.388
a 14.963 16.382 18.zo2 19.226
G~C o.346 0.333 0.346 0.345
u o.0681 0.0613 0.0563 0.0526
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In table 5.2 an example is given, where the weight of leisure in
the utility function increases. Here a is set equal to 0.74. If y equals
0.02 we see that government only introduces wage tax corresponding to
proposition 5.1. To avoid negative utility define U for this table as
Oa01-a(L:L)y
If y íncreases from 0.02 to 0.08, the government still only uses
wage tax to finance its expenditures. It decreases the wage tax rate from
0.38 to 0.37. If y increases, the wage tax becomes more distortionary. The
wage rate gces up, because the higher y leads to a shift of the supply
curve to the left. This is partly compensated by a decrease in financial




Figure 5.2. Labour market equflibrtum.
If y increases from 0.08 to 0.14, it becomes optimal for the gov-
ernment to introduce also a certain amount of profit tax, even though the
weight of public expenditures is low. The reason for this is that a higher
value of y makes labour taxation more distortionary and increases the tax
burden. In other words, (see figure 5.3) a higher value for y shifts the
Laffer curve to the left.
If y increases from 0.14 to 0.20 the wage tax rate further decrea-
ses from 11.6X to 9.2X and the profit tax increases from 14.1z to 15.3X.
In figure 5.4 the relation between y and the optimal wage tax and profit
tax rate is illustrated.
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0.02 0.08 0.14 0.20
W
Figure 5.4. The optimal i~- and TZ-values fn case of OLS.
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As pointed out before, the described open-loop Stackelberg equi-
libria in table 5.2 are time-inconsistent. Once capital is accumulated,
the government has an incentive to renege and introduce a higher tax rate
on capital. If time-consistency is required, the feedback Stackelberg
equilibrium is the proper equilibrium. In table 5.3 we have given the
steady-state values for the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium. As we should
expect the government introduces the profit tax instead of the wage tax,
because announcing a low profit tax rate is not credible. Similar to pre-
vious chapters we see that the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium yields a
lower steady-state utility compared to the open-loop Stackelberg equilib-
rium with the same w. If w increases from 0.02 to 0.20 we see that the
profit tax rate slightly decreases (see also figure 5.5). Furthermore,
from table 5.2 and 5.3 we may conclude that the importance of credibility,
i.e. the difference of utility between open-loop and feedback equilibrium,
decreases if w increases.
Table 5.3. The FBS steady-states by tncreasfng w.
w- 0.02 w- 0.08 w- 0.14 w- 0.20
zL 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
T o.2059 0.2055 0.2052 0.2048Z
q 1.480 1.455 1.433 1.414
x o.480 0.455 0.433 0.414
c o.0838 0.0780 0.0730 0.0686
c o.0295 0.0274 0.0256 0.0241
L o.043 0.039 0.036 0.034
I 0.024 0.023 0.022 0.021
~(I) O.OO6 0.005 0.005 0.004
Q o.143 0.133 0.125 0.118
w 1.677 1.706 1.733 1.758
a 16.448 17.378 18.289 19.183
c~c o.351 0.351 0.351 0.351
v o.0639 0.0594 0.0556 0.0522
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The result for the feedback equilíbria are similar to Fischer (1980), who
finds for e simple two-period model that in the feedback equilibrium the
government is in favour of capital instead of wage tax. The difference
between Fischer's work and our model is that wages are not constant and
that there are adjustment costs, which implies a well-defined microecono-
mic behaviour of consumers and firms. In table 5.3, it is shown that the
wages are much lower in the feedback equilibrium than in the open-loop
equilibrium. Labour supply increases because of less financial wealth and
lower wage taxation. Labour demand decreases because of a lower capital
stock. These two facts together lead to lower wages.
0.02 0.08 0.14 0.20
TZ
Figure 5.5. The optimal TL- and ~[Z-values in case of FBS.
5.5. Summary
In this chapter we have derived the optimal level of different
often used tax rates in a market economy. The consumers and the government
maximise a utility function depending on private and public consumption
and the amount of leisure. The firms maximise net cash flows and face
costs of adjustment for capital. Furthermore, we assume market clearing on
both output and labour market. Now also we distinguish between two pos-
sible equilibria: the open-loop and the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium.
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The first solution concept gives the highest possible welfare, but re-
quires aome type of commitment.
In spite of the relatively simple structure of the model, the
analytical derivation of the optimal policy for the government is in gene-
ral not easy. In particular, the fact that the government takes into
account that markets are cleared causes some technical difficulties.
Therefore, for a comparison of the optimal tax policies in various cases
we rely on some numerical examples and we focus on the steady-states only.
A crucial role in the analysis plays the weight of leisure in the utility
function. If this weight is relatively small we can give a general clas-
sification of tax rates. In that case a government should choose wage or
consumption tax to finance their expenditures, since those taxes will not
disencourage capital accumulation.
If the component of leisure in total utility increases, numerical
examples of the steady-state show that the government should then choose a
mixed tax policy. Furthermore, the examples show that the importance of
credibility decreases if the importance of leisure increases. In future
research it would be worth while to investigate the dynamic paths of such
an economy and show the link between growth and the choice of taxes.
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CHAPTER 6. OPTIMAL GOVERNMFIVT DEBT UNDER DISTORTIONARY TAXATION
6.1. Introduction
In the previous chapter we have described the level of optimal taxation if
the government maximises the welfare of a representative consumer. We
considered only the impact of distortionary taxation assuming that lump
sum taxes are not available as an instrument of economic policy. In chap-
ter 2 through 4 we analysed the issue of optimal profit taxation, while in
chapter 5 the trade off between optimal profit, wage and other taxes was
described. However, in these chapters we assumed balanced budget policy.l)
Confronted with the large budget deficits in a number of Western
countries this does not seem such a realistic assumption. An interesting
question in this respect for the previous models would be: what will the
optimal level of taxation and debt be if the government has the possibil-
ity to borrow or lend money. That in the case of distortionary taxation
debt policy can have real effects has already been stated by Barro (1979).
In this seminal paper Barro approximated the distortionary effects of
taxation and the costs of collecting taxes by a reduced form equation and
the debt policy is used to smooth the tax burden over time. Following the
route of the previous chapters we start from microfoundations and try to
show in this chapter a more elaborate picture of the factors determining
optimal debt.
However, facing the model of chapter 5 for analysing this question
there are some difficulties. The first problem is that in a model with an
infinite horizon the optimal deficit can become extremely large (e.g.
Romer (1988)). of course, assuming No-Ponzi-Games quarantees that from a
certain point on the government has to pay back the deficit and raise
taxes. However, as in Romer the choice of such a time-point can be arbi-
trary. The second problem is the general technology. In that case the
factor returns (r and w) will not be invariant to the tax policy and this
add as we saw in chapter 5 some additional sources of inconsistency into
the analysis. Therefore, we cast the analysis in terms of a two-period
1) Only in section 3.4.3 we briefly discussed the issue of a debt policy
for the basic model.
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model with e linear technology, where the second period can be seen as
representing the entire future. Furthermore, we assume that there is only
a distortionary taxation on labour and there is no separation between
consumer and firms. In the last section we briefly discuss what will
happen if we extend the model with a capital tax.
Thus, this chapter focusses on the role of government borrowing
and lending in a macroeconomic model with a distortionary tax on labour
income. The economic role of public debt is to shift tax distortions over
time. Under well-specified conditions this policy implies tax smoothing
(uniform tariff across periods). The familiar case of tax smoothing will
be used as a benchmark to analyse the role of government debt in some
specisl but not unimportant situations. More specifically, attention will
be paid to optimal public debt when government spending is productive
instead of exhaustive. Moreover, we will consider optimal tax policy in a
case where the government treats present and future generations alike,
while the private sector discounts future consumption of goods and lei-
sure. As will be shown, tax smoothing is not optimal in these cases for
purely economic reasons. Political aspects of public debt, as discussed in
Persson and Svensson (1989) and Alesina and Tabellini (1987), and over-
lapping generations, as discussed in Diamond (1965) and Atkinson and
Stiglitz (1980), are not taken into account.
Even with a tax on wage income and a linear technologyl) the gov-
ernment policy may be time-ínconsistent as shown in Rogers (1987) and
Persson and Tabellini (1990). Under these circumstances the introduction
of a credibility constraint to attain time-consístency may have consequen-
ces for debt policy. Credibility may be another reason to deviate from a
policy of tax smoothing. A discussion of the problem of time-consistency
is therefore appropriate to get a proper understanding of the economic
factors which may determine public debt.
This chapter is organised as follows. In section 6.2 we present
the standard two-period model (e.g. Rogers (1987)) and formulate the con-
ditions for tax smoothing and its implications for debt. Applying a speci-
fication of this model analytical solutions for the cases mentioned above
-------------------------------------------------------
1) So that wages are fixed.
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are derived in section 6.3. There is no time-inconsistency in these sec-
tions, because for the time being we assume that government spending is
exogenous. As a consequence the government has no possibility to cheat in
the second period. The issue of time-consistency and debt is discussed in
section 6.4 using a different specification. Numerical examples are pre-
sented to illustrate the analytical results. In section 6.5 we discuss
what will happen if we add a capital tax to these kinds of models. Final-
ly, in section 6.6 the chapter closes with some conclusions.
6.2. A ltao-Period Model
In this chapter following Fischer (1980) and Judd (1985) we keep the in-
stitutional structure simple: there are only consumers, who hire labour
and own some capital or bonds. Thus, there is no separation between the
saving and investment decision. Consumers have to decide on consumption
and leisure in both periods. They live for two periods or alternatively
they live for one period and take care of their heirs in the second
period. The utility function of a representative agent is assumed to be
linear separable:
U- ul(C1) t vl(Lm-L1) t hl(G1) t 1}0 [u2(C2) t v2(Lm-L2) t
h2(G2)~.1) (6.1)
where Ct, Lt, Gt denote consumption, labour supply and public spending in
period t respectively. The felicity functions ut, vt and ht are increasing
and concave. For the time being we assume that government expenditure is
exogenous, so that the terms in Gt can be ignored. The consumer maximises
equation (6.1) subject to budget constraints for periods 1 and 2. The
government imposes a tax on wage income in both periods. The real wage
1) To put forward the difference with the continuous-time model denote the
different time periods with subscript t.
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rate and the interest rate are given for the individual. Assuming zero
initial wealth and setting the real wage rate equal to one,l) we may write
C1 . B 5 L1(1-TL ),
1




where B denotes first period savings, r denotes the interest rate on
savings and TL denotes the tax rate in period t. Savings cum interest
t
payments can be spend in the second period.
Maximisation of (6.1) subject to (6.2) and (6.3) results in the
first order conditions (assuming an interior solution):
ui(C1) ltr
u2(C2) - i;o, (6.4)
vi(Lm-L1) - (1-TL )ui(C1)~ (6.5)
1
v2(Lm-L2) - (1-2L )u2(C2), (6.6)
2
where first derivatives are indicated by a prime. Equation (6.4) states
that the marginal rate of substitution between current and future consump-
tion equals the real interest rate. Equation (6.5) and (6.6) specify the
leisure-consumption trade off in each period. Equations (6.4)-(6.6) to-
gether with the budget constraints (6.2) and (6.3) can be solved for C1,
C2, L1, L2 and B.
The real wage rate and the interest rate are determined in factor
markets by equating supply and demand. Aggregate labour supply and aggre-
gate savings follow by summing over individuals. Labour demand and demand
for (financisl) capital can result through the profit maximising behaviour
-------------------------------------------------------
1) The conclusions of this model survive all of the following modifica-
tions:
(1) allowíng for bequests and endowments,
(2) extending the number of periods,
(3) different wage rates for each period.
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of firms. The problem can be solved elegantly way by postulating a linear
technology in labour and capital
Q(Kt,Lt) - aKtf bLt, t- 1,2. (6.7)
Equation (6.7) implies that marginal products are constant, so that factor
demands are completely elastic. The real wage rate equals w- b, which is
set equal to unity for convenience. Furthermore, to avoid corner solutions
we assume that the consumers are indifferent between capital and govern-
ment bonds. This implies that the gross return on capital (a) equals the
gross return on bonds (1 ; r).
The government supplies the public consumption good in both
periods. Facpenditure in the first period can be financed by taxing labour
income or by issuing government bonds, which are perfect substitutes for
financial assets issued by the private sector. In the second period the
government has to raise taxes to pay for second period expenditure on
goods and servicing debt incurred in the first period. It is assumed that
the government always honours its debt. The alternative of financing a
deficit by printing money is not taken into account.l) The government
budget constraints can now be written as
G1 5 L1TL t Z,
1
G2t (ltr)Z S L2~L ,2
where Z denotes the level of government debt.2)
ding is assumed to be exogenous. This assumption
(6.8)
(6.9)
Recall that public spen-
is relaxed in section
6.4. The government maximises the welfare of its citizens, but may apply a
1) The consequences of financing the government deficit by money growth in
a model of optimal taxation are discussed in Turnovsky and Brock (1980),
Lucas and Stokey (~983) and Persson, Persson and Svensson (1987).
2) Summation of the budget constraints of consumers and the government in
both periods yields the resource constraint C1 t G 1 t K- L1 and
C2 t G2 - L2 . aK assuming B- K t Z. As both financial assets give the
same rate of return consumers are indifferent with respect to holding
private and public debt.
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different discount rate (g). As observed by Ramsey (192~) it may be rea-
sonable not to discount future streams of goods and leisure.l) The conse-
quences of such a behaviour for debt are analysed in section 6.3.4. In
maximising the common good the government behaves as a leader in a
Stackelberg game with atomistic behaving consumers as followers. It
announces the optimal tax rate whereupon the private sector chooses the
time-paths of consumption and leisure. The reactions of the private sector
are taken into account by the government in determining the optimal tax
rate on labour income. Moreover, the government must satisfy its budget
constraints (6.8) and (6.9).
It is well-known that government borrowing may be applied to
smooth tax distortions over time. However, it is difficult to characterise
the solution of the problem of optimal taxation in general terms. To
clarify this issue the special case of tax smoothing T - T may serveL1 L2
as a benchmark for further discussion. As appears from equations (6.4)-
(6.6), tax smoothing is optimal if the following conditions are fulfilled:
(1) the discount rate of the government and the private sector should be
the same (~ - 6); (2) the private discount rate should be equal to the
rate of interest (6 - r); (3) the felicity functions for leisure should be
equal across periods (vl - v2). It should be noticed that it is not
necessary to assume that consumption is smoothed over time (C1 - C2). The
latter result occurs if the felicity function for the consumption of goods
are concave and equsl across periods (u - u).1 2
Under conditions (1)-(3) the marginal trade off between leisure
and consumption is the same in both periods. It is then optimal for the
government to impose equal tax rates (TL - ZL , so that L1 - L2). The
1 2
optimal amount of debt can then be derived from equation (6.8) and (6.9)
(with equality sign):
Z - G1-G2 -
G - GP.2 4 r 1
-------------------------------------------------------
(6.10)
1) In the previous chapters we assumed that the government has the same
discount rate as the private sector.
G
where GP -(G1 . 13r)(24r) is the permanent level of government spending.
Debt policy should be simed at smoothing peaks and troughs in government
spending ( e.g. Barro (19~9)). In the next section we shall present expli-
cit solutions for some situations in which it is not optimal to smooth tax
rates.
6.3. Optimal Debt: Some Special Cases
6.3.1. Introduction
The special cases considered in this section relate to government invest-
ment (productive spending) and to a divergence between private and public
discount rates. To obtain tractable results the felicity functions have to
be specified. This will be done in such a way that the conditions for tax
smoothing will be fulfilled. As observed in section 6.2 tax smoothing may
be used as a benchmark in discussing more complex cases of optimal taxa-
tion. In section 6.3.2 the benchmark model will be specified. Government
spending is assumed exogenous and exhaustive. The consequences of produc-
tive government spending are discussed in section 6.3.3. In section 6.3.4
it is assumed that the government behaves in a non-Pigouvian way by
treating present and future generations on the same footing (the egalita-
rian society). The analytical results obtained are illustrated by presen-
ting a numerical example in section 6.3.5.
6.3.2. The Benchmark Model
It is convenient to work with a linear felicity function for con-
sumption of goods u(Ct) - Ct for t- 1,2. To avoid corner solutions we
further assume that the private discount rate equals the rate of interest
(6 - r). The felicity function for leisure is given by v(Lm-Lt) -
y..~n(Lm-Lt), t- 1,2. As can be easily checked the conditions for tax
smoothing are fulfilled in this case. Moreover, consumers are indifferent
with respect to present and future consumption, so that savings can be set
equal to public borrowing: B- Z.
Substitution of these assumptions into equation (6.1) gives:
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U- C1 f y.~n(Lm-L1) 4 140 (C2 t y.~n(Lm-L2)).
Maximisátion of equation (6.11) subject to the budget
(6.2) and (6.3) and assuming w- 1 for convenience yields
C1 - L1(1-TL ) - Z,
1
C2 - L2(1-TL ) t (1'r)Z,
2
(L iL ) - (1-iL )~
m 1 1








Substitution of these results into equation (6.11) taking acount of y- 1
gives the following expression for the government utility function
V - (LmiLl) - Z . ~n(Lm-L1) , 1~6 [(Lm2L2) . (ltr)Z . ~n(Lm-L2)].
(6.16)
The government maximises V subject to the budget constraints (6.1~) and
(6.18) which can be written as:
G1- L1[1 -(L 1L )] t Z,
m 1
C2t (l~r)Z - L2[1 - (LmiL2)].
(6.1~)
(6.18)
The first order conditions for a maximum of V with respect to L1, L2 and Z
are:
Li . al(ÍLm-L1)2 - Lm) - 0.
1~Q L2 t~2((Lm-L2)2 - Lm) - 0~





where al and a2 denote the Lagrange multipliers associated with the gov-
ernment budget constraints (6.1~) and (6.18). Substitution of equation
(6.11) in equation (6.10), taking account of the assumption ~- r, result
in:
L2 f al((Lm-L2)2 - Lm) - 0. (6.22)
As appears from equations (6.19) and (6.22) the supply of labour is equal
across periods, this result is obtained by imposing uniform tax rates over
time: T - 2 . The optimal amount of government debt follows from equa-L1 L2
tion (6.10).
6.3.3. Productive Government Spending
The government has to invest in social overhead capital to keep the econ-
omy going. As discussed in Arrow and Kurz (19~0) some forms of social
overhead may yield direct utility. In other cases government capital may
enhance productivity and therefore consumption in an indirect way. The
latter aspect is also analysed in the seminal work by Arrow and Kurz, but
here we do not take it into account. In line with the two-period model it
is assumed that government capital fully depreciates after having been
used in the second period. If there is no initial social overhead capital
we can equate the stock of capital available at the beginning of the
second period with the amount of government investment in the first period
which is denoted by G1. In our model social overhead capital is supposed
to diminish the disutility of labour, because it improves the environment
in which people have to work. This idea is captured by the preference
function:
U- C1 t~n(Lm-L1) t 146 [C2 t G ~n(Lm-L2)~. (6.23)
1
Government spending is again an exogenous variable in the model. To rea-
lise the intended effects we assume G1 ~ 1.
There is a Pigouvian government, which maximises equation (6.23)
subject to the government budget constraints and the behavioural equations
of economic agents. The first order conditions for this case read:
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L1 t al((Lm-L1)2 - L) - 0.
lt~ L2 t a2(G ( Lm-L2)2 - Lm) - 0.
1
146 - 1 t A1 -( ltr)~2 - 0.
Gl - L1[1 -(L 1L )] t Z,
m 1
G
(l.r)Z - L2[1 - (L -L ) ~'m 1
These results give rise to the following proposition.
(Lm-L2)2. The latter
Proposition 6.1. It is optimal to impose a higher tax rate in the second
period compared with that in the first period (TL C TL ). Labour supply
1 2
will nevertheless be larger in the second period (L1 ~ L2) and government
borrowing exceeds the level which is optimal in case of exhaustive expen-
G
diture ( Z ) 2}r).
Proof. From equations (6.24), (6.25) and (6.26) we get
L1 - 1(Lm-L1)Z - Lm
~ 1 if (Lm-L1)2 ) G
2 G (Lm-L2) - Lm 1
1
holds for L1 ( L2 and G1 ) 1. From the first
TL1 1-1~(Lm-L1)
behaviour we have: - ~ 1
also holds for L1 (
TL2 1-G1~(Lm'L2)








order conditions of consumer
if (Lm-L1) ) G1(Lm-L2), which
1
both results we may write
t L ) T L, so that L(1 - 1 )) L(1 - 1 )L2 2 L1 1 2 (Lm-L2) 1 (Lm-L1) '
1
Applying equa-
tion ( 6.28) we can state ( ltr)Z ) L1(1 -(L -L ) ), which together with
m 1
G1
equation (6.27) yields (ltr)Z ) G1 - Z~ Z) 2;r. q.e.d.
If there is only nonproductive government expenditure in period 1 optimal
G
debt equals Z- 24r as appears from formula (6.10) and it is optimal to
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smooth tax rates. In the case that government spending is productive a
larger amount should be borrowed, because it is optimal to impose a higher
tax rate in the second period. To put it differently, the work-leisure
margin in the second period shifts in favour of work. The second period
tax rate is therefore less distortionary and can be increased vis 8 vis
the first period tax rate. Total tax receipts will, nevertheless, be
higher in the second period than under tax smoothing, and so will the
optimal amount of government debt.
6.3.4. The Egalitarian Society
The government discount rate is set to zero (~, - 0), while the private
discount rate is assumed to be positive (v ) 0). In this case one could
speak of an egalitarian society, because the government treats present
and future generations alike. The second period optimality conditions can
in this case be written as:
L2 . a2((Lm- L2)2 - Lm) - 0,
1~2 - ltr (~1'r)~




The first period optimum corresponds to equations (6.1~) and (6.19). From
these conditions the following proposition can be derived.
Proposition 6.2. It is optimal to tax labour in the first period more
heavily (TL ) TL ), so that relatively more labour is supplied in the
1 2
second period (L1 C L2). Even with uniform government expenditure across
periods (G1 - G2) tax smoothing is not optimal in this case and the
government retires debt or lends from the public (Z C 0).
Proof. We first show ~1 ) 1, so that ~1 ) a2 from equation ( 6.30). Equa-
tion (6.19) can be written as al - L1~(Lm-(Lm-L1)2) -
(Lm - 11,~ )~(Lm - (1-T )2) ) 1 for (1-iL ) C 1.L1 L1 1
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Dividing equations (6.19) and (6.29) gives:
L1 ~1 ( Lm-L1)2 - Lm
L2 - ~2 (Lm-L2)2 - Lm.
If L1 ~ 1 and ~1 ) 1 then
L2 ~2
Notice that the nominator
(Lm-L1)2 - Lm
we must have 2 ~ 1.
(Lm-L2) - Lm
and denominator are both negative so that this
condition can be reformulated as (Lm-L1)2 )(Lm-L2)2. However, this can
only be true if L1 ( L2. With iL ) TL and L1 C L2 we have TL L1 ) tL L21 2 1 2
because optimal tax rates lie on the rising branch of the Laffer curve.
From equations (6.19) and (6.22) it can be derived that this rising branch
is characterised by (Lm - Lt)2 ) Lm (t - 1,2). For G1 - G2 we now get
Z( 0 as follows directly from equations (6.8) and (6.9). q.e.d.
The government has a lower discount rate than the private sector and
therefore raises aggregate savings in favour of future generations. The
additional savings must come from the government sector (Z ( 0), which
taxes the younger generation more heavily than the older one (TL )~L )'1 2
Optimal taxation is now not only a matter of minimising the excess burden,
but also of intergenerational welfare. These objectives are to be traded
off in an optimal manner. An alternative way to describe this trade off
between objectives is to argue in terms of the marginal cost of public
fonds, which are reflected in the present value of the Lagrange multi-
pliers (e.g. Persson and Tabellini (1990)). The marginal cost of public
a
funds is higher in the second period (a2 ) ltr), so that it is optimal to
have a higher tax rate in the first period.
6.3.5. A Numerical Example
The analytical results obtained are illustrated by numerical examples
presented in table 6.1. The examples are based on the following parameter
values and exogenous variables:
Benchmark model : Lm - 10, r- o-~- 0.5, G1 - 2, G2 - 0.
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Productive spending: Lm - 10, r- a- g- 0.5, G1 - 2, G2 - 0.
Egalitarian society: Lm - 10, r- a- 0.5, ~- 0, G1 - 2, G2 - 0.
In the benchmark model there is tax smoothing and the amount of government
debt (Z) corresponds to formula (6.10). Exhaustive public spending crowds
out private consumption in period 1, so that private savings match the
public deficit. With productive government expenditure the tax rate in the
second period (TL ) is higher, while the first period rate (TL ) is lower
2 1
compared with the benchmark. The lower tax rate in the first period allows
the government to raise the amount of borrowing from the private sector.
In the second period consumption (C2) is higher despite a higher tariff on
wage income. In the egalitarian society the tax rate in the first period
is higher than in the second period. The lower tax rate in the second
period allows a higher consumption level (C2) than that in the first
period. Public debt is lower than in the benchmark model because the gov-
ernment forsters aggregate savings. With uniform government expenditure
across periods (G1 - G2 - 2) there would be a surplus (Z --0.1~9).







G1 2.00 2.00 2.00







z 0.800 1.109 0.663
L1 8.843 8.889 8.821
[.2 8.843 9.392 8.8~4
C1 6.843 6.889 6.821
C2 8.843 9.392 8.8~4
v 12.981 13.255 15.982
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A strict welfare comparison of the cases considered is not pos-
sible, ~because the social welfare function differs across the examples
presented. However, the results with respect to V are plausible. With pro-
ductive government spending social welfare is higher than with pure ex-
haustive spending. In the egalitarian society sociel welfare is higher
than in the benchmark model, as a result of the lower public discount
rate, which dominates the negative welfare effect of a change in private
spending.
6.4. Time-Inconsistency and Debt
If government expenditure is taken into account as an endogenous variable
the government has two instruments in the second period. Once this period
has been arrived at it may then be optimal to change the optimal plan with
respect to these instruments. The government may surprise or cheat con-
sumers, so that economic policy is time-inconsistent. In a case of wage
taxation cheating may be preferable if the consumption-leisure margin ex-
post differs from this margin ex-ante. It is always possible to eliminate
the cheating option by calculating the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium.l)
However, also now there is a price to be paid for consistency. As denoted
before a feedback Stackelberg equilibrium usually yields a lower welfare
level than an ex-ante solution or open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium (e.g.
Fischer (1980), Rogers (1987)).2) It may be interesting to analyse the
consequences of time-consistency for government debt policy. Unfortunately
the problem cannot be solved in general terms, so that we must rely on a
(numerical) example.
Following a suggestion by Persson and Tabellini (1990, Ch. 8) we
introduce the following assumptions: ul(C1) - C1, u2(C2) -~n(C2),
vl(Lm-L1) -~n(Lm-L1), v2(Lm-L2) -~n(Lm-L2), h2(GZ) -~n(G2), G1 - 0 and
a- 0. The utility function of the representative individual can then be
expressed as:
1) To be precise, if we calculate the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium we
mean the nocommitment equilibrium with atomistic behaviour of consumers.
2) However see for a counter example Van der Ploeg and De Zeeuw (1989).
115
U - C1 t ,Cn(Lm-L1) . .Cn(C2) ~ ~n(Lm-L2) t ~n(G2). (6.32)
Consumers maximise U with respect to C1, C2, L1 and L2 subject to their
budget constraints. Asssuming r- 0 the intertemporal budget constraint
can be written as
Clt C2- (1-YL )Llt (1-~L )L2.
1 2
(6.33)
It should be noticed that the conditions for tax smoothíng are fulfilled
in this case. From the first order conditions for a maximum of U subject
to equation (6.33) the following solutions can easily be derived:







L - L -
1






It is assumed that C1 is always positive. Substitution of equations
(6.34)-(6.37) in equation (6.32) gives the indirect utility function:
V - (2-TL -TL )Lm - 3 t ,~n(1-T ) t ,in(1-T ) t ,~n(G2). (6.38)
1 2 L1 L2
The government maximises V with respect to TL , TL and G2 subject to the
1 2
intertemporal budget constraint:
G2 - TL L1. iL L2.
1 2
(6.39)
First period government expenditure (G1) is set equal to zero, because it
is inessential for the problem of time-inconsistency. The first order
conditions for a maximum of V are
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1 1 L2-Lm ; 1-TL } A(Lm - 1-TL - 1-t 2)
- 0~




where ~ denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated with the government
budget constraint (6.39). Equations (6.39)-(6.42) can be solved for tL ,
1
2L , G2 and ~ and gives us the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium. As
2
appears from (6.40) and (6.41) it is indeed optimal to smooth taxes
(T - T ). Moreover, it should be noted that government debt is negativeL1 L2
(Z --TL L1), because taxes are raised in the first period, while govern-
1
ment spending is zero in this period.
In the second period when the decisions made in period 1 belong to
the past the consumers' problem can be specified as
max U2 - ~n(C2) t ~n(Lm-L2) t ~n(G2), (6.43)
{C2,L2}
subject to C2 -(1-TL )L2 t B. (6.44)
2
Savings (B) are invested in private or public bonds as shown in section
6.2. Denoting the Lagrange multiplier associated with budget constraint
(6.44) by ~2 the first order conditions can be written as




Solving equations (6.44)-(6.46) for C2 and L2 yields
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CZ - 2 ~(1-TL ) Lm } B),
2
1 B




It should be observed that equations (6.47) and (6.48) are equivalent to
equations ( 6.35) and (6.37) if TL is not changed. This can easily be
2
checked. Savings are defined as B-(1-~L )L1 - C1. Substitution of equa-
1
tion (6.34) and ( 6.36) into this savings function results in
B - 2 - (1-TL )Lm.
2
(6.49)
If this outcome is substituted in equations (6.47) and (6.48) we get the
second period consumption level and labour supply as shown in respectively
equations (6.35) and (6.37). However, there is no reason to assume that






Figure 6.1. Consurrrption versus leisure diagram.
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The effects of s rise in the second period tax rate on the supply
of labbur differ in the ex-ante situation from that in the ex-post situa-
tion as can be deduced from equations (6.3~) and (6.46). There is no
reason to suppose that the ex-post Lagrange multiplier ~2 is equal to
unity. To put it differently, the income effects of a change in the price
of leisure are unequal in both cases considered as shown in figure 6.1.
The initial equilibrium is given in point A, where the marginal substitu-
tion ratio between second period consumption and second period leisure
equals the price of leisure, which is equsl to (1-TL ) in the present
2
example. An increase in TL implies a downward rotation of the budget line
2
and the new equilibrium will be at point B' in the ex-post situation. The
change in LZ is the result of a positive substitution effect and a nega-
tive income effect with respect to leisure. Consumption always declines if
both goods are normal because then the substitution and income effects are
both negative. In the ex-ante situation this will lead to a rise in cap-
ital accumulation because the rate of time-preference now falls below the
interest rate.l) An increase in nonhuman wealth shifts the second period
budget line upwards as indicated by the vertical arrow in figure 6.1. The
new equilíbrium in the ex-ante situation is at point B with C2 unchanged
as required by equation (6.35). The negative income effect with respect to
leisure is more than compensated, so that labour supply falls by a larger
amount than in the ex-post situation. The distortionary effect of change
in ~L is therefore lower ex-post and the government has an incentive to
2
surprise consumers by raising the wage tax in the second period. In the
ex-post situation investment decisions are bygones and the individual is
unable to rearrange the consumption profile.
Consumers will be aware of the opportunities the government has to
cheat them in the second period. A credible tax strategy requires an eli-
mination of the surprise incentive. This can be done by constructing a
feedback equilibrium in the following way. First, the government solves
the second period problem for given (first period) consumers' savings
1) The rate of time-prefence is equal to: -dC2~dC1-1 - ui(C1)~u2(C2)-1 -
C2-1.
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max V2 - .~n[2 {(1-tL )Lm t B}] . ~n[2 {Lm - 1-B }] . ~n(G2)
{TL ,G2} 2 L2
2
subject to the budget constraint
TL [2 {Lm - 1 B }] - Z' G2-
2 L2
The first order conditions for a maximum of V are
Lm B











where ~2 denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated with the government
budget constraint (6.51). Second, given the optimal choice of TL and G2
2
the government solves the problem:
max V1 - (2-TL -TL )Lm - 3 t ~nLl-T ].{TL } 1 2 L1
1




Denoting the Lagrange multiplier associated with the government budget
constraint (6.55) by ál. The first order condition can be written as:
2
1 1 L1-Lm 4 1-TL t~1(Lm - 1-T1 - 1-T1 1 ( L1)
2) - o. (6.56)
Third, decisions should be made in a consistent way, so that total utility
V- V1 t VZ is maximised. This requires that the government satisfies its
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intertemporal budget constraint, which implies ~1 -~2 -~. The model now
consists of equations (6.49), (6.51), (6.52), (6.53), (6.55) and (6.56)
and solves for the endogenous variables TL , TL , G2, Z, B and ~.
1 2
The consistent or feedback equilibrium will have a higher TL than
2
the time-inconsistent or open-loop equilibrium for reasons given above. If
so, the first period tax rate will be lower in the feedback Stackelberg
equilibrium. As a consequence the government will save less than in the
open-loop equilibrium. Tax distortions are shifted towards the second
period to gain credibility. As a result social welfare will be lower. The
shift towards taxation in the future raises the potential for government
borrowing.
It may be useful to illustrate these results numerically. The
outcomes for the different solution concepts discussed in this section are
presented in table 6.2. Calculations are based on a parameter value
Lm - 2.5, so that corner solutions are avoided. Initial nonhuman wealth is
assumed to be zero.






T 0.26 0.25 0.26L
1
T o.26 0.42 0.35L
2
G2 0.59 0.62 0.69
z -0.30 -0.29 -0.30
L1 1.15 1.17 1.15
L2 1.15 0.77 1.14
ci o.71 0.32 0.71
c2 l.oo l.oo 0.89
B o.i4 0.55 0.14
x 0.44 0.84 0.44
v o.79 0.67 0.83
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The open-loop equilibrium shows tax rate smoothing and a reduction of
government debt. As appears from the last column in table 6.2 it is pre-
ferable from a welfare point of view to surprise consumers in the second
period by raising the tax rate and government spending at the expense of
private consumption. The negative effect on second period leisure is
small, which corroborates our earlier conclusion. Time-consistency has its
price in terms of welfare as appears from the feedback equilibrium. The
second period tax rate on wages is now even higher than under cheating.
This can be explained by the lower tax rate in period 1, which raises debt
service in period 2. However, because the relatively high distortionary
impact in the second period compared with the cheating solution the tax
rate TL must be high to generate sufficient revenue to pay for all gov-
2
ernment outlays. Finally, it should be noted that C2 is equal to unity in
the feedback equilibrium, because the rate of time preference must be
equal to the rate of interest.
6.5. Capital Taxation
In section 6.2 through 6.4 we analysed the issue of optimal debt, if there
is only distortionary taxation on labour. We show that in some cases there
can be an additional role for deficit financing. In this section we dis-
cuss briefly what will happen if we include capital (or wealth) taxation
in these sections.
The results of including a capital tax in a model with a linear
felicity function for consumption like the one presented in section 6.3
are well-known in the literature (cf. Persson and Tabellini (1990, sec-
tion 6.4.2)). Because the government has two instruments (Tw and TL ) in
2
the second period there are two possible outcomes: the feedback or open-
loop Stackelberg equilibrium. In the open-loop equilibrium (or commitment
case) the government should choose Tw such that (lrr)(1-Tw) -(1;6). How-
ever, it is obvious that once the second period is reached there is an
incentive to deviate from its announced plan and introduce only capital
tax. Because by doing this the excess burden of labour taxation in the
second period is eliminated. Anticipating this outcome, consumers would
not buy capital in period 1 and the government has to raise taxes in the
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first period to finance their expenditures. Clearly, this raises the
excess burden of taxation compared to the commitment equilibríum and the
social welfare in the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium will be lower than
in the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium.
A more interesting question would be what would happen, if we
introduced a capital tax in the model with the logarithmic utility
function of section 6.4. It is straightforward but tedious to check that a
zero capital tax rate will be optimal in the open-loop Stackelberg
equilibrium of example 6.2. If we calculate the optimal capital tax
recursive, it is obvious that iw - 1 is the outcome. This is the same
result as in Rogers (1987), where she argues that in a Fischerian model of
optimal labour and interestl) taxation the optimal interest tax rate
should be zero. However, this result is highly dependent on the chosen
specification of the utility function and the values of the parameters.
If we take a positive interest rate in the model specified in
section 6.4 the results will be different. In that case it can be optimal
for the government in the commitment situation to introduce a certain
amount of capital tax. Assuming r- 0.1 and Lm - 3 gives an optimal cap-
ital tax of 9.7X (see table 6.3). One can check that this tax rate gives a
higher utility than a zero capital tax.
In table 6.3 we see that the capital tax has shifted consumption
from the second to the first period. Because of the utility function the
consumer prefers first period consumption. Moreover, there will be more
government expenditures in the second period. The extra utility gained by
more first period private consumption and second period government
consumption is higher than the decrease of utility caused by lower leisure
in both periods and lower second period consumption. Furthermore, the
amount of public debt is less, because a positive capital tax forsters
savings. This could change if we have another utility function. If we
take, for example, as utility function
U-,~n C1 3 C2 t~n(Lm-L1) t,~n(Lm-L2) (6.57)
1) The interest tax works in the same direction as the wealth or capital
tax.
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the zero capital tax rate is, for the parameter values specified before,
the commitment outcome.
Table 6.3. Capital Taxatton: an exampte.















In future research a more rigorous treatment of the circumstances
under which it is optimal to introduce a certain level of capital taxation
in models with labour and capital taxation should be given. Starting point
of this analysis could be the Fischerian two-period model.
6.6. Conclusions
In the previous chapter we derived the optimal level of government debt in
an economy with distortionary labour taxation. We discussed this issue in
1) Tax smoothing is no longer optimal, because of a positive interest
rate.
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a simple Fischerian macroeconomic model with a linear technology. If pre-
ferences are symmetric across periods and the discount rates of the pri-
vate and the public sector are equal to the real interest rate it is
optimal to smooth taxation over time. The optimal amount of debt then
depends on transitory components in government spending and the rate of
interest. If government spendings are different in both periods there is a
role for debt policy and the government borrows or lends. Even if govern-
ment expenditure is uniform over time debt policy can have real effects if
the conditions for tax smoothing are relaxed. More specifically, when the
government discount rate lies below the private discount rate tax
smoothing is no longer optimal. Welfare can then be raised by increasing
aggregate savings, which calls for a shift in taxation from the future to
the present and there ís a shift in consumption from present to future and
a reduction in public debt. With productive government spending things are
quite the reserve. Public investment extends the tax base in the future as
social overhead capital contributes to private consumption either directly
or indirectly. As a consequence taxes can be shifted to the future to a
certain degree and there is an additional role for government borrowing.
If government expenditure is taken into account as an endogenous
variable the government has two instruments in the second period and there
can be an incentive for the government to deviate from its announced plan.
There will be such an incentive, if the public discount rate differs from
the interest rate (e.g. Rogers (198~)) and if there is asymmetry in the
utility function. Under these circumstances a rational expectations
equilibrium with the government as leader in a Stackelberg game requires
the introduction of a credibility constraint. Comparing the resulting
feedback solution with the time-inconsistent open-loop solution it can be
concluded that taxes have to be shifted to the future to generate
credibility. If so, there is an additional role for deficit financing and
the government borrows more in feedback Stackelberg equilibrium.
Our analysis of public debt points in the direction of interesting
areas for future research. Here we will mention two such topics but the
list could easily be supplemented with other examples. First, the impact
of public investment on the economy and on government policies could be
given a more complete treatment along the lines set out in Arrow and Kurz
(1970). More specifically, it might be rewarding to extend their model by
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introducing endogenous labour supply. Second, assuming a more general
technology factor renumerations would become endogenous. In this case an
optimal policy should take account of the effects of tax and debt instru-
ments on factor incomes.
Fïirthermore, economists could work on embedding these kinds of
models into a more general macroeconomic context and clarify the trade off
between taxation, debt, savings and investment. Moreover, a comparison
between actual debt and tax rates and 'optimal' debt and tax rates could




Government policy has a great influence on the way firms and consumers
behave also in a free market economy. By its taxation, distribution and
legislative decisions the government influences nearly all decisions of
the firms and consumers. Economists have paid notable attention to the
question in what direction the taxation decision should be chosen to
achieve welfare-improvement. Also, in the last decade economists have
shown a growing interest in the way the dynamic behaviour of the firm is
affected by taxation and other government measures.
In this thesis we combine these two streams of literature. We have
extended the tradition of dynamic microeconomic tax theory of the firm by
modelling the government policy endogenously. This thesis is divided into
two main parts: chapters 2 and 3 which contain partial equilibrium models
and chapters 4, 5 and 6 in which the analysis is extended to a general
equilibrium framework.
For a simple differential game between government and firms, which
is presented in chapter 2, it is shown that if open-loop Stackelberg is
played instead of feedback Stackelberg, the government and the firms are
better off. The government chooses the corporate tax rate, while the firms
decide on investment and dividend. However, this open-loop equilibrium is
time-inconsistent and it depends on the credibility of the government
whether the firms believe this announcement or not. As follows from the
difference between open-loop and feedback the market value of the firm
depends on the credibility of the government. Another interesting feature
of this basic model is that compared with cooperative equilibria the gain
from cooperation is relatively small, especially if the firm is in a
strong bargaining position.
This interesting difference between open-loop and feedback
Stackelberg equilibria for a game between government and firms still
applies if the basic model is extended and if the objective function is
slightly changed as in chapter 3. Moreover, if we introduce some other
policy instruments like a pay-roll tax and budget policy into the basic
model we can conclude that:
128
- Implementing a pay-roll tax will in general not yield some advantage.
- Allowing for a deficit will not change the tax policy of the basic
model.
In chapter 4 we extend our analysis to a general equilibrium
framework, where also the consumer's side is modelled and the prices are
determined on the markets. Then also the requirement of time-consistency
results in a lower social welfare. In the open-loop equilibrium the gov-
ernment gives up some public consumption, so that the marginal utility of
private consumption is less than the marginal utility of public consump-
tion. Therefore, it can raise a low profit tax rate, so that capital
accumulation will be stimulated. In the feedback equilibrium both marginal
utilities are equal, thus capital and, consequently, social welfare will
be lower.
Introducing other tax instruments as we did in chapter 5, faces
the government with the question of which tax rate should be chosen to
finance expenditures. A question which has received considerable interest
during recent policy reforms. One can argue that the government in the
open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium is in favour of wage or consumption tax,
because these taxes are less distortionary than profit tax or sales tax.
Therefore, taking into account that playing open-loop is the best possible
outcome it is beneficial to announce such a policy rule. However, this
reasoning only applies if the supply of labour is not too elastic, because
otherwise the consumption tax and wage tax would become more distortio-
nary.
In the last chapter we analyse the question of optimal debt and
distortionary taxation in a macroeconomic model. In the previous chapters
it is assumed that there is a balanced budget policy. It is shown that the
economic role of public debt is to shift tax distortions over time. More-
over, we derive that in the following cases there can be an additional
role for debt:
- Government spending is productive instead of exhaustive.
- The government discount rate is less than the discount rate of the pri-
vate sector.
- A credibility constraint is imposed.
By productive government spending welfare can be raised through a shift in
taxation from the first to the second period and the borrowing of the
government increases. Public investment extends the tax base in the
future. If the government discount rate is lower than the prívate discount
rate, taxes are shifted from the future to the present, and there is a
reduction of public debt. If a credibility constraint is added taxes have
to be shifted to the future to generate credibility and again there is an
additional role for deficit financing.
Since the Lucas critique differential game theory has received con-
siderable attention in economics. In this thesis we modelled optimal gov-
ernment behaviour in dynamic taxation problems and have compared two pos-
sible equilibria: the open-loop and feedback Stackelberg equilibrium. We
have shown that credibility can play an important role in the outcome of
the economic process. We have focussed our attention on the factors
underlying the credibility in different economic situations. Although
general conclusions are difficult to derive, credibility might play a more
important role than politicians may be aware off.
In future work, there are many avenues to explore. Firstly, in
order to have richer economic foundations the analysis should be extended
to a framework with heterogeneous agents, different sectors, and unions.
Secondly, the modelling of the government should be extended to public
investment and enterprises. Thirdly, the trade off between debt and taxa-
tion in an international policy framework may be an interesting question
to study. Finally, it is important to perform an empirical investigation
so as to establish in which regime the economy has been at various points
in time. We hope that this thesis will be useful for this future research.
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APPENDIX 2. TF~ DERIVATION OF THE EQUILIBRIA OF THE 1NODEL PRESENTED IN
CHAPTER 2
A2.1. Introduction
In this appendix the derivations of the open-loop and feedback Stackelberg
and the Pareto equilibria presented in chapter 2 are given. In A2.2 we
give the derivation of the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium, while the
way to solve the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium is presented in A2.3.
Finally, the derivations of Pareto equilibria are given in A2.4.
A2.2. The Open-Loop Stackelberg Equilibrium
An open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium (TOLS(t)' IOLS(t)) with the govern-
ment as leader satisfies
JG(TOLS(t)' IOLS(t)) ~ JO(T(t), I(T(t))). di E U1
(A2.1)
with I(Y(t)) such that JF(T(t), I(i(t))) ) JF(i(t), I(t)), dI E U2,
where U1 and U2 are the strategy spaces belonging to the government and
the firm. As is usual in Stackelberg games (e.g. Pohjola (1983)) let us
first solve the problem for the follower, i.e. the firm, and substitute
this into the problem of the leader, i.e. the government.
The firm maximises
T
max f (aK(t)(1-T(t) - I(t))dt,
I(t) 0
(A2.2)
s.t. K(t) - I(t), (A2.3)
0 ( I(t) ( (1-i(t))aK(t), (A2.4)
This is a control problem with a mixed state constraint. The way to handle
these problems is described in Seierstad and Sydsaeter (1987, pp. 269-
312). The Lagrangean of this problem equals
L- aK(t)(1-i(t)) - I(t) t q(t)I(t) t pl(t)I(t) t
P2Ít)((1-t(t))aK(t) - I(t)),
where: q- costate variable belonging to the dynamic constraint,l)
pi - dynamic Lagrange multipliers.
(A2.5)
Following Seierstad and Sydsaeter (1987) the necessary conditions are:
~I --1 t 9(t) t P1(t) - P2(t) - 0, (A2.6)
9(t) - - ~K - -a(1-i(t)) - p2(t)a(1 - i(t)), 9(T) - 0, (A2.7)
pl(t) ) 0(- 0 iff I- 0), (A2.8)
p2(t) ) 0(- 0 iff I-(1-T(t))aK(t)). (A2.9)
One can check that the following solution (see table A2.1) satisfies these
necessary conditions.
-------------------------------------------------------
1) This costate variable can be interpreted as the shadow price of capital
stock for the firm.
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Table A2.1.
t E [O,tOLS) t E [tOL5'T~
pl(t) 0 1- q(t) ) 0
p2(t) q(t) - 1) 0 0
I(t) (1-Z(t))aK(t) 0
q(t) -q(t)a(1-K(t)) - a(1 - T(t))
q(t) ) 1 q(t) ( 1
Define now the firm's investment rate
0 if I(t) - 0,
i(t) - (A2.10)
1 if I(t) - (1-T(t))aK(t).
In that case rewrite (A2.6) -(A2.9) as follows
q(t) - -q(t)a(1-~t(t))i(t) - a(1-2(t))(1-i(t)), q(T) - 0, (A2.11)
1 if q(t) ) 1,
i(t) - (A2.12)
0 if q(t) ~ 1.





s.t. K - I(T,q,K), (A2.14)
0( T1 C T(t) ( T2 ( 1. (A2.15)
q(t) - -q(t)a(1-2(t))i(t) - a(1-T(t))(1-i(t]), (A2.16)
134
It should be noted that the government also takes into account that I is a
functioh of K, q and T, because in a Stackelberg setting the government
takes into account strategic behaviour of the firm.
For the control problem of the government we can formulate the
following Hamiltonian
H- eK(t)T(t) r a(t)I(K,q,T) t v(t){-q(t)a(1-T(t))i(t) -
a(1-T(t))(1-i(t))}, (A2.17)
with: a- costate variable belonging to the dynamic capital con-
straint,l)
v- costate variable belonging to the costate equation of the
firm.2)
The necessary conditions can be stated as follows:
~~ - aK(t) . a(t).~~ 3) t v(t)a{1 - i(t) t i(t)q(t)}
T
- ax(t)(1-a(t)i(t)) . v(t)a{1 - i(t) t i(t)q(t)} ~ o F--~ T- T1,
2
(A2.18)
~(t) - - c~K - -aT(t) - ~(t) ~K - -aT(t) - a(t)a(1-T(t))i(t)~
~(T) - 0. (A2.19)
v(t) - - ~q - -a(t) ~q . v(t)a(1-T(t))i(t), v(o) - o. (A2.2o)
We have one forward looking variable, i.e. a(t), and one backward looking
variable, i.e. v(t). The costate variable v(o) is zero at the initial
time, because the initial value of the 'state' ~(t) is not given.
-------------------------------------------------------
1) This costate variable can be interpreted as the shadowprice of capital
stock for the government.
2) For a possible interpretation of this costate variable see chapter 4,
p. 73.
3) ~I~cIT - 0 and ~I~~K - 0 if í- 0
~I~~T --aK and ~I~~K -(1-T)a if i- 1.
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Applying the results obtained by Wishart and Olsder (1979) we can evaluate
the costate variable v(t). The term ~I behaves with respect to time as a
q
b-function with a jump b(t-tOLS)~a(1-2) at t- tOLS' The size of this jump
is determined by the properties of the b-function (see Wishart and Olsder
(1979)). So v(t) will be zero until the moment that the firm switches from
investment to dividend and will have a jump at t- tOL5
v(tOLS) - -~(tOLS)K(tOLS)
so that
S(tOLS) -(1-~(tOLS))K(tOLS) ~ 0 if a(tOLS) ~ 1'
(A2.21)
(A2.22)
where S is defined as the switching function for the tax rate according to
equation (A2.18).
It depends on the value of ~(tOLS)' which policy will be chosen. We have 3
possible situations:
1) ~(tOLS) C 1~ TOLS(t) - il, t 2 tOLS'
This will happen if T2 ~ 2, because using i(t) - 0, T(t) - t2 and
(A2.19) we get ~(tOLS) - l~i '2
From the condition 9(tOL5) - 1 tOLS can be derived which is the same
for the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium, as can be checked in section
A2.3.
2) ~(tOLS) ) 1~ TOLS(t) - T1. t 2 tOLS
This will happen if T1 ) 2, because for these values ~(tOLS)
zl
1-T1 ) 1.
From the condition q(tOLS) - 1 tOLS can be derived:
1 1 (A2.23)tOLS - T - a(1-T1)'
i36
I T3) ~`(tOLS) - 1 ~ J TÍt)dt -I
tOLS
So, the summation of the tax rates after the investment switch is l~a.
From the condition of q(tOLS) - 1, it follows that
I 2
tOLS-T-a (A2.24)
We can check that a necessary condition for a(tOLS) - 1 is that ~1 ~ 2,1T2 ) 2.
For the last case, i.e. T1 ( 2 and T2 ) 2, the government's stra-
tegy after tOLS is not unique. The government can choose, for example, an
average tax rate Z or the government can choose to continue for a while
with the minimal tax rate T1 and then switch to the maximal tax rate T2 at
T 1 - 2i1
tOLS ' T - 8(T2-T1) (A2.25)
If we compare our result with those of Pohjola, the open-loop
Stackelberg equilibrium he found coincides with our equilibrium, although
his model was slightly different. He works with an investment rate instead
of an investment level. Moreover, he uses it to solve a different economic
problem. Due to an error in the derivation this nonuniqueness of the
equilibrium was not found by Pohjola (1983). He was not correct in his
conclusion that the costate v, which he denotes by z, changes after the
follower's policy switch.
So, for the outcome of the open-loop Stackelberg game it makes no
difference whether we work with an investment rate or with levels. As we
will see in the next section this is also the case for the feedback
Stackelberg equilibrium.l) Therefore, we work in chapter 3 with an invest-
ment rate, because it is easier to calculate the equilibria in that case.
-------------------------------------------------------
1) This is, however, not the case for the Nash equilibrium. This point was
recognised by Cees Withagen.
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A2.3. The Feedback Stackelberg Equilibrium
The feedback Stackelberg equilibrium results from the application of dyna-
mic programming and the Stackelberg equilibrium concept (e.g. Ba~ar,
Haurie and Ricci (1985)). The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations are given
by
~VG(t,K) ~ ~VO(t,K) 1
c1t t max aTK t ~K IJ4 - 0.TE[T1,T2]
(A2.26)
~VF(t,K) ~ ~VF(t,K) 1
~t ~ max (1-T)aK - I t ~K IJ4 - 0. (A2.27)
IE[0,(1-T)aK]
where VG and VF are the value functions for the government and the firm
respectively.









I - I ~KF, T K .~~" . ~ (A2.29)
This substituting back into (A2.26) gives
~V t,K) ~V t,K) ~V( (
O~t 4 max azK 4 GdK 'I(~KF' T. K) - 0. (A2.30)TE[T1,T2]




T1 if iFBS ~R ~ 1
av
T2 if iFBS ~KG ( 1
(A2.31)
where i is the investment rate as defined in equation (A2.10). So, if the
investment rate is zero then the government chooses the high tax rate.
Because of the fact that this problem is linear in its state vari-
able, i.e. K, as a consequence linear-value functions satisfy the
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations. Dockner, Feichtinger and J~drgensen
(1985) first stated this result. We cen check that VG(t,K) - a(t).K(t) and
VF(t,K) - q(t).K(t), with
~(t) - -T~S(t)a - a(t)a(1-TFBS(t))iFBS(t), ~(T) - 0, (A2.32)
9(t) - -(1-T~S(t))a(1-i~s(t)) - 9(t)a(1-TFBS(t))1FBSÍt),
q(T) - o. (A2.33)
where q and ~ can be interpreted as the firm's and government shadow price
of capital stock and q- ~VF~~K and a~ ~VG~~K.
We can now distinguish between two possible situations (cf. table
2.1 and table 2.2)
1) T2 ~ 2~ a(t) ~ q(t),
so that
T~S(t) - T1, i~S(t) - 1, for t E [0, t~S),
T~S(t) - T2, i~S(t) - 1, for t E (t~S, T],
with
I 1




This follows from the reaction functions (A2.28) and (A2.31) end the
integration of a(t) and q(t) starting from the last period.
2) T2 ~ 2 -~ ~(t) ~ 9(t).
so that
T~S(t) - T1, i~s(t) - 1, for
T~S(t) - T2, i~s(t) - 1, for
~r~S(t) - T2, i~s(t) - 0, for
t E [0, t~s) ,
t E (t~s, t~S), (A2.36)
t E (t~s, T],
with t~s defined as in equation (A2.34) and
T I Rn(2Z2)
tFas - tFBS } a(1-T2)' (A2.37)
This follows from the reaction functions (A2.28) and (A2.31) and the
integration of ~(t) and q(t) starting from the last period.
A2.4. The Pareto Equilibria
To find the Pareto equilibria we have to maximise
J-JFty,JG
- Tax f N((1-T)ax - I), (A2.38)
0~ u~ m, where u measures the relative importance of player 1 against
player 2 and is assumed to be given, subject to
K - I, (A2.39)
0 5 I 5 (1-T)aK, (A2.40)
0( T1 S T 5 T2 ( 1. (A2.41)
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This is a standard optimal control problem, which is easy to solve. We
give no-details about the derivation. Define the following Langrangean
L- TaK t u((1-T)aK - I) . Y'I t piI t P2((1-T)aK - I)
t p3(T-Ti) t P4(T2-T),
where: Y' - costate belonging to the capital stock,
pi - dynamic Lagrange multipliers.
So, the following necessary conditions can be derived
Y' --TH - u(1-T)8 - p2(1-T)e, Y'(T) - o,
ax(i-u) t p2ax t p3 - p4 - o,
-K t Y~ t pi - p2 - 0.
We can now distinguish between 3 situations
TP - Ti, IP -(1-Ti)aK if Y' ~ 1
1) H - 1 :
TPE[Ti, T2], IP-O if~51
(TP - Ti, IP -(1-Ti)aK íf Y' ~ u
2) u ~ i :
ITP - Ti, IP - 0 if `Y s u
TP - Ti, IP -(1-Ti)aK if Y' ) 1





TP - T2, IP - 0 if Y' ( u
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APPENDIX 3. THE DERIVATION OF THE EQUILIBRIA OF THE MODEIS PRESENTED IN
cHAPTER 3
A3.1. The Open-Loop and Feedback Stackelberg Equilibria of the Model in
Section 3.2
To derive these solutions we use the NPV-method.l)
step 1:
The first step is to calculate t~S. We know that after this switch the
optimal tax policy will be T2.
The extra stream of dividend due to one unit investment at time point
t~S minus this unit is (see also Kort (1989, pp. 17-19))
T -(b.r)(t-tI ) -(S4r)(T-tI )J' (a - TZ(a-b))e FBS dt t b.e ~s - 1. (A3.1)
I
tFB5
At the moment that the firm stops investment this term equals zero,
which implies
b t r {
a - T2(a-b) -(b~r)(T-t~S) -(btr)(T-t~S)
After some rearranging we obtain
I 1 (a-b)(1-T2) - r
tFBS - T 4 b t r Rn a- T2(a-b) - b(btr) .
- e } - 1 - b.e . (A3.2)
(A3.3)
- step 2:
The second step is
earnings due to
t~S, in the other
to calculate tFBS' We know that if the marginal tax
an extra unit investment are greater than one t
case t~S lies before tFBS'
T
FBS -
1) The same solution can be obtained by using Pontryagin's maximum prin-
ciple (e.g. Gradus ( 1988c, pp. A1-All)).
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The marginal tax earnings due to one unit investment at t~S are
tFes
(A3.4)
So, the government has greater affinity towards investment than the firm
at t~S íf
MTE(tI )) 1 e~ T~ a- b(btr)FBS 2 (2-b)(a-b)' (A3.5)
If T2 ~ a- b(b3r) the tax switch lies before the investment switch and(2-b)(a-b)
this moment can be calculated from
~(tT ) - 0 e~
(1-b)(a-b)T2 e(s-b)(1-T2)(tFBS-tFBS)
tFBS s - T2(a-b) - b(btr)
I
tFBS ((a-b)(1-i2)-r)(t-t~S)
f (a-b)T2e dt - 1, (A3.6)
T
tFBS
which implies equation (3.18).
- step 3:
In the third step we calculate the switching moments for the open-loop
Stackelberg equilibrium. If MTE(t~S) ~ 1(or T2 ( a2-bb(á`b)), than the( )( )
open-loop and feedback equilibrium are eÍual. For MTE(t~S) Z 1 from The
NPV-formula's the switching points tOLS (investment switch) and tOLS
(tax switch) can be derived:l)
-------------------------------------------------------
T -(btr)(t-t~S) (1-b)(a-b)t2
If (a-b)i2e dt - 1- e- T2(a-b) - b(b.r)'
1) As pointed out in chapter 2 there are more equilibria. However, to
economise on notation assume that the government switches from the low to
the high tax rate.
143
T
tOLS -(b~r)(t-tI ) T -(btr)(t-tI )














(a-b)T2 ~ -(btr)(tOLS-tOLS) -(btr)(T-tOLS)I
b t r e - e - 1,
(A3.9)
a - TZ(a-b) ~ -(b;r)(tOLS-tOLS) -(b'r)(T-tOLS)~ -b t r e - e
-(btr)(T-tOLS)
1 - b.e . (a3.1o)
After some calculations we get
I 1 a - 2(b.r)
tOLS - T} b f r ~n a- b(btr)}'
T 1
(a-b)T1 ~ -(átr)(tOLS-tOLS)`1 - e J .b . r
a - T1(a-b) ~ -(b.r)(tOLS-tOLS)`b} r 1- e J.
(A3.11)
(b4r)(a-b(b.r)).T (a-2(b.r))(a-b)-T (a-b)(a-b(b.r))





If T1 ) a- b(btr) then tT ~ T, so we put tT equel to T and(a-b)(2-b) OLS OLS
tI - T 4 1 (a-b)(1-T2) - r
OLS b t r~n a- T2(a-b) - b(ótr) '
A3.2. The Qpen-Loop Stackelberg Equilibrium of the Model in Section 3.3.1
In the case of decreasing returns to scale the game can be rewritten as
follows:
- objective function government
T ~~1-~
max f TaK dt,
T 0
- objective function firm
- state equation
T ~,1-~







The necessary conditions for an open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium are
T - (A3-17)
T1 if S(t) ~ 0
T2 if S(t) ) 0
1 if q ) 1
i -
0 if q ( 1
(A3.18)
~~ ~1
a--aT ~ x 1-~ -~(1-T)i 1~ K 1-X .
i45
.~ 2,y-2
v sA(Ató-2).(1-T).K 1-~ {1 - i t iq},
(1-Y)
~t~ ~~
q--a(1-T)(1-i)~~ K 1-~ - 9(1-T)ia ~ K 1-~ ,
(A3.19)
(A3.2o)
( ~~ ( ~ ~~
v- a(1-T){i ~ K 1-ó v-{axl-~ t ( 1-q)v ~ K 1-~r ái .l l (a3.2i)
a(T) - 0, (A3.22)
q(T) - o, (A3.23)
v(o) - 0, (A3.24)
~
K - aKl-~(1-i)i,
and the switching functions for the tax rate is
~ ~
S(t) - Kl-ó' - aiKl-;f t
~~ ~~






It should be noted that it is not easy to calculate the feedback Stackel-
berg equilibrium. Because of nonstate separability nonlinear value func-
tions satisfy Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations. In general it is diffi-
cult to obtain these value functions. Therefore, we only present the open-
loop Stackelberg equilibrium.
The costate variable v has a jump at tOLS





(1 - ~(tOLS)) ~ 0 if A(tOLS) ) 1. (A3.28)
From ( A3.20) and (A3.21) can be derived
, ~ íi-A-~)(1-X)
2
for T2 ~., (1-p-D') (1-ë) then a(t~~) C 1,
~2
i t (1-P-X)(1-X) 1 t (1-A-X)Í1-ë)
2 2
for t~ ~ and T C s then a(tl )- 1,2 2 t(1-P-X)(1-D') - 1 2 4(1-H-X)(1-y) OLS
~2 ~2
i t (1-P-Jl) (1-á)
2
for T1
~., ~ (1-1~-?l) ( 1-X)
then ~(tOLS) ) 1.
~2
The switching moment tOLS can be obtained from the equation q(tOLS) - 1'
A3.3. The Open-Loop and Feedback Stackelberg Equilibria of the Model in
Section 3.3.2
Let us first give the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium.
The Hamiltonian for the government has the following form:
H1 -.ln K {,~n T t~n a t a{i(1-T)aK}
4 v{-a(1-T)(1-i) - qa(1-i)i} (A3.29)
Using the transformation z-.~n K and writing the Hamiltonian of the
transformed problem:
H1 - z 4~n Z.~n a f Y'1{i(1-T)a}
t v{-a(1-t)(1-i) - qa(1-T)i} (A3,3p)
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The necessary (and sufficient) conditions for the government's problem are
~H
~1 - - ~zl - -1, ~1(T) - 0
DT1 - T- 'YliB t av{1 - i f iq} z 0 F--~
i- IT?.1 T1




Let tOLS be the time-point, where the firm switches from investment to









Depending on the value of `Y1(tOLS) we have three possible situation:
1) aY'1(tOLS) ~ I ~ T(t) - T1, t 2 tOLS
T(tOLS)
Because of the fact that `Y1(t) - T-t this situation occurs if T1 ~ Z.
From firm's problem follows tOLS - T- a(11T )1
2) aY'1(tOLS) ~ I ~ T(t) - T2, t 2 tOLS
T(tOLS)
Substitution of Y'1(t) in the inequality above gives T2 ~ 2. It should
be noted that the government from the moment tl - T- l~atl till the
moment t2 - T- 1~aT2 have smoothly switched from low to high tax rate.
From firm's problem follows tOLS - T- a(11T )'2
3) g~l(tOLS) - I ~ T(t) - 2. t 2 toLs
~ 2(tOLS)
In this case the moment tOLS - T- á and tl ( 2, T2 ) 2.
Thus, from the moment tl - T- a2 the government smoothly increases the
tax rate until it is 2.
Without going into technical details it is easy to see that the feed-
back solution can be calculated by same derivation and putting v(t) equal
to zero. For the feedback equilibrium at the moment that the firm stops
investment the government immediately raises taxes till t2.
A3.4. The Feedback Stackelberg Equilibrium of the Model in Section 3.4.2
Let us write down the government decision problem for the model with a
pay-roll tax
T
max J (Ta(6)K f 8wL)dt,
8,T 0
s.t. K - i(1-T)a(8)K,
(1-p)a(8) 1)L - Sw(1}8) x .
The Hamiltonian of this problem is





The optimal value for 8 can be found by differentiating (A3.40) with res-
pect to 8:2)
~ - ~(T } P(~)) } a.~2
; aag(1-i)i - o. (A3.41)
g(1'8)
1) Assume without loss of generality that p- 1.
2) Assume that there is an interior solution.
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with a8 - - ~~~g .
After some rearranging we get equation (3.33). In the same way we can
derive the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium.
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APPffi~iDIR 4. Tt~ DERIVATIONS AND PROOFS OF CHAPTER 4
A4.1. The Derivation of the Interest Function
In section 4.4.2 we have stated that the interest can be calculated from
the equilibrium in the goods market
C(t) } 0(t) . I(t) t P(I(t)) - Q(K(t).L(t)).




I(t) - 2n (q(t)-i),
F(I(t)) - YlI(t)2.







x~t) . T(t)ax(t) t 2n (q(t)-1) 4 4n (q(t)-1)2 -(atwh)K(t) (A4.7)
and taking the derivative with respect to time gives
-~ t t t(t)aK(t) }((T(t)-1)a - wh)K(t) . t t- o. (A4.8)x(t) 2
For x(t), K(t) and q(t) we cen substitute (cf. (4.2), (4.3) and (4.16))
x(t) - (o-r(t)).x(t), (A4.9)
K(t) - I(t) - SK(t), (A4.10)
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q(t) - (r(t)4á)q(t) - a(1-T(t)). (A4.11)
More difficult is a substition for 2(t). In chapter 4 we have stated that
2(t) can be derived from equation (4.39)
G t 1-a v(t)G(t)(atr~q)
C~ - a 1 } a(1-a)K(t) (A4.12)
To simplify we ignore that the interest is a function of T, q and K.1)
Therefore, (A4.12) becomes
G t - 1-a v(t)G(t) (A4 13)C(t) a (1 ` (1-a)K(t) '
After substitution of (A4.2) and (A4.3) in (A4.13) we get for t(t)
~(t) - (1-a)
(x(t)x(t) - v(t))'
Taking the derivative with respect to time gives
T(t) - (1-a)(-K(t)x(t) t v(t) - K(t)x(t))
(K(t)x(t) - v(t))2
(1-a){-K(t)(6-r(t))x(t)t(o-r(t)-b)v(t)- ~2Z.x t2~ t
(K(t)x(t) - v(t))2
(A4.15)
Substituting (A4.9), (A4.10), (A4.11) and (A4.15) back into (A4.8) gives
us an expression for
F(r(t), x(t), q(t), v(t), ~(t), K(t)) - 0. (A4.16)
After some worrysome calculations we can obtain
(A4.14)
-x(t)(I(t)-bK(t))}
1) Otherwise, we have to solve partial differential equations. Moreover,
it is our guess that these effects are relatively small.
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r(t) -[(K(t)x(t) - v(t))2{2naa a((1-T(t))a t wh)(2n (q(t)-1) -
bK(t))x(t) - bq2(t)x(t) 4 1-T(t))aq(t)x(t)} . K(t)(1-a)
x(t){2nv(t)(b-a) t a(t) . 2nx(t)(2n (q(t)-1) - bx(t)) -
q(t)x(t)} f K2(t)x2(t)2n(1-a)(o-b)]~
[(K(t)x(t)-v(t))2(2na.q2(t)x(t)) . (K(t)x(t) -
v(t))2nx(t)K(t)(1-a)].
So after substitution of
x - a~{(atwh)K - ~(q) - ~(4(q))}
(A4.17)
(A4.18)
we get a relation between r and the state variables. This relation is used
in the numerical simulations.
A4.2. The Derivation of the Feedback Stackelberg Equilibria
A4.2.1. Introduction
In this appendix we derive the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium for the
macrceconomic model specified in chapter 4. In section 4.2 and 4.3 we have
modelled the behaviour for the firm and the consumer, while in section 4.4
the model for the government was given. By deriving the firm's optimal
investment and employment and the consumer's consumption path we stated
that there is no difference between open-loop and feedback information
structure and we assumed open-loop information structure. In this appendix
we try to clarify this issue by deriving the feedback equilibria. Thereby,
the instruments of consumers, firms and government are not only a function
of time, but also of the state variables.
As already noted in section 4.3 because of the fact that the con-
ditions of the Modigliani-Miller theorem apply the finance decision is
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independent of the consumption-investment-taxation decision in this econ-
omy. Therefore, the consumers' problem can be solved independently of the
government's and the firms' problem. That the consumers' decision problem
for the case with open-loop and feedback information structures coincides
is easy to see, due to of the fact that the Hamiltonian (i.e. equation
(4.14)) is linear in the state variable B.
To clarify the issue of open-loop and feedback information struc-
tures for the firm we derive the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium for two
possible cases: there is one firm or there are many firms, which are all
identical.l) In the case of many firms it is shown that the firms actually
behave, if there is open-loop information structure. This is, however, not
true for the "one firm" case.
To put it differently, if we calculate the feedback Stackelberg
equilibrium we assume that all players have feedback information struc-
tures and the solution can be obtained by dynamic programming. However, it
can be shown that if the number of firms goes to infinity for the firm's
problem the open-loop equilibrium results. For this reason in section 4.2
we have used Pontryagin's maximum principle to obtain the firm's solution.
A4.2.2. The Derivation of the FBS-equilibrium with One Firm
In the feedback equilibrium the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equa-
tions hold for the government and the firm
6V1 - Vlt - max{a~n((1-i)aK t whK - I(t,7,R) - ~(I(t,T.R))) t
T
(1-a),~n(TaK) t V1K(I(t,T,K) - bK)}, (A4.19)
rV2 - V2t - max{(1-T(t,K))aK - I- p(I) t V2K(I-SK)}, (A4.20)
I
where V1 and V2 are the government's and firm's value function.
So, to solve this problem we have to find value functions V1 and V2 and
mappings
1) We did not discuss this issue in chapter 2 and 3, because here the FBS-
equilibria did not depend on the number of firms.
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T(t,K) ~ T(t) E [0,1]1),
I(t,T,K) ~ I(t),
such that these HJB-equations are satisfied.
From (A4.20) we can derive the firm's optimal level of investment
-1 - P' ` ~2K - 0 ~ I - ~(~2K). ~' - 1~9~"~ ~(1) - 0. (A4.21)
It is important to notice that the optimal choice of the firm's investment
rate dces not directly depend on the government tax rate. Thus, the
feedback Stackelberg and Nash equilibria for a game between government and
firms coincide (see also Ba~ar, Haurie, Ricci (1985, p. 113)). So, it is
sufficient to derive the feedback Nash equilibria. To do so we use the
method originally introduced by Starr and Ho (1969). They write down the
same Hamiltonian system as in the open-loop Nash case, but in the feedback
case the instruments are not only a function of time, but also a function
of state (capital). Because of that the costate equations may be different
from the open-loop case. They also show in that paper that for the Nash
geme this method yields the same solution as using the HJB-equations. The
Hamiltonians are:
H1 - or.tn((1-~)aK f whK - I(t.K) - p~(I(t.}C)) f(1-a)~n(TaK) t
~(I(t,K) - bK),
H2 -(1-T(t,K))aK - I- 9~(I) t q(I - bK),
with maximising conditions:
. clH2 ~H2(t'K'I'~) `~H2 c1T
9- rq - ~K - rq - ~K - ~2 ' ~K





1) Similar to chapter 2 and 3 we could impose upperbounds and lowerbounds.
In chapter 4, however, we have assumed that there is an interior solution.
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~H1 ~H1(t'K'I'~) ~H1 ~I~-cs~-~K -6~- ~K -~I '~K
- (o.b)a - ~ (a(1-T) t wh) - l~a,




From (A4.2~) the derivative of T with respect to K can be obtained. Sub-
stituting this back into equation (A4.24) gives us the following solution.
9 - (rtb)q - a(1-T) t (1-a)(It9~(I))K (A4.28)
It should be noted that this solution is different from the open-loop Nash
equilibrium, because of the last term in equation (A4.24). In some special
differential games this last term disappears (see for example Van der
Ploeg (1987)). In general this is not the case.
A4.2.3. The Derivation of the FBS-equilibrium with Many Firms
Assume now contrary to appendix 4.2.2 that there is not one firm, but
many firms which all have the same initial value of capital stock. Fur-
thermore, assume that
K - iN K . , I - iN I . . ~ - FN- V . .~-1 ~ ~-1 ~ ~-1 ~ (A4.29)
where N is the number of firms. As is well-known in the literature there
are some problems by aggregation over a large number of firms, if we work
for the individual firm with the adjustment costs function as described in
equation (4.49). There would be no problems if we use a homogeneous ad-
justment costs function (cf. Hayashi (1982)). However, assume for this
moment that every individual firm has such an adjustment costs function
that its investment is 1~N times aggregate investment, i.e. g~ - N~,I2.
With the same arguments as above we can show that the feedback
Stackelberg and Nash equilibrium coincide. So, we can write down the fol-
lowing Ntl-Hamiltonians:
H1 - a.ln((1-T)aK - whK - I(t.K) -~(I(t,K)) t(1-a)~n(TaK) t
A(I(t,K) - áK),
H~tl -(1-T(t,K))aK~ - I~ - p(I~) i q(I~-áK~). ~- 1,...,N,
with necessary conditions
9-(rtb)q - s(1-t) t aK~ ~K~. J- 1....,N,
a-(otb)a - ~(e(1-T) t wh) - 1Ga.
I~ - N ~Íq), J - 1,...,N,







Notice that due to the fact that all firms have equal capital stocks the
shadow price is equal for all firms. The crucial point is now that since
K.
the number of firms is large, the term K~ ~K - T K.~K.~ is almost zero
J
and equation (A4.32) becomes equal to (~). To be precise, K~~K goes to
zero if N increases while ~T K- I t~(I) is a number less than~K'T Q-I - ~ÍI)
infinite. It should be noticed that we assume that if the number of firms
increases in this economy the amount of total capital remains constant. So
for the behaviour of the firms it makes no difference if there is an open-
loop or a feedback information structures. This point is also recognised
by Cohen and Michel (1988) and De Zeeuw, Groot and Withagen (1988).
The solution obtained by equation (A4.32)-(A4.35) is equal to the
open-loop Nash equilibrium between government and firms, because the last
term in (A4.32) disappears. The government takes the consumption function
as described in equation (4.44).
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APPENDIX 5. TF~ SOLUTION OF THE IKODEL PRESENTED IN CHAPTER 5
A5.1. The Government's Optimal Policy
After some substitution from (5.13) through (5.22) the following Hamil-
tonian can be defined
H- U({(1-TZ)(1-Zy)Q(K,L) - I- 4~(I) t wL(TZ-TL)}~(lttc),
T
1~-,c~ {(1-TZ)(1-Ty)Q(K,L) - I- 9~(I) t wL(TZ-TL)} . TLwL t
c
TyQ(K~L) t Tz(Q(K.L)(1-Ky) - wL), Lm - L)1)t ~(~(q) - bK) .
y((rfá)q - QK(1-TZ)(1-2y))2).
with the following necessary conditions
~,H-~ - 03) or UC{[(1-TZ)(1-2 )Q L - w.L t(w L. L w)
L - y L ~L TL ~L
T
(TZ-TL)~~(ltTC)} t UG{1}ic {(1-TZ)(1-Ty)QLL,~L - wL f
(LwT t wLT )(zL-TZ))} t wL t TyQLL~ t
L L L
(A5.1)
Tz ( QLLT ( 1-Ty ) - w,~ L - wL,~ ) } - UL . L,~ - vr,~ q - yQK L,~ (1-~rz )
L L L L L L L
(1-2y) - 0,
1) Assume that utility is separable in C, G and L.
2) It should be noted that r, L and w are function of
and q.
(A5.2)
TL, Ty, tz, Tc, K
3) Hereby, we assume that there is an interior solution. However, there
are no guarantees that T is positive. In the case that from (A5.2) fol-
lows TL is negative, putLit equal to zero.
~T - -U~[(l.TC){(1-TZ)(1-Ty)QLLT - wL 4 (LwT tc c c
LT w)(TZ-TL)} -{(1-TZ)(1-TY)Q(K.L) - I- P(I) . wL(TZ-TL)}~
c
~(l;TC)2 t u~[(1-TZ)(1-Ty)Q(K.L) - I- P(I) t wL(TZ-tL) f(1-TC)
{(1-TZ)(1-TY)QLLT - wL 4 (LwT t wLT )(TZ-TL)}~~(1tTC)2
C C C
- ULLT - vrT q- Lp ~~ LT (1-TZ)(1-TY) - O,
c c 'KL c
aTY - u~{[-(1-TZ)Q(K,L) ; (i-TZ)(i-Ty)QL.LTY .
T
(w,~ L t wLT )(TZ-TL)~I(1rTC)} f UG{14~ {-(1-TZ)Q(K,L) t
Y Y C
(A5.3)
(1-TZ)(1-TY)QLLT .(wt L a wLT )(TZ-TL)} ' Q(K,L) ; RLLT T t
Y Y Y y y
TL(wT L~ LT w) - TzQ(1{.L) f TzQLLT (1-T )- T(w L t L w)} -
Y Y y Y
Z TY Ty
ULLT - vrT q . vQK(1-TZ) - yQK LT (1-TZ)(1-Ty) - ~. (A5.4)
y y L y
~TZ - ~~{[-(1-TY)Q(K.L) 4 (1-TZ)(1-TY)QL.LTZ t
T
(wT L t wLT )(TZ-TL) . wL~I(1tTC)} . U~{1}~ {-(1-TY)Q(K,L) tz z c
(1-TZ)(1-TY)QLLT .(wT L. LT w)(TZ-TL) t wL} t QLLT T.
z z z z Y
Q(K.L)(1-Ty) - wL t Tz(1-Ty)QLLT t(TL-TZ)(wT L; LT w)} -
z z z
UL.LT - vrT q t vQK(1-Ty) - vQK LT (1-TZ)(1-TY) - O. (A5.5)z z L z
v - av - jq - (6-r-b)v - a~' - U~{(1-TZ)(1-Ty)QLLq - ~'q f
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T
(TZ-TL)(wqL . Lqw)}~(1tTC) - UG{i,TC {(1-TZ)Í1-Ty)QLLq - ~'q t
(TZ-TL)(wqL t Lqw)} t TyQLLq } TZ(1-Ty)QLLq t(TL-TZ)(wqL t Lqw)}
- ULLq - vrqq - vQK Lq(1-TZ)(1-Ty),
L
(A5.6)
A - Qa - ~K - (6tb)~ - UC{(1-TZ)(1-Ty)QK t (1-TZ)(1-Ty)QL~ '
(TZ-TL)(wKL i I.Kw)}~(1~TC) - UG{[(1-TZ)(1-Ty)QK t
T
(1-2z)(1-Ty)QLLK t(TZ-TL)(wKL t LKw)~ 14T 4 Ty(-K ' QLLK)c




The necessary conditions (A5.2) -(A5.~) is a system of six equations and
six unknown variablesl) (TL' Tc' Ty' Tz' v' ~), which is, in general,
solvable. An interpretation of the optimal policy is difficult, because of
the complexity of the different equations. Therefore, in appendix 4.2 we
make some further assumptions. Furthermore, we assume small supply effects
of labour taxation. In that case it is possible to obtain a classification
of different tax rates. This case will be used as a kind of benchmark.
A5.2. A Possible Classification of Tax Rates by Small Supply EPPects
In this section we will give, under some additional assumptions, a
classification of tax rates. First assume Cobb-Douglas preferences and
production
U(C, G, Lm - L) - a~n C 4(1-a)~n G t y~n(Lm-L), (A5.8)
1) The unknown variables K and q can be obtained from the firm's problem.
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Q(K,L) - K~L1-P.
and quadratic adjustment costs
P(I) - ~.I2.











Furthermore, under the assumption of Cobb-Douglas preferences and produc-




Ls - Lm - ocw(1-TL)(1-TC)'
(A5.14)
(A5.15)
which implies under the condition of equilibrium in the labour market
1 1 1
wSocLm(1-tL)(1.2c) - a(1-TL)(l,ic)(1-TY)~(1-p)~ K -
~ 1 1~- 1-~
W((1-p) ~ K(1-TZ)(1-Ty) 4(1-~)~ I{(TZ-tL) - Iw ~- P(I)w ~)- 0.
(A5.16)
w
From this equation the partisl derivatives of w with respect to K, q, TL,
Tc, ~cy, tZ can be obtained
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1 1~-
WK((1-p)~ - (1-ty)(1-P) ~ ) ( 0, (A5.17)wTC - 1~- 1-2P
~ w ~ aLm(1-TL)(1'TC) ~ (I ' Y~(1))W ~ w ~
1 1 1 1
w~aLm(l~tc) - a(lt~c)(1-Ty)~(1-~)~ - W(1-A)~K
wTL - ~ 1-2g .
~ w~ aLm(1-~[L)(l.TC) t(1 t 4~(1))W ~ w~
(A5.18)
1 1 1-~-1
- S a(1-ZL)(1rTC)(1-Ky)~ (1-~)~K - W(1-~) ~ K(1-TZ)
C 0,wTy - ~ 1-2A
~ w~ aLm(1-TL)(lttc) t(1 t 9~(I))W S w~
1 1 1
-w~aLm(1-TL) t a(1-TL)(1-Zy)~(1-~)~ K
wT - 1~- 1-2p .
c 1 w~ aL (1-i )(1;2 ) t(I t V(I))Y' ~ w~g m L c p
(A5.19)
(A5.20)
~s ~wq - ~ -w w 2b 1 2~ C 0, (A5.21)
~ w~ aLm(1-TL)(ltTC) t(1 t~(I))W S w~
1 1
a(1-2 )(14~ )(1-~ )~(1-F3)RwK - ~ L c y 1 2~ ) 0. (A5.22)
1 w S aL (1-T )(lii ) ' (I ; P(1))W ~ w ~p m L c p
Because of (A5.12) and (A5.13) it is not difficult to derive the
derivatives of L with respect to these arguments. Without going into
technical details it is possible to obtain that if y 4 0 and T~, Ty, iz,
T ~~ 1c
w,~ - w,~ ~ w,~ - wq ~ Lj m LT ~ LT ~ Lq - Lt ~ 0
L z c z L c y
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Substituting this back into (A5.2) -(A5.5) and neglecting similar to
chapter 4, the derivatives of the interest function with respect to the
government's instruments gives
T
o(laTC) wh a 1G~ wh - 1}tc wh ~ 0 if TL ~ 0 (A5.23)
- ~{(1-TZ)(1-T~)Q(K,L) - I- 9~(I) t wL(TZ-Th)} 1 2}(14TC)
l~a {(1-TZ)(1-TY)Q(K,L) - I-~(I) t wL(TZ-TL)} 1 2~ D.
(1tT~)
if Tc ) 0 (A5.24)
o(1~TC) {(1-TY)Q(K,L) - wL} . G~laTC) {(1-TY)Q(K,L) - wL} .
v~hl-P(1-TY) ~ 0, if TZ ~ 0 (A5.25)
T
(1tTC)C {-(1-TZ)hl-P
t (TZ-TL)wTYh} . 1Ga {1}TC {-(1-TZ)hl-P
t(TZ-TL)wT h} .(1-TZ)hl-I~ t(TL-TZ)wT h} t y~hl-A(1-TZ) ~ 0,
Y Y
if TY ) o (A5.26)
Define now:
a 1-aB1(t) -- ~(1tTC) wh i ~(1,TC) wh. (A5.27)
B2(t) -- ~{(1-TZ)(1-TY)hl-R - I- 9~(I) . wh(TZ-TL)} 1 2 t
(14TC)
1~~ {(1-TZ)(1-T )hl-R - I - F(I) . wh(T -T )} 1Y Z L (14jc)2.
B3(t) -- ~(laTC) {(1-TY)hl-~ - wh} t ~~iaTc )
v~hl-P(1-TY).
(A5.28)




B4(t) -- ~(laTC) {(1-TZ)hl-~ t 1zTyL wh} t ~~1~TC) {-(1-TZ)
T -T
hl-~ t 1ZT b wh}t y~hl-~(1-TZ).
y
These results give rise to the following proposition.
Proposition 5.1. If B1(t) - 0- B2(t) then B3(t) - B4(t) ( 0
Proof. B1(t) - 0 implies C- lGa 1)
Substituting this into (A5.29) gives
B3(t) - L~hl-~(1-Ty).
B4(t) - v~hl-~(1-TZ).
Because of the fact that v~ 0(see chapter 4) is
s3(t) t o.
B4(t) ~ o.




So, the public consumption has to be financed from wage or consumption
tax.
1) Zn other words marginal utility from private consumption equals mar-
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LIST OF SYI~BOLS
B : bonds hold by the consumer
C : private consumption
D : dividend
G : government consumption
I : investment
K : capital good stock
K` : capital stock at final stage
L : labour
L : consumer time-endowmentm
0 : gross profits
Q : production
T : planning horizon
TX : total tax amount
U : consumer utility function
V : government utility function (if different from U)
VF : market value of the firm
Z : government debt
a : capital productivity
b : salvage rate
h : labour to capital ratio
p : price of final goods
q : shadow price of capital stock
r : interest rate
w : wage rate
t~~ : investment switch by OLS-equilibrium
t~ : investment switch by FBS-equilibrium
t~~ : tax switch by OLS-equilibrium
t~S : tax switch by FBS-equilibrium
a : parameter for private consumption in the utility function
p : Cobb-Douglas paremeter for capital
~r : Cobb-Douglas parameter for labour
ó : depreciation
~ : adjustment costs
v : government shadow price belonging to the costate of firm
TZ or T: corporate tax rate (or tax rate on gross profits)
Tc : consumption tax rate
YL : wage tax rate
T : sales tax rate
Y
Tw : capital or wealth tax
6 : consumer time-preference rate
~ : government time-preference rate
~, : ahare parameter of adjustment costs
a : government shadow price of capital stock
8 : pay-roll tax
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Atomistic behaviour
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Calculus of variations 3
Capital intensive 49. 59, 82
Capital taxation 94-95, 121-123
Cass-Koopman economy 3, 64
Classical unemployment 9, 63
Constant returns to scale 13, 65
Consumption taxation 88, 90-92
Corporate taxation (see profit taxation)




Decentralised market economy 4, 64-68
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Saddle point 79, 87
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SAMENVATTING ( in Dutch )
In het verleden is binnen het VF-programma "Dynamische Ondernemingsmodel-
len" onderzoek gedaan naar de vraag, hoe bedrijven reageren op bepaslde
overheidsmaetregelen, zoals de belastingpolitiek en het verlenen van in-
vesteringspremies. Echter in deze analyse neemt men het overheidsgedrag
als exogeen en gaat men voorbij ean de Lucas kritiek, die er op neer komt
dat bij de evaluatie van economische politiek alle interacties tussen
economische agenten (overheid en bedrijven) meegenomen moeten worden. Dit
impliceert dat niet alleen het gedrag van een onderneming zal veranderen
als gevolg van een veranderende overheidspolitiek, maar dat ook de over-
heidspolitiek zal reageren op een veranderende bedrijfspolitiek.
In dit proefschrift houden we expliciet met de Lucas kritiek reke-
ning door het gedrag van de overheid te modelleren in samenspel met het
bedrijfsleven (en ook de consumenten). In hoofdstuk 2 hebben we de inter-
actie tussen overheid en bedrijfsleven gemodelleerd met behulp van een
eenvoudig differentiaelspel tussen overheid en een representatief bedrijf.
Voor wat betreft de bedrijfsmodellering hebben we gebruik gemaakt van de
bestaande modellen uit de dynamische ondernemingstheorie: het bedrijf
tracht met zijn investeringskeuze de winst te maximaliseren. Betreffende
de overheid veronderstellen we dat zij het winstbelastingtarief zodanig
kiest dat de stroom toekomstige belastingopbrengsten wordt gemaximali-
seerd. Van dit differentiaalspel wordt de oplossing afgeleid voor een
tweetal mogelijke oplossingsconcepten (Stackelberg en Pareto) en voor een
tweetal informatiestructuren (open-loop en feedback). In het Stackelberg
spel zullen beide spelers hun eigen doelstelling trachten te maximalise-
ren, waarbij de ene speler (de overheid) als leider in dit spel de manier
waarop de andere speler (de bedrijven) reageert op haar belastingmaatrege-
len in haar beslissing meeneemt, terwijl de bedrijven de belastingen als
gegeven beschouwen. In het Pareto-evenwicht is er sprake van samenwerking
tussen de beide spelers. De gezamenlijke doelstelling is een gewogen som
van de afzonderlijke doelstellingen van de beide spelers. Open-loop infor-
matiestructuur houdt in dat beide spelers (overheid en bedrijfsleven) aan
het begin van de planperiode hun strategieën vastleggen, terwijl in het
geval van feedback informatiestructuur de spelers de mogelijkheíd hebben
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om hiervan af te wijken. In het laatste geval zal voldaan zijn aan het
optimaliteitsprincipe van Bellman.
Het blijkt dat alle evenwichten beginnen met een periode van lage
belastingen en hoge investeringen. De hoge investeringen zorgen ervoor dat
de kapitaalgoederenvoorread wordt uitgebreid waardoor de stroom toekomsti-
ge dividenden zal stijgen. Een lage winstbelastingvoet zorgt ervoor dat de
bedrijven meer mogelijkheden hebben om te investeren, waardoor de stroom
toekomstige belastingopbrengsten groter zal worden. Als het einde van de
planperiode nadert zal het bedrijf op een gegeven moment stoppen met in-
vesteren, en overgasn tot het uitkeren van dividend. Daarnaast zal ook de
overheid in de meeste gevallen overschekelen op een hoger belastingtarief
om zodoende meer belasting te innen. Aangetoond wordt dat de open-loop
Stackelberg voor beide spelers een betere oplossing geeft dan de feedback
Stackelberg oplossing. Vanuit dat oogpunt is er een stimulans om open-loop
te spelen. Er is echter een probleem met het open-loop Stackelberg even-
wicht, namelijk dat het tijdsinconsistent is. Dit houdt in dat een door de
overheid op tijdstip nul afgekondigde optimale politiek niet langer opti-
masl hoeft te zijn op een later tijdstip waardoor er voor de overheid een
reden is om af te wijken van de op tijdstip nul gekozen strategie. Dit
heeft tot gevolg dat indien er voor het bedrijf geen reden is (wat in het
algemeen het geval is) om te geloven dat de overheid wil vasthouden san de
(op tijdstip nul) afgekondigde strategie, het open-loop Stackelberg even-
wicht niet langer bruikbasr is. In dat geval kan men terugvallen op het
feedback evenwicht, dat dit probleem van tijdsinconsistentie niet heeft
omdat het optimaliteitsprincipe van Bellman impliceert dat iedere beslis-
sing op een toekomstig tijdstip optimeal is onafhankelijk van de huidige
toestand of beslissing. De essenti~le vraeg is dus hoe geloofwaardig de
van overheidswege afgekondigde strategie is. De conclusie luidt dus dat de
geloofwaardigheid van de overheid bij bepalen van de effectiviteit van de
overheidsmaatregelen en de hoogte van de marktwearde van de onderneming
een rol zal spelen.
In hoofdstuk 2 wordt ook nog ingegaan op een alternatieve manier
om de Stackelberg evenwichten in dit soort differentiealspelen te bepalen.
Deze methode is vooral gebaseerd op economische íntuitie en heeft als
belangrijke voordeel dat het gebruik van het maximum principe en delta-
functies wordt omzeild.
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In hoofdstuk 3 wordt voortgeborduurd op het model van hoofdstuk 2
door het in verschillende richtingen uit te breiden. In de eerste plaats
wordt het bedrijfsmodel realistischer gemaakt door het inbouwen van dis-
contering, afschrijvingen en een eindwaarde voor de onderneming. In de
tweede plasts wordt de in hoofdstuk 2 veronderstelde lineaire relatie
tussen winst en kapitaalgoederenvoorraad vervangen door een concave rela-
tie. In zijn algemeenheid kunnen er een tweetal oorzaken zijn voor deze
concaviteit:
- er is sprake van een produktiefunctie met afnemende meeropbrengsten.
- er is sprake van een imperfecte afzetmarkt met een dalende prijs-afzet
functie.
In de derde plasts, veronderstellen we dat de door de overheid gehenteerde
nutsfunctie niet langere een linesire functie is van de overheidsconsump-
tie maar een logarithmische. Het interessante van deze uitbreiding is dat
de oplossing nu geen 'bang-bang' structuur meer heeft (d.w.z. de belas-
tingvoet springt niet langer van een laag naar een hoog niveau), maar dat
er sprake is van geleidelijke asnpassing, hetgeen natuurlijk realistischer
is. Ondanks al deze toevoegingen blijft het evenwicht grote overeenkomsten
tonen met de in hoofdstuk 2 gevonden evenwichten. In de vierde plaats
introduceren we ook andere instrumenten voor de overheid. In het bijzonder
bekijken we het effect van een 'pay-roll' tax (ofwel het werkgeversgedeel-
te van de premies). Het blijkt dat het in de meeste gevallen zinvol is
voor de overheid om zich te beperken tot de winstbelasting en geen pay-
roll tax te heffen. Daarnaast laten we de overheid de mogelijkheid hebben
om in tegenstelling tot hoofdstuk 2 geld in en uit te lenen. Ook deze
toevoeging blijkt geen verandering te brengen in de uitkomsten van dit
eenvoudige model althans als men veronderstelt dat er geen schuld zal zijn
aan het einde van de planningshorizon. Het is eenvoudig af te leiden dat
het aangaan van schuld geen reële effecten heeft en dat er dus sprake is
van een soort 'Ricardian debt neutrality'.
De laatste uitbreiding van hoofdstuk 3 heeft betrekking op de
doelstelling van de overheid. Sinds Tinbergen en Theil is er in de litera-
tuur volop discussie over wat deze doelstelling dient te zijn. In para-
graaf 3.5.2 vervengen we de doelstelling van het streven nasr maximale
overheidsconsumptie door het streven naar maximale werkgelegenheid. Een
hoog belastingtarief heeft tot gevolg dat de overheid ruime mogelijkheden
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heeft om publieke werkgelegenheid te scheppen, maar daar staat tegenover
dat de ondernemingen minder geld over hebben om te investeren en dus pri-
vate werkgelegenheid te cre~ren. Ook in dat geval vertoont het evenwicht
grote overeenkomsten met wat we eerder gevonden hebben en blijven de eer-
der beschreven verschillen tussen open-loop en feedback evenwichten over-
eind stean.
In hoofdstuk 4 bezien we het tot dan beschouwde partiële model als
onderdeel van een macro-economische evenwichtsmodel met drie sectoren:
overheid, consumenten en bedrijven, die ieder voor zich een intertemporele
doelstellingsfunctie trachten te maximaliseren. We veronderstellen hierbij
dat er evenwicht is op de goederenmarkt, zodat de prijzen niet vast zijn.
Wat dit onderdeel van onze modellering betreft sluiten we aan bij de lite-
ratuur over dynamische macro-modellen (zie bijvoorbeeld Abel en Blanchard
(1983) en Van de Klundert en Peters ( 1986)). Het grote verschil met de
voorgaande hoofdstukken is dat de overheid het nut van een representatieve
consument tracht te maximaliseren. Dit is mogelijk omdat we het gedrag van
de consument afzonderlijk modelleren. Een dergelijke werkwijze sluit meer
aan bij de bestaande "Public Choice" traditie. Wat betreft het conceptuele
karakter borduren we voort op het speltheoretische kader van de voorgaande
hoofdstukken. De overheid neemt de wijze, waarop de bedrijven en de consu-
menten reageren op haar gedrag, mee in haar beslissing, terwijl de bedrij-
ven en consumenten de beslissing van de anderen als gegeven beschouwen. In
hoofdstuk 4 leiden we een tweetal mogelijke evenwichten af: de open-loop
en feedback Stackelberg oplossingen. Het eerste evenwicht geeft een veel
hogere sociale welvaart, masr vereist op grond van een zelfde betoog als
eerder een bepaalde vorm van commitment. De overgang tussen beide "re-
gimes" is geillustreerd met behulp van een "multiple shooting" algorithme.
Opmerkelijk hierbij is dat er in de simulaties sprake is van een soort
"undershooting". Daarnsast stean we stil bij de interpretatie van de di-
verse "costate" variabelen, die we nodig hebben voor de formulering van
het probleem. Zo kan de costate van de overheid behorende bij het investe-
ringsgedrag van de bedrijven geYnterpreteerd worden als een prijs van
tijdsinconsistentie.
In hoofdstuk 5 breiden we het model van hoofdstuk 4 uit op een
drietal punten:
185
- de overheid heeft de mogelijkheid om ook nog loon-, omzet- en consump-
tiebelasting op te leggen;
- er is sprake van een evenwicht op de arbeidsmarkt;
- de consument heeft een meer algemene nutsfunctie met daarin ook vrije
tijd als keuzevariabele.
Het gevolg van deze aanpassingen is dat al de vier belastingsoorten ver-
storend zijn op de omvang van de produktiemiddelen, waarbij de mate van
verstoring van de loon- en consumptiebelasting afhankelijk is van de zoge-
naamde vrijetijdsparameter in de nutsfunctie. Is die parameter klein dan
zal de overheid lonen en consumptie zwaar belasten. Is die daarentegen
groot dan is het optimaal voor de overheid om consumptie en lonen minder
te belasten. Echter, deze oplossingen zijn tijdsinconsistent. In de tijds-
consistente (of feedback) oplossing zal de winstbelasting altijd geprefe-
reerd worden boven loon- en consumptiebelasting. Het zal duidelijk zijn
dat in dat geval er minder kapitaal geaccumuleerd zal worden. In de situa-
tie dat de vrijetijdsparameter in de nutsfunctie niet al te groot is, is
het blijkbear aantrekkelijk voor de overheid om alleen loon- of consump-
tiebelasting op te leggen.
In het lastste hoofdstuk wordt het vraagstuk van de optimale
schuld geanalyseerd. In feite wordt er geanalyseerd in hoeverre belasting-
heffing is uit te stellen via het aangaan van een schuld. Hierbij kan
natuurlijk ook worden gekeken naar het verhogen van de belastingheffing
hetgeen dan resulteert in een (overheids-)tegoed. Om de analyse van deze
vraag niet al te zeer te compliceren beperken we ons tot een macro-econo-
misch twee-periodenmodel met een lineaire produktiefunctie. Binnen dit
model is het mogelijk om precieze voorwaarden voor 'tax-smoothing' af te
leiden. In het geval van tax-smoothing zal er schuld aanwezig zijn indien
er in de eerste periode meer overheidsuitgaven zijn dan in de tweede
periode.
Uitgaande van deze situatie van 'tax-smoothing' als een benchmark
bekijken we een drietal uitbreidingen. Als we ervan uitgaan dat overheids-
uitgaven in de eerste periode niet consumptief maar produktief zijn, dan
leidt dit tot lagere belastingen in de eerste periode en dus meer lenen.
Reden hiervoor is dat de produktiviteitsgroei als gevolg heeft dat de
belastingen minder verstorend worden. Als we dasrentegen veronderstellen
dat de overheid toekomstige nutsstromen niet disconteert en de private
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sector wel, dan zien we het omgekeerde effect. In dat geval vrasgt de
overheid in de eerste periode een hogere belastingvoet vragen en behoeft
dus minder te lenen. Zodoende wordt de consumptie in de eerste periode
conform de wensen van de overheid minder.
Een derde reden om af te wijken van tax smoothing is een geloof-
waardigheidsconstraint. Hiermee wordt bedoeld dat er geen prikkel is voor
de overheid om eenmaal in de tweede periode aangekomen een andere belas-
tingvcet te kiezen. In feite wordt hier dus de feedback oplossing bere-
kend, waarbij het voor de hand ligt dat in deze oplossing de belastingvoet
in de tweede periode hoger is dan in de open-loop oplossing. Op die manier
zal de overheid geloofweardigheid opbouwen en is er extra potentieel om te
lenen. Dus ook in deze situatie speelt de geloofwsardigheid van de over-
heid een belangrijke rol.
10. De toelating op grote economische congressen zoals de meetings van de
Econometric Society zou niet alleen moeten afhangen van de kwaliteit
van het paper, maar ook van het presentatievermogen.
Voor relevante literatuur zie:
Hartl, R.F. en S. J~rgensen ( 1990), "Gptimal Slidemanship in Con-
ferences with Unpredictable Chairmen", O~timal Control Applications
and Methods, 11, pp. 143-155.
11. Het Christen Democratisch Appél zou zich de toenemende desinteresse
voor de politiek en de recente daling van de opkomstcijfers in het
bijzonder moeten aenrekenen, aangezien zij als geen andere partij
bestuurlijke verantwoordelijkheid heeft gedragen in de afgelopen
decennia. Het zou weleens een tragische vergissing kunnen zijn als
zij die verantwoordelijkheid van haar afschuift en niet naar oplos-
singen zou zoeken om dit fenomeen te stoppen, wsarbij overigens de
interne partijstructuur ntet buiten beschouwing gelaten moet worden.
12. De congestie in het verkeer zou aanzienlijk verminderd kunnen worden
door automobilisten te verbieden om in files en langzaam rijdend
verkeer continu van links near rechts te gaan in de (foutieve) ver-
onderstelling dat daarmee tijdwinst is te boeken.
13. De communicatie tussen promotor en promovendus heeft iets weg van een
ping-pong spel, zij het dat de winnaar bij voorbeat vaststsat.
STELLINGEN
behorende bij het proefschrift
"DYNAMIC OPTIMAL TAXATION: A GAME THEORETIC APPROACH"
1. Het door Pohjola (1983) gegeven open-loop Stackelberg evenwicht van
het Lancaster model is niet volledig. In de situatie dat de onder-
grens van het consumptiequote van het loonínkomen van de arbeiders
kleiner is dan ~ zijn er ook nog andere evenwichten, waarbij overi-
gens de totale waarde van de doelstellingsfunctie gelijk blijft (zie
hoofdstuk 2 van dit proefschrift).
Pohjola, M.J., "Nash and Stackelberg Solutions in a Differential Game
of Capitalism", Journal of Economic Dvnamícs and Control, 6, pp. 173-
186.
2. De in hoofdstuk 6 berekende "cheating"-oplossing blíjkt alleen maar
beter te zijn dan het open-loop Stackelberg evenwicht, indien de
private besparingen positief zijn. Zijn de besparingen negatief dan
is er geen reden voor de overheid om af te wijken van haar strategie.
Dit punt lijkt door Carol-Ann Rogers (1987) verontachtzaamd te wor-
den.
Rogers, C.A. (1987), "Expenditure Taxes, Income Taxes, and Time-
Inconsistency", Journal of Public Economics, 32, pp. 215-230.
3. Indien de overheid tot een juiste afweging van haar beleidsmastrege-
len wil komen, dan zal zij ook de verwachtingen die de economische
agenten hebben over het toekomstige verloop van de maatregelen in
haar beslissing moeten meenemen.
4. De intertemporale benadering van het belasting- en schuldvraagstuk in
de economie lijkt ook te zijn doorgedrongen tot de populair econo-
mische tijdschriften. Nu nog de politiek.
"The federal deficit is almost twice the size it was when Ronald
Reagan took office. Neither the Democratic leadership in Congress nor
the Bush Administration believes deficits don't matter. And with the
exception of the President on capital gains, hardly anyone argues
anymore that lowering rates will raise revenues. When you slice
through the baloney, it's clear that any tax cut will be offset by
other tax increases."
Pak, J.A. (1990), "Why Your Taxes Won't Get Cut", Fortune, February
26. pp. 68-72.
5. Het werk van Adam Smith lijkt vandaag de dag nog niets aan actuali-
teit te hebben verloren:
"The four principles of taxation:
I. The subject of every state ought to contribute towards the
support of the government, as nearly as possible, in proportion
to their respective abilities.
II. The tax which each individual is bound to pay ought to be
certain, and not arbitrary.
III. Every tax ought to be levied at the time, or in the manner, in
which it is most likely to be convenient for the contributor to
pay it.
IV. Every tax ought to be contrived as both to take out and to keep
out of the pockets of the people as little as possible over."
Smith, A. (1~~6), An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth
of Nations, Vol. 2, J.M. Dent, Londen,
193~).
pp. 30~-308 ( uitgegeven in
6. Het gebrek aan consensus tussen statistici op de vraag of de warae
zomers en winters van de afgelopen tijd zijn te wijten aan het brcei-
kaseffect (om nog maar te zwijgen over de extreme temperatuur waar-
onder deze stelling tot stand kwam), bevestigt de relativiteit van de
statístiek of de econometrie bij het opstellen van macro-economische
modellen.
~. Van groter belang lijkt de econometrie bij het verklaren van het
gedrag in specifieke micro-economische situaties, zoals bijvoorbeeld
in een consumptiepenel waarbij men over een groot aantal waarnemingen
beschikt, dan bij het opstellen van macro-economische modellen.
Alessie, R., Gradus, R. en B. Melenberg (1990), "The Problem of Not
Observing Small Expenditures in a Consumer Expenditure Survey", Jour-
nal of Applied Econometrics, 5, pp. 151-166.
8. De pogingen van sommigen om het kordate optreden van de Verenigde
Staten in de Golfcrisis af te schilderen als het veiligstellen van de
eigen olietcevoer, doen geen recht aan het verlangen van de Amerika-
nen om de internationale rechtsorde te beschermen.
Schulte Noordholt, J.W. (1988), Triomf en Tragiek van de Vríjheid: de
geschiedenis van de Verenigde Staten, Meulenhoff-Amsterdam.
9. In de V.S. is de bekende econoom Arthur Laffer regelmatig te zien in
een televisie-commercial, waar hij een bekend automerk aan de man
probeert te brengen. Alhoewel dit wellicht toch ook niet helemaal is
aan te bevelen, lijkt een meer commerci~le opstelling van de Neder-
landse economen op zijn plaats te zijn.
In dit proefschrift wordt in het bijzonder stil gestaan bij principle
II, III en IV.
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